Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 The Value of Knowledge Is External to It
- 2 The Value of True Belief
- 3 The Value of Justification
- 4 Reliabilism, Normativity, and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology
- 5 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge
- 6 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable
- 7 Epistemic Attitudinalism: Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches
- 8 Knowledge and Understanding
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- Index
9 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 August 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 The Value of Knowledge Is External to It
- 2 The Value of True Belief
- 3 The Value of Justification
- 4 Reliabilism, Normativity, and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology
- 5 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge
- 6 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable
- 7 Epistemic Attitudinalism: Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches
- 8 Knowledge and Understanding
- 9 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
I want first to point out an important misconstrual of what I have been arguing. For a quick but misleading summary of my thesis might be that knowledge is not valuable, whereas understanding is.
Such a summary is grossly misleading, for the position I have defended maintains a high value for knowledge. First, knowledge involves true belief, and true belief is valuable in virtue of the action-guiding character of belief and in virtue of the intrinsic value of finding the truth. Second, knowledge is valuable because of its relationship to subjective justification. I have not claimed, and do not claim here, that subjective justification is necessary for knowledge, but it is nonetheless true that one of the paths to knowledge is through the land of subjective justification. So, much knowledge is subjectively justified, even if not all of it is. Third, we have found also that displays of cognitive excellence or intellectual virtue are valuable as well. Once again, I have defended no position on the relationship between such displays and knowledge, but the same point is true here that is true of subjective justification. That is, even if displays of cognitive excellence are not necessary for knowledge, it is nonetheless true that much of our knowledge is explained in terms of such displays.
There are also other items that are related to knowledge that are valuable as well and lead to the conclusion that knowledge is of immense value.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding , pp. 204 - 206Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003