Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-55f67697df-4ks9w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-08T17:14:15.604Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Transnational boards and governance regimes: a Franco-British comparison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2010

By
Charles Harvey  and
Mairi Maclean
Edited by
Marie-Laure Djelic  and
Sigrid Quack
Marie-Laure Djelic
Affiliation:
ESSEC Business School, France
Sigrid Quack
Affiliation:
Max-Planck-Institute, Cologne
Get access

Summary

Introduction

This chapter assesses the argument that a transnational community of elite corporate directors, bonded by shared values and assumptions, and spanning leading international companies, is emerging as a consequence of globalization and the harmonization of corporate governance practices. Governance regimes are inextricably connected to the interplay between national business systems and the processes, albeit nascent, of transnational community-building. The past decade has witnessed extraordinary global change, fuelled by heightened competition, and marked by extensive transnational corporate restructuring.

Internationalization has raised questions concerning the extent to which best practice in governance regimes may be transported from one national business system to another (Djelic 1998; Whitley 1999). This has generated much research on the prospects for international convergence (Pedersen and Thomsen 1997; Rhodes and van Apeldoorn 1998; Carati and Tourani Rad 2000; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Toms and Wright 2005; Maclean and Harvey 2008), to which the growing internationalization of the boards of leading global companies might be deemed to be contributing (Conyon and Muldoon 2006; Scherer et al. 2006; Staples 2007). Against this supposed trend, however, it can be seen that actors involved in rule-setting at international level often remain embedded in national and local cultures and environments, from which they extend their behaviors and strategies into the global domain (Djelic and Quack 2003a).

A community, from our perspective, is a defined set of individuals with shared values, assumptions and beliefs, whose interests, whether material, aesthetic or ideological, are bound together. Communities bind individuals into a collective whole.

Type
Chapter
Information
Transnational Communities
Shaping Global Economic Governance
 , pp. 107 - 129
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

,AFEP/CNPF. 1995. Le Conseil d'administration des sociétés cotées. Paris: IEP (Viénot Report I).Google Scholar
,AFEP/MEDEF. 1999. Rapport du Comité sur le gouvernement d'entreprise présidé par M. Marc Viénot (Viénot Report II).
Aguilera, R. V. 2005. “Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective,” British Journal of Management 16, supplementary edition: 39–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aguilera, R. V. and Jackson, G. 2003. “The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants,” Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 447–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Albert, M. 1991. Capitalisme contre capitalisme. Paris: Seuil.Google Scholar
Basani, B. and Lechypre, E. 2004. “Délocalisations: la grande peur française,” L'Expansion No. 691/November: 36–39.
Bauman, Z. 2000. Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Bauman, Z. 2004. Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Bauman, Z. 2007. Liquid times: Living in an age of uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Bloch, L. and Kremp, E. 2001. “Ownership and voting power in France,” in Barca, F. and Becht, M. (eds.), The control of corporate Europe. Oxford University Press, pp. 106–27.Google Scholar
Bourdieu, P. 1990. The logic of practice. Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Bourdieu, P. 1996. The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.-C. 1990. Reproduction in education, society and culture. Second edition. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Bremner, C. 2005. “French hail victory over English,” The Times, January 12, 37.Google Scholar
,British Combined Code. 2003. The combined code on corporate governance. London: Financial Reporting Council.Google Scholar
Burt, R. S., Hogