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Edited by
John Bryden, Professor, University of Aberdeen and Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute,Lesley Riddoch, Director, Nordic Horizons,Ottar Brox, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research
We examine here the development of public education systems in Norway and Scotland and the ways in which both systems have responded to new challenges. Our focus is on the policies adopted for democratising access to schools and democracy within the schools, the means and mechanisms used in developing Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) services and school-age childcare services, and the relationship between schools and communities. We find that national autonomy has made a difference, and that local identity and democracy have also been significant in the three areas examined here. In ECEC, there is a yawning gap in levels of provision between Scotland and Norway, where, from 1975, a strong partnership between local authorities and national government developed a fully integrated system. Post- devolution, growing divergence in educational principles and models between Scotland and England suggests that Scotland should look more to its northern than its southern neighbour in developing some aspects of policy.
EARLY HISTORY
Norway and Scotland both have a long history of school education, dating from the Protestant Reformation and predating the formal establishment of their national education systems. Various versions of religious education existed in Norway from the sixteenth century. This became compulsory through an Education Act passed by Denmark in 1739, requiring Norwegian children from the age of seven in rural areas to learn religion and reading for five years in schools, using the official language of Danish.
A long campaign led to Norway obtaining its first university, in Oslo, in 1811, joined in 1859 by the Agricultural University (now known as the University of Life Sciences or NMBU) in Ås, Akershus. Independence from Denmark in 1814 gave Norway greater control over its institutions, and subsequently the language used for teaching. The nature of the relationship between the Church and schools changed as education became the subject of public debate and the aspirations of newly enfranchised property owners, including small farmers and fishermen (see Chapters 1 and 9). In 1864, inspired by the Danish educationalist Nikolaj Grundtvig, Norway established its first folkehøgskole or folk high school, mentioned later in this chapter. Schools had developed separately in rural and urban areas, with those in rural areas generally taking the form of omgangsskole, a peripatetic school where the teacher travelled around. Urban schools had their own school buildings.
Edited by
John Bryden, Professor, University of Aberdeen and Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute,Lesley Riddoch, Director, Nordic Horizons,Ottar Brox, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research
By
John Bryden, Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute in Oslo,
Erik Opsahl, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim,
Ottar Brox, University of Tromso and Senior Research Associate at NIBR (Norwegian Institute for Regional Research) in Oslo,
Lesley Riddoch, Strathclyde University
Edited by
John Bryden, Professor, University of Aberdeen and Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute,Lesley Riddoch, Director, Nordic Horizons,Ottar Brox, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research
Hear me, Despot, I will be your bane, as long as I last. For Norway's law, in the peasant's hand shall smash your slaves’ bonds.
Henrik Wergeland – The Norwegian's Catechism, 1832
INTRODUCTION
This book is a comparative study of the economic, social and political development of Norway and Scotland since about 1800. Our main question is about how the development of these two small countries at the north of Europe, whose histories were intertwined from about the year ad 795 when Norse raiders sacked Iona Monastery, and whose economic, social, cultural and political structures had certain similarities in the early and late medieval periods, nevertheless diverged sharply in economic, social, political and other ways from the eighteenth century on. In seeking to answer that question, we inevitably move closer towards an understanding of the political, social and economic conditions that make an ‘ alternative’ development possible. In this way we hope to inform debates about the future of Scotland after the referendum in Autumn 2014, as well as contribute to debates about present and future policy choices in Norway.
In this referendum, the Scottish electorate faced a choice of whether or not to vote for independence from the rest of the UK. In the political developments of the recent past that have led to this situation, there has been growing Scottish interest in Norway and the wider Nordic region, exemplified by Lesley Riddoch's lively ‘Nordic Horizons’ group. This interest has focused on issues such as education, land ownership, urban transport, green cities, elderly care, NATO, the management of North Sea oil and gas, local government, the welfare state and Nordic cooperation. The general tenor of the Nordic Horizon debates, as well as the White Paper on Scottish Independence produced by the Scottish Government in the Autumn of 2013, is that Norwegian – and wider Nordic – policies might offer some interesting ideas for Scotland should it become a nation-state again. Beyond that, some form of future alliance with the structures of Nordic and wider Scandinavian cooperation, in particular the Nordic Council of Ministers, is also under discussion. These issues, and in particular the perceptions around them, are further discussed by Hilson and Newby in Chapter 10.
