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Chapter 2 - Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2020

By
Cameron Boult ,
Christoph Kelp ,
Johanna Schnurr  and
Mona Simion
Edited by
Christoph Kelp  and
John Greco
Christoph Kelp
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
John Greco
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

The investigation of epistemic virtues, such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual humility is a growing trend in epistemology. An underexplored question in this context is: what is the relationship between these virtues and other types of virtue, such as moral or prudential virtue? This paper argues that, although there is an intuitive sense in which virtues such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness have something to do with the epistemic domain, on closer inspection it is not clear to what extent they should be understood as genuine epistemic virtues. We draw a distinction between epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content and provide reason to believe that the aforementioned virtues are moral virtues with epistemic content rather than bona fide epistemic virtues. The upshot is that there are far fewer epistemic virtues out there than commonly assumed.

Keywords

virtue epistemologyvirtue responsibilismnormativityopen-mindednesscuriosityepistemic temperanceepistemic self-indulgence
Type
Chapter
Information
Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
New Methods and Approaches
 , pp. 42 - 57
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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