Book contents
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Preface
- Acronyms
- Introduction
- Part I A Political Theory of Criminal Violence
- Part II The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
- Part III The State’s War Against the Cartels
- Part IV The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
- 6 Why Cartels Murder Mayors and Local Party Candidates
- 7 Seizing Local Power
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Criminal Violence in Mexico Database (CVM)
- Appendix B Criminal Attacks Against Political Actors in Mexico (CAPAM) Database
- Appendix C Chapter 2. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix D Chapter 4. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix E Chapter 4. Natural Experiment (Additional Information)
- Appendix F Chapter 6. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix G Chapter 6. Natural Experiments (Additional Information)
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (continued from page iii)
7 - Seizing Local Power
Developing Subnational Criminal Governance Regimes
from Part IV - The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2020
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Preface
- Acronyms
- Introduction
- Part I A Political Theory of Criminal Violence
- Part II The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
- Part III The State’s War Against the Cartels
- Part IV The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
- 6 Why Cartels Murder Mayors and Local Party Candidates
- 7 Seizing Local Power
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Criminal Violence in Mexico Database (CVM)
- Appendix B Criminal Attacks Against Political Actors in Mexico (CAPAM) Database
- Appendix C Chapter 2. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix D Chapter 4. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix E Chapter 4. Natural Experiment (Additional Information)
- Appendix F Chapter 6. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix G Chapter 6. Natural Experiments (Additional Information)
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (continued from page iii)
Summary
This chapter presents new evidence showing how drug cartels and their associates attacked municipal party candidates and mayors to take control over local elections, penetrated municipal governments, and subdued local economies, populations, and territories. Extensive interviews with former local officials, local economic actors, and local human rights activists show the development of subnational criminal governance regimes in Michoacán and Guerrero – two states ruled by leftist governors, where subnational authorities were purposefully unprotected by the conservative federal government. Cartels inflitrated local campaigns and municipal governments, established themselves as monopolists of violence and criminal taxation, and regulated economic activities in key economic areas. But they failed to do this in Baja California, where the federal government protected the president’s subnational co-partisan rulers. We discuss why, in a context of competition for turf, and state-cartel and inter-cartel conflict, drug lords and their associates developed highly coercive and predatory governance regimes, subverting local democracy, and opening a new era of intense civilian victimization.
Keywords
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- Information
- Votes, Drugs, and ViolenceThe Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico, pp. 252 - 278Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020