This book grew out of my attraction to and discomfort with the idea of human rights. When I led an Amnesty International group as a law undergraduate twenty years ago, the concept of human rights already seemed to me both desirable (or even necessary) and flawed. Since then I have never been sure which of these two aspects take precedence. If I stress the defects of the concept I immediately want to recall that the concept is important and cannot be dismissed altogether. Conversely, I do not wish to signify my attachment to the concept without highlighting that it is far, very far, from being a panacea. This book represents my attempt to sort out my persistent ambivalence towards human rights. It does so by seeking to answer the following two questions: Can we believe in human rights? Should we believe in human rights? I shall give my personal answer to these questions. I shall also provide an intellectual map of the way I understand current scholarship approaches the concept of human rights.

Human rights as an article of faith

According to a standard definition, human rights are those rights one has by virtue of being human. This definition suggests that human rights belong to every human being in every human society: all human beings have them, equally and in equal measure. Implied in one's humanity, human rights are generally presented as being inalienable and imprescriptible – they cannot be transferred, forfeited, or waived.