In the last chapter I examined one source of doubt about the universality of value. To put it crudely, among what matters to us most, many believe, are attachments which are unique because of the uniqueness of their objects. The value of those attachments is also unique. They have the value they have because they have the objects they have. Since their objects are unique so is their value. But the universality of value is incompatible with the thought that value is unique. Or so the challenge goes.

I acknowledged the importance of uniqueness in our lives, especially in our relations to people dear to us, and to some other objects. But I dismissed the thought that it is incompatible with any sensible view about the universality of values. I relied on the distinction between the value of things, and their value to us, which I also called their ‘personal meaning’. Personal meanings can depend on the uniqueness to us of the object of our attachments. But that is consistent with the fact that the value of these attachments, as distinct from their value to us, is universal. Their value to us lies in properties of the attachments, including properties of their objects and their relations to us, which make them unique in our life, sometimes unique de facto, and sometimes necessarily unique. This is not to say that what is important or meaningful for us is to have a unique relationship or object.