Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 More than a ‘Blank Slate’: Afghan Meta-norms in World History
- 3 Afghan Independence and European Union Humanitarianism in the Global International System
- 4 Terrorism, Solidarity and European Marginalization
- 5 European Union State-building Efforts and the Corruption Eruption
- 6 European Union Diplomacy, Democracy and Security Assistance
- 7 The Fall of Kabul and New Challenges for the European Union
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
6 - European Union Diplomacy, Democracy and Security Assistance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 January 2025
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 More than a ‘Blank Slate’: Afghan Meta-norms in World History
- 3 Afghan Independence and European Union Humanitarianism in the Global International System
- 4 Terrorism, Solidarity and European Marginalization
- 5 European Union State-building Efforts and the Corruption Eruption
- 6 European Union Diplomacy, Democracy and Security Assistance
- 7 The Fall of Kabul and New Challenges for the European Union
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
When challenged with widespread corruption, European Union (EU) institutions prioritized the norm of solidarity with the United States (US) and a norm of partnership with the Government of Afghanistan (GOA). This was not without consequence for other aspects of EU engagement. With absorption capacity greatly exceeded, and corruption fuelling an insurgency, insecurity throughout Afghanistan grew. This had a counterintuitive effect on EU- level relations with Afghanistan. As corruption and insecurity took hold, EU Member States would start to pass on more responsibilities to EU institutions, to counter growing fatigue with the ongoing conflict. As a result, having marginalized norms of EU integration at the start of the conflict, EU institutions would be drawn further into a relationship with Afghanistan and take on new responsibilities. Importantly, the EU increasingly had to operate in a strategically selective context, whereby it not only had to navigate Afghanistan, but demands and previous responsibilities of Member States, along with the larger transatlantic relationship with the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All while remaining a secondary partner in all these relations. The complexity of being in this position is reflective of how norms and the interaction capacity of global international society have evolved in the early 21st century.
The complexity of having to negotiate the norms of global international society was compounded by the problems accumulated from previous contextual dissonance. As a marginalized partner in the ongoing conflict, EU institutions were sceptical about casting counterterrorism operations within military norms. EU actors had also been sceptical about empowering the Northern Alliance and embedding neopatrimonialist norms within the institutions of state and the decision to invade Iraq. Yet, the EU was being asked to do more and work around the accumulation of problems that had been generated throughout the conflict. This required going beyond the blank slate development policies as EU institutions became more active in Afghanistan in the second decade of the conflict. This started with a contribution to Afghan security and the establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) in 2007. Indeed, the EU became more engaged in offering bilateral assistance, political dialogue and peacebuilding efforts from 2007 to 2017.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Why the European Union Failed in AfghanistanTransatlantic Relations and the Return of the Taliban, pp. 157 - 190Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2024