Book contents
- Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Cambridge Critical Guides
- Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Wittgenstein’s Impatient Reply to Russell
- Chapter 2 Modality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
- Chapter 3 Clarification and Analysis in the Tractatus
- Chapter 4 The Fish Tale: The Unity of Language and the World in Light of TLP 4.014
- Chapter 5 That Which ‘Is True’ Must Already Contain the Verb: Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Frege’s Separation of Judgment from Content
- Chapter 6 Solipsism and the Self
- Chapter 7 The Tractatus and the First Person
- Chapter 8 Arithmetic in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Chapter 9 ‘Normal Connections’ and the Law of Causality
- Chapter 10 The Ethical Dimension of the Tractatus
- Chapter 11 “Obviously Wrong”: The Tractatus on Will and World
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Critical Guides
Chapter 5 - That Which ‘Is True’ Must Already Contain the Verb: Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Frege’s Separation of Judgment from Content
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 March 2024
Edited by
Book contents
- Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Cambridge Critical Guides
- Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Wittgenstein’s Impatient Reply to Russell
- Chapter 2 Modality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
- Chapter 3 Clarification and Analysis in the Tractatus
- Chapter 4 The Fish Tale: The Unity of Language and the World in Light of TLP 4.014
- Chapter 5 That Which ‘Is True’ Must Already Contain the Verb: Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Frege’s Separation of Judgment from Content
- Chapter 6 Solipsism and the Self
- Chapter 7 The Tractatus and the First Person
- Chapter 8 Arithmetic in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Chapter 9 ‘Normal Connections’ and the Law of Causality
- Chapter 10 The Ethical Dimension of the Tractatus
- Chapter 11 “Obviously Wrong”: The Tractatus on Will and World
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Critical Guides
Summary
Truth and content are theoretically prior in Frege to the act of judgment. Wittgenstein takes the opposite view, maintaining that truth is fundamentally correctness in judgment and that a content is fundamentally something to be judged. At Tractatus 4.063, Wittgenstein gives an argument against the Fregean position. Judgment can aim internally at truth, Wittgenstein holds, only if it is internal to truth that it is correctness in judgment.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusA Critical Guide, pp. 90 - 109Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024