Chapter 4 looks at two recent projects that aim to establish far more radical conclusions than Parfit, so-called consequentializing and deontologizing. Proponents of these projects try to come up with a simple mechanism to produce deontically equivalent counterparts to any consequentialist or non-consequentialist theory. I first explain how the two projects work on a technical level, that is, what steps are required to achieve deontic equivalence. I then reject several interpretations of the results of these projects, from the idea that we are all consequentialists (or deontologists) to the idea that consequentialism (or deontology) turn out to be empty traditions. Finally, I introduce the underdetermination interpretation of these projects and argue why it is to be preferred to yet another interpretation, the notational variants interpretation. If consequentializing and deontologizing can be interpreted in this way, we are presented with a much more far-reaching version of moral underdetermination.