Chapter 5 takes stock and considers the bigger picture in normative ethics. I first make explicit the analogy to the three strategies outlined in Chapter 1 and what we can learn from this about the analogous strategies in ethics. I discuss the charge of gimmickyness against conseqentializing and deontologizing, arguing that these algorithms in ethics are more plausible than similar ones in science. Still, I acknowledge the need for case studies, arguing that, even though much has been missing so far, we have a very strong case study in Parfit and that, due to the completeness of moral theories, this might already establish more than one might think at first sight. Next, I draw a map of underdetermination in ethics, assessing each version of the thesis that has been identified for the scientific realm in Chapter 1 in terms of its status in ethics. To finish, I outlinethe three most important impacts of moral underdetermination for the future of normative moral theorizing, having to do with falsification, the role of theoretical virtues, and the justification of moral theorizing itself.