Peasants in general, and rural rebels in particular, were mercilessly ridiculed in the satirical cartoons that proliferated in European cities from the mid-nineteenth century. There was more to these images than the age-old hostility of the townspeople for the peasant, and this article comparatively explores how cartoons of southern Italian brigands and rural Irish agitators helped shape a liberal version of what was modern by identifying what was not: the revolting peasant who engaged in “unmanly” violence, lacked self-reliance, and was in thrall to Catholic clergymen. During periods of unrest, distinctions between brigands, rebels, and the rural populations as a whole were not always clear in cartoons. Comparison suggests that derogatory images of peasants from southern Italy and Ireland held local peculiarities, but they also drew from transnational stereotypes of rural poverty that circulated widely due to the rapidly expanding European publishing industry. While scholarly debates inspired by postcolonial perspectives have previously emphasized processes of othering between the West and East, between the metropole and colony, it is argued here that there is also an internal European context to these relationships based on ingrained class and gendered prejudices, and perceptions of what constituted the centre and the periphery.
This paper challenges the broad consensus in current historiography that holds the Indian stereotype of criminal tribe to be a myth of colonial making. Drawing on a selection of precolonial descriptions of robber castes—ancient legal texts and folktales; Jain, Buddhist and Brahmanic narratives; Mughal sources; and Early Modern European travel accounts—I show that the idea of castes of congenital robbers was not a British import, but instead a label of much older vintage on the subcontinent. Enjoying pride of place in the postcolonial critics' pageant of “colonial stereotypes,” the case of criminal tribes is representative and it bears on broader questions about colonial knowledge and its relation to power. The study contributes to the literature that challenges the still widespread tendency to view colonial social categories, and indeed the bulk of colonial knowledge, as the imaginative residue of imperial politics. I argue that while colonial uses of the idea of a criminal tribe comprises a lurid history of violence against communities branded as born criminals in British law, the stereotype itself has indigenous roots. The case is representative and it bears on larger problems of method and analysis in “post-Orientalist” historiography.
In this paper I argue that the ways in which a genealogical idiom brings together multiple scales of space and time is as important to its social, political, or religious efficacy as the particular people, places, and events it incorporates. To illustrate this point, I turn to the unusual patrilineal genealogy of Habib Abdurrahim, a nineteenth-century descendant of the Prophet Muhammad buried in the Indonesian region of Seunagan. Since the late 1950s, Habib Abdurrahim's descendants have cultivated a version of his patriline emphasizing five prominent figures. This constellation of figures, together with the relationships Muslims in Seunagan foster with each of the five, produce configurations of spatial-temporal scale through which local Muslims inscribe themselves as participants in several Islamic pasts: the establishment of Seunagan's customary practice, the Islamization of the Indonesian nation, and Islam's cosmic history. Narrative, social, and ritual practices surrounding Habib Abdurahim's patriline link Muslims in Seunagan to the multiple scales that inhere in the genealogy, encouraging them to see themselves as actors within entwined and unfolding histories of Islamization.
The politics of meritocracy at the Indian Institutes of Technology illuminates the social life of caste in contemporary India. I argue that the IIT graduate's status depends on the transformation of privilege into merit, or the conversion of caste capital into modern capital. Analysis of this process calls for a relational approach to merit. My ethnographic research on the southeastern state of Tamilnadu, and on IIT Madras located in the state capital of Chennai, illuminates claims to merit, not simply as the transformation of capital but also as responses to subaltern assertion. Analyzing meritocracy in relation to subaltern politics allows us to see the contextual specificity of such claims: at one moment, they are articulated through the disavowal of caste, at another, through caste affiliation. This marking and unmarking of caste suggests a rethinking of meritocracy, typically assumed to be a modernist ideal that disclaims social embeddedness and disdains the particularisms of caste and race. I show instead that claims to collective belonging and to merit are eminently commensurable, and become more so when subaltern assertion forces privilege into the foreground. Rather than the progressive erasure of ascribed identities in favor of putatively universal ones, we are witnessing the re-articulation of caste as an explicit basis for merit and the generation of newly consolidated forms of upper-casteness.
Sai Baba of Shirdi, who died in 1918, was raised as a Muslim but is today revered as a Hindu saint. One of his most important perceived qualities was his ability to provide miraculous cures for his devotees, and this has continued after his death. I argue here that the emphasis in the Hindu tradition on saintly figures healing the sick is a relatively modern phenomenon. Earlier, though such figures were renowned for their miracles, healing played a very minor part in this. Their miracles were generally designed to worst religious rivals and to enable them to speak truth to power. In the modern era, however, such saintly figures can gain a reputation through healing in a way that is presented as beyond the comprehension of modern medical science. Such people are seen to provide living evidence of the superiority of Indian civilization and its religious beliefs. This move became entangled with nationalist sentiments, so that getting the better of the “English” doctor became a means to reveal the limited scope of Western science and culture. Although this appears to suggest that many Indians have rejected the biopolitics associated with Western modernity (as defined by Foucault), I argue that certain elements of such biopolitics are central to this process, and illustrate this through a study of Sai Baba, a village holy man taken up by the Indian middle classes and made into a pan-Indian figure, with a now global presence.
