Chapter 4 examines the phenomenon of direct party violence, examining why and how the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) engaged in violence in Karachi between 1986 and 2016. I show that the MQM was able to reap the numerous benefits of violence in the ethnically polarized, Hobbesian landscape of Karachi without losing the support of its core, Muhajir constituency. The MQM maintained a captive support base among the plurality Muhajir ethnic group, who perceived few alternative options available for purposes of political representation and who did not therefore punish the party electorally for its involvement in violence. Survey experimental results based on an original conjoint survey are striking: The likelihood of Muhajirs supporting a violent MQM candidate is identical to the probability of their supporting a peaceful MQM candidate. Relying on my own qualitative fieldwork and secondary ethnographic accounts, I show that the MQM used its own militant cadres to target the opposition and engage in turf wars with rival ethnic groups. It was able to do so because it was an organizationally strong political party with committed and socialized party workers willing to engage in risky action.