Since to trust implies to run a risk, you may want to make sure your trust is justified before you decide to trust someone. In this chapter, the authors examine the justification of trust in the information we receive from others (epistemic trust). They stipulate that only information which is relevant to the receiver counts as testimony. Contrary to this, irrelevant information, arguments, and the provision of pieces of evidence do not count as testimony. By resorting to the concept of street-level epistemology, that is, by shifting from the truth content of a statement to the content relevance (i.e. relevance to the receiver of the information), it is possible to justify epistemic trust. Between the extreme positions of complete rejection and almost a priori acceptance of epistemic trust, the authors argue that it is responsible to grant derivative authority, i.e. to accept testimony to p if and only if we have sufficient reason to believe that p. To determine what counts as ‘sufficient reason’ they present two strategies: ‘epistemic vigilance’ and assessing the ‘epistemic trustworthiness’ of the trustee.