The political history of welfare state institutions is one thing, their ethical justification another. The collective intentions of the many and varied actors who had a hand in shaping such institutions were seldom simple and rarely altogether noble. For present purposes, let us leave actual intentions to one side, however. Let us ask, instead, whether there are any good moral reasons (whether or not they were actually the founders' reasons) for the institutions that they have bequeathed to us. Putting the point another way, were we constructing our social institutions de novo, would we have good moral grounds for including a welfare state with these particular characteristics among them? It is in this spirit that I here inquire into the practice of paying certain social benefits in an earnings-related form.

Conventional moral wisdom has long held that the welfare state is justified principally as a device to benefit the poor. There may, of course, be perfectly respectable reasons for its benefiting not only the poor. Pragmatists, reflecting upon the realities of political power and economic behavior, may counsel that the price to be paid for programs that benefit the poor is to allow the nonpoor to cream off some of those benefits, too. Idealists, reflecting upon the value of community solidarity, may offer some more high-minded reasons for wishing the welfare state to benefit rich and poor alike.