Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T14:10:22.304Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - The U.S.–Japan trade imbalance: causes and consequences from the Japanese perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2010

Get access

Summary

Introduction

Japan's success in coping with two rounds of skyrocketing oil prices in the 1970s has dramatically changed both its economic structure and competitiveness in the world market. The oil shocks of the 1970s were regarded in Japan as a national emergency to a country poor in raw materials and arable land. As a result, the government and the business community worked rigorously to maintain the competitiveness of Japanese industry through research and development to reduce energy costs and industrial restructuring efforts.

By the end of the 1970s, these objectives had been largely achieved. Japan had invested almost twice as much as the United States in research and development to reduce energy costs and to create newer and younger vintages of capital stock in Japan. Overall investment in Japan has grown much faster than overall investment in other advanced countries. For instance, capital perunit of employment between 1973 and 1979 increased at an average annual rate of 6.1 percent in Japan, whereas in the United States it grew at an average annual rate of only 0.9 percent. Japanese imports and exports roughly balanced at the rate of 16 percent of GNP in 1981 and the excess of savings over domestic investment exactly matched the government's budget deficit, leaving domestic effective demand and supply in equilibrium.

In the early 1980s there was a growing concern among government officials and business groups, notably the Keidanren (the most powerful federation of business organizations in Japan), that the large government deficit would eventually cripple the economy and that the size of the government was becoming too large.

Type
Chapter
Information
Unkept Promises, Unclear Consequences
US Economic Policy and the Japanese Response
, pp. 165 - 194
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×