Chapter 8 concludes by providing a summary of the overall argument and discussing implications for democracy and development. It emphasizes that relational clientelism is an inferior substitute for an adequate welfare state, but it provides an informal risk-coping mechanism in countries with patchy coverage. The chapter explores why citizens’ actions to fortify ongoing exchange relationships may have important consequences for higher levels of political systems, given that the local politicians examined in this book often serve as brokers for state, provincial, and national politicians. It also discusses when citizens might shift away from sustaining relational clientelism, drawing on findings from a field experiment in which our team randomly distributed water cisterns to reduce vulnerability in Northeast Brazil.Moreover, it suggests directions for future research.First, it emphasizes the need to take more seriously the independent role of voters in the survival of clientelism. Second, it underscores the importance of studying how vulnerability, and not just poverty, affects contingent exchanges. And finally, it calls for refocused attention on ongoing exchange relationships.