As Afghanistan gained its independence in the early 20th century it joined a growing number of decolonized states in the international system. Indeed, while it is commonplace to refer to modern states as the dominant unit of international relations, it is important to reflect that in 1914 there were only 44 states. Prior to the First World War colonies, dominions and protectorates characterized much of the global international system. By 1930 this had increased to 64 states, and as waves of formal independence took hold this grew to 107 in 1960, 148 in 1978, and over 190 by the turn of the new millennium (Buzan and Little 2000, 265). In this respect, Afghanistan gained the status of an independent state comparatively early in the global process of decolonization. Conversely, in the context of world history, Afghanistan's independence as a modern state is a novel phenomenon. Nevertheless, as Buzan and Little identify:

The perception of outward uniformity has allowed traditional International Relations theory to attempt to ‘close the historical box’ on these decolonized states. However, in Afghanistan, gaining the formal status of a modern state did not suddenly eradicate the tensions between desert norms and sedentary norms that had developed over the previous millennia. Statehood, and the centralization of power that this implies, did not eradicate the heterarchical norms of tribal republics. On the contrary, in fighting for Afghan independence, many ‘village states’ began to question the imposition of power and hierarchy by the ruling elite that had come to rely on their mobilizations of resistance. The rise of Afghan national consciousness in the 17th century had fused with practices of resistance in the 18th and 19th centuries, and unsettled questions of political legitimacy.