Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Part 1 Background and Theory
- Part 2 Cases and Tests
- 7 Background to Western Intervention in the Balkans
- 8 The Case of the Roma in Kosovo
- 9 Background to Kosovo
- 10 Waiting for the West
- 11 Kosovo Intervention Games, I
- 12 Kosovo Intervention Games, II
- 13 Kosovo Conclusions
- 14 South Serbia
- 15 Macedonia
- 16 Bosnia
- 17 Montenegro
- 18 Conclusion
- Appendix A A Note on Names
- Appendix B Alternative Arguments
- References
- Index
- References
10 - Waiting for the West
from Part 2 - Cases and Tests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Part 1 Background and Theory
- Part 2 Cases and Tests
- 7 Background to Western Intervention in the Balkans
- 8 The Case of the Roma in Kosovo
- 9 Background to Kosovo
- 10 Waiting for the West
- 11 Kosovo Intervention Games, I
- 12 Kosovo Intervention Games, II
- 13 Kosovo Conclusions
- 14 South Serbia
- 15 Macedonia
- 16 Bosnia
- 17 Montenegro
- 18 Conclusion
- Appendix A A Note on Names
- Appendix B Alternative Arguments
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
Period one: the strategy of building a parallel society
In December of 1989, a small group of Albanian intellectuals formed the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in Pristina, which became the leading political force for Kosovo's Albanian population. The party was led by Ibrahim Rugova, a literature professor who had studied in France. To establish legitimacy for these alternative governance structures, underground elections for a Presidency (Rugova garnered 99.55 percent of the votes) and a Kosovo Parliament (the LDK won 96 of 143 seats) were held. The Kosovo Parliament declared independence in October 1991. Outside of Albania, no other country recognized Kosovo as a state. The Milosevic regime had taken control of Kosovo's political institutions and dismantled local Albanian governance. The question for the LDK and Kosovo's Albanian leadership was what to do next.
They had several choices. An incomplete list might contain the following:
They could acquiesce to Serbian rule for the time being and wait for better opportunities in the future.
They could try to reenter Serbian politics and side with anti-Milosevic parties in an effort to reform the system from within.
They could continue to boycott elections but participate in day-to-day activities relating to education, health care, and the economy.
They could not only boycott elections, but also create an entirely parallel social and political system in hopes of having it recognized as a legitimate government from the outside.
They could escalate nonviolent resistance through more direct belligerent acts of protest and civil disobedience.
They could start a series of violent provocations.
They could attempt violent rebellion.
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- Western Intervention in the BalkansThe Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict, pp. 147 - 163Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011