Book contents
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Preface
- Acronyms
- Introduction
- Part I A Political Theory of Criminal Violence
- Part II The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
- 2 Why Cartels Went to War
- 3 Fighting Turf Wars
- Part III The State’s War Against the Cartels
- Part IV The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
- Appendix A Criminal Violence in Mexico Database (CVM)
- Appendix B Criminal Attacks Against Political Actors in Mexico (CAPAM) Database
- Appendix C Chapter 2. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix D Chapter 4. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix E Chapter 4. Natural Experiment (Additional Information)
- Appendix F Chapter 6. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix G Chapter 6. Natural Experiments (Additional Information)
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (continued from page iii)
2 - Why Cartels Went to War
Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Inter-Cartel Wars
from Part II - The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2020
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Preface
- Acronyms
- Introduction
- Part I A Political Theory of Criminal Violence
- Part II The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
- 2 Why Cartels Went to War
- 3 Fighting Turf Wars
- Part III The State’s War Against the Cartels
- Part IV The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
- Appendix A Criminal Violence in Mexico Database (CVM)
- Appendix B Criminal Attacks Against Political Actors in Mexico (CAPAM) Database
- Appendix C Chapter 2. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix D Chapter 4. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix E Chapter 4. Natural Experiment (Additional Information)
- Appendix F Chapter 6. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix G Chapter 6. Natural Experiments (Additional Information)
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (continued from page iii)
Summary
This chapter explains why Mexican drug cartels went to war as the country transitioned from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy. Postauthoritarian elites did not reform the military, the police, and the judicial system and did not dismantle the gray zone of criminality. Electoral mechanisms thus became catalysts of criminal violence. Subnational alternation and the rotation of parties in the gubernatorial seat undermined informal networks of protection that had allowed Mexican cartels to thrive, so they created their own private militias to defend themselves from rival groups and incoming opposition authorities, and to conquer rival territory. We use in-depth interviews with the first opposition governments and new data on historical patterns of government repression to show that state-level police and judicial authorities were key todeveloping informal networks of protection, allowing cartels to become major players in the international drug trafficking industry in the late 1980s. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and synthetic control models, we show that party alternation in the 1990s and early 2000s caused inter-cartel violence.
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- Votes, Drugs, and ViolenceThe Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico, pp. 69 - 112Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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