The evolution of grain export policy and the negotiation of the U.S.–Soviet grain agreement illustrate the executive branch engaged in a form of crisis management. Examining the sequence of events and the way in which the president and his senior officials developed policy reveal much about the internal processes of an administration coping with a difficult issue. In retrospect, the events of 1975 hold lessons for public policy makers and provide insights into the formulation of policy in the federal government. Some of these include marshaling support and packaging policy, defining and articulating policy, the origins of public policies, the attraction of caution, and the limits of leverage.

MARSHALING SUPPORT

Every president is in the business of marshaling support, of selling his policies to the country, to the Congress, to foreign governments, and to affected interest groups. Thus, the president and his advisers, if they are to be successful, must not only spend time developing policies that, if carried out, will secure their objectives, but must also find ways of implementing those policies. The president must not only decide or choose; he must also execute and implement.

As discussed before, a great deal of time and attention was devoted to developing an analytical basis for decision making, to thinking about negotiating strategies, and to discussing the desirable parameters for a U.S.–Soviet grain agreement. Numerous meetings were held.