By way of conclusion, let us briefly meditate on a central paradox in the development of modern science. We first state it bluntly and then unpack it a bit, but we intentionally leave loose ends to discourage any temptation to think there are easy answers.

Here is the paradox. When science was a more personal matter, conducted by amateurs on the margins of society, scientists were imbued with a more public sense of responsibility. But just when science became more public – when it was enrolled into institutions of commerce and politics, money and power – scientists shrunk their sense of responsibility. In short, just when science became a powerful social force scientists became parochial laborers, responsible only to a narrow community of disciplinary peers. This mismatch, we believe, must be rectified. Scientists must reclaim a broader moral responsibility and rediscover a sense of science as a higher calling, a vocation, and not just another job.

In the previous chapter, we noted an emerging consensus in the scientific community that all human beings possess intrinsic moral worth, which means they cannot be used as mere resources in order to advance scientific knowledge. There is far less consensus about the moral status of nonhuman animals, which means that there is much greater disagreement about the principles that ought to guide research involving animals. The notion of free and informed consent that played such a central role in the previous chapter is of little use in this context as perhaps no other animal is capable of comprehending a proposed research project and communicating consent. Yet this fact alone does not mean that the perspective of animals merits no consideration in the conduct of scientific research. After all, human babies and those who are severely mentally handicapped are similarly incapable of understanding and communicating. Is there anything different about nonhuman animals that might justify treating them differently in the name of scientific progress?

Setting the stage: war over animal research

Animal research can take a variety of forms, from ethological studies of animal behavior and the paradox of scientific wildlife management to veterinary medical research and the genetic engineering of animals for specific forms of experimentation. Animals in research are not only used to test drugs but have been bred and engineered to do so. Other animals are used to test, not therapies, but cosmetics. Some animals live for the most part in the wild only to be, on occasion, tranquilized, trapped, tagged, and released. Still other animals are subjects of research in their own right, with electrodes implanted in their brains to learn more about the brains of animals and by extension humans.

Chapter 8 made the case that a book on ethics and science should include considerations of science–society relationships. Thinking must extend beyond doing things right to doing the right things. Thus the remaining chapters explore the social contexts of scientific research. Chapters 9 and 10 form a natural pair: the former covers the making of policies to guide the conduct of science, the latter deals with the use of science to guide policymaking. Notice how in the political context concern for “good science” and “certified knowledge” tends now to be discussed in terms of “sound science” (science that is good for society) and “responsible knowledge.” The final two chapters broaden the perspective beyond politics to consider the place of science in ideational culture (the world of ideas and beliefs) and material culture (technologies and their human significance).

Setting the stage: government funding of embryonic stem cell research

Early in his administration, US President George W. Bush gave a nationally televised address about government funding of research on human embryonic stem cells (ESCs). He announced a policy that would restrict federal funding of research involving ESCs. This policy for science can be used as a case study in the political governance of science, which includes state regulation and promotion of scientific research.

This appendix contains information for accessing a wide range of influential science ethics codes and declarations. In addition to the websites listed, many of these documents and other related codes, statements, and declarations can be found in appendix V in volume IV (pp. 2158–2296) of Mitcham (2005).

1 Hippocratic Oath (fifth century BCE)

Ancient oath requiring physicians to swear upon a number of healing gods and to uphold certain professional ethical standards. The National Library of Medicine, nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html.

2 The Nuremberg Code (1947)

The first and perhaps most influential code outlining ethical guidelines for the treatment of human subjects of medical research. National Institutes of Health, http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html.

3 World Medical Association: Declaration of Geneva or International Code of Medical Ethics (1948)

A declaration of the physician’s dedication to the humanitarian goals of medicine. Updated in 1968, 1984, 1994, 2005, and 2006. World Medical Association, www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c8/index.html.

4 The Einstein–Russell Manifesto (1955)

A statement calling on scientists to convene a conference to consider the perils that have arisen as a result of nuclear arms proliferation. Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm.

Following the introduction to ethical theory (Chapter 2) and an analysis of how science as a social institution involves commitments to certain behavioral norms (Chapter 3), Chapters 4 through 6 surveyed attempts to cultivate these norms. Although some behavioral norms, such as those concerning the treatment of human subjects, reflect concerns from a larger, nonscientific society, even these were cast – as is typical – in distinctly science–science-relationship terms. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 thus surveyed leading issues related to ethics in the practice of science itself, more than in the maintenance of science–society relationships. Chapter 7 provided another take on science-science discourse, the efforts of scientists themselves to explain ethics. Are such considerations enough? Might something more be required? Consider the following scenario.

Setting the stage: developing a course

Two professors at a prominent research university – one a faculty member in science, the other in philosophy – happened to have read some equivalent of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. A number of such publications exist. One widely used example is the third edition of On Being a Scientist: A Guide to Responsible Conduct in Research. Both faculty are intrigued and decide to collaborate to offer a course on science and ethics. The scientist thinks that ethics training would enhance the science curriculum, on top of which some GSP (good scientific practice) or RCR (responsible conduct of research) education is increasingly being required by funding agencies. The philosopher would like to step down from the ivory tower of abstract ideas and arguments and bring philosophy to bear in human affairs. What better way, in a society imbued with science, than to offer a course on ethics and science?

Following the Chapter 1 high-altitude overview of the whole terrain to be covered, Chapter 2 begins with an inventory of key concepts and theories. This is not a book focused primarily on theory. But concepts indicate a geological-like foundation for thinking important distinctions in the landscape, while theories function like maps, which can call attention to different features in a geography – features which might otherwise be overlooked or obscured. Political maps reveal jurisdictional boundaries, road maps help navigate driving distances, and “worldmapper cartograms” can resize images to give abstract phenomena graphic representation. Consider, for instance, the maps in Figures 1 and 2.

The land area map provides one perspective on the world, the population map another. Each may be described as a theory of, or way of looking at, the world. Indeed, the word “ theory ” comes from the Greek theorein, to look at or observe. Theories are ways of observing our experience. Like spectacles or glasses, ethical concepts and theories assist us in seeing the world in which we live – although they can on occasion also distort it.

The previous chapter explored the ethical dimensions of policies that guide the conduct of science and raised questions about scientists’ responsibilities for the broader outcomes of their work. This chapter continues to focus on science in its social context, with emphasis shifted to the role of science and scientists in informing public policy. Considering how scientists ought to contribute to political decision-making and policy formation raises ethical issues about relationships scientists have with the military, courts of law, and the media. This in turn prompts further questions about science and culture, which will be explored in the next chapter.

Setting the stage: climate change and an inconvenient heretic

No policy issue has been more dependent on input from science and more contested than that of global climate change. Global climate change refers to the ways average planetary weather patterns alter over time. For example, evidence of ancient climates shows that in the last 800,000 years the planet has seen a series of oscillations between ice ages and warmer interglacial periods. Because of the long timescales involved, climate change is not subject to direct individual experience; humans experience weather, not climate. Science is needed to identify climate change. The scientific study of climate or climatology depends in turn on interdisciplinary analysis of the atmosphere, including circulation patterns and interactions with ocean and land masses; the global monitoring of weather patterns along with human historical records; measurements of ancient atmospheric compositions from small samples of air trapped for thousands of years in glacial ice cores and dendrochronological reconstructions of changes in plant growth; and more. This scientific dependence has encouraged the assumption that defining and responding to climate change are scientific and technological in nature.