Through an examination of the September 1948 event known as the “Police Action,” this article argues that “internal violence” was an important engine of state formation in India in the period following independence in 1947. The mid-century ruptures in the subcontinent were neither incidental to nor undermining of the nascent Indian nation-state project—they were constitutive events through which a new state and regime of sovereignty emerged. A dispersal and mobilization of violence in and around the princely state of Hyderabad culminated in an event of violence directed primarily at Hyderabad's Muslims during and just after the Police Action. This violent mediation of the incorporation of India's Muslims into the postcolonial order left significant legacies in subsequent decades. These events in the heart of peninsular India, and the processes behind them, have remained largely invisible or obscured in the historical record. Here I substantially revise the historiography of what happened in Hyderabad, and draw on my findings to offer an alternative perspective on decolonization in India.
This article analyzes efforts by Soviet and present-day scientists in Russia to “rationalize” and ultimately automate the diagnostic techniques of Tibetan medicine. It tracks the institutional and conceptual histories of designing a pulse diagnostic system, a project that began in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. It has recently been re-enlivened in Buryatia, an ethnic minority region in Southeastern Siberia, in efforts to mobilize indigenous medical practices in response to local and national public health concerns. I focus on the translational ideologies that informed efforts to develop the pulsometer as a medical imaging technology, and analyze obstacles to these efforts found at the core of the device. Scientists working on the pulsometer have systematically tried to discern whether their measurements indicate sustained bodily pathologies, or instead reflect only technological white noise, and they still recruit and rely on the embodied expertise of practitioners of Tibetan medicine to validate their findings. In so doing they reaffirm claims that Tibetan medicine in Buryatia is inextricable from the forms of knowledge and practice that their projects work to standardize. I show how the apparent failures at perfect mechanization have made the pulsometer a surprisingly productive site for creating new kinds of expert communities and forms of knowledge making.
This paper examines the nature of late Ottoman provincial intercommunal interactions and affiliations as they appear in the memoir of Hovhannes Cherishian (1886–1967), a shoemaker from late Ottoman Marash (present-day Kahramanmaraş, in southeastern Turkey). The paper is situated within the larger discourse of “untold histories” that historians have begun to address in revising the deeply ingrained post-Ottoman nationalist historiographies that dominate both academic and popular discourses. Conventional historiographies have represented former late Ottoman subject communities (e.g., Greek, Jewish, Armenian) as insulated and homogenous proto-nation-states. In the revisionist historiography, the late Ottoman Armenian voice, especially the provincial one, has been noticeably absent. Here I utilize Cherishian's memoir to examine the life and thoughts of one late Ottoman Armenian provincial subject. I focus especially on his treatment of intercommunal interactions in Anatolia and present-day Syria between 1897 and 1922. His accounts of these often extended intercommunal interactions, affiliations, and networks are characterized by intercommunal and interpersonal openness, sympathy, intimacy, and pleasure, even as he presents them side-by-side with descriptions of deportation and death at the hands of the late Ottoman state. I develop the idea of what I call “provincial cosmopolitanism” to conceptualize and represent the disposition, affinity, and process of identity formation that enabled Cherishian to create and operate these interpersonal relationships and networks that propelled his life, a historical condition to which we are not currently privy in most historiographical accounts of the late Ottoman period.
This article analyses the intersection between cosmopolitanism and racist ideologies in the faith healing practices of the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion. Originally from Illinois, USA, this organization was the period's most influential divine healing group. Black and white members, under the leadership of the charismatic John Alexander Dowie, eschewed medical assistance and proclaimed God's power to heal physical affliction. In affirming the deity's capacity to remake human bodies, church members also insisted that God could refashion biological race into a capacious spiritual ethnicity: a global human race they referred to as the “Adamic” race. Zionist universalist teachings were adopted by dispossessed and newly urbanized Boer ex-farmers in Johannesburg, Transvaal, before spreading to the soldiers of the British regiments recently arrived to fight the Boer states in the war of 1899–1902. Zionism equipped these estranged white “races” with a vocabulary to articulate political reconciliation and a precarious unity. But divine healing was most enthusiastically received among the Transvaal's rural Africans. Amidst the period's hardening segregation, Africans seized upon divine healing's innovative racial teachings, but both Boers and Africans found disappointment amid Zion's cosmopolitan promises. Boers were marginalized within the new racial regimes of the Edwardian empire in South Africa, and white South Africans had always been ambivalent about divine healing's incorporations of black Africans into a unitary race. This early history of Zionism in the Transvaal reveals the constriction of cosmopolitan aspirations amidst fast-narrowing horizons of race, nation, and empire in early twentieth-century South Africa.