Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- A Unified Theory of Party Competition
- 1 Modeling Party Competition
- 2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting
- 3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors
- 4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results
- 5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election
- 6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election
- 7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections
- 8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000
- 9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election
- 10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects
- 11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory
- 12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis
- 13 Concluding Remarks
- Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling
- Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice
- Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification
- Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald
- Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation
- Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
- Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck
- Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model
- Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1
- Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model
- Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications
- Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models
- Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1
- Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects
- References
- Index
Appendix 2.1 - Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- A Unified Theory of Party Competition
- 1 Modeling Party Competition
- 2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting
- 3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors
- 4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results
- 5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election
- 6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election
- 7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections
- 8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000
- 9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election
- 10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects
- 11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory
- 12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis
- 13 Concluding Remarks
- Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling
- Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice
- Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification
- Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald
- Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation
- Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
- Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria
- Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck
- Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model
- Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1
- Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model
- Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications
- Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models
- Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1
- Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects
- References
- Index
Summary
An apparent limitation of the conditional logit (CL) model is that it assumes that the error terms Xik are independent not only among voters but also among candidates. However, such independence – often referred to as independence of irrelevant alternatives – need not be the case. In a contest among two liberals and one conservative, for example, the two liberals are likely to compete against each other for unmeasured, nonpolicy evaluations (represented by the Xik terms), whereas their competition with the conservative may be more on ideological grounds, represented instead by the Vi (k) terms. As a result, if we specify the two liberals by the subscripts 1 and 2 and the conservative by the subscript 3, we may expect the perturbation terms Xi1 and Xi2 to be negatively correlated (because higher nonpolicy evaluations of one liberal are likely to come at the expense of the other). On the other hand, neither of these two terms may be significantly correlated with Xi3 (because relative evaluation of liberals versus conservatives is more likely to be based on policy). In particular, the ratio between the support of the two liberals is little affected by the presence of the conservative (or an additional liberal) in the race, whereas the ratio between the support of one of the liberals and the support of the conservative would be strongly affected by the entry of an additional candidate.
An alternative model that permits limited correlation structures of the type suggested here is the generalized extreme value (GEV) model.
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- A Unified Theory of Party CompetitionA Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors, pp. 245 - 246Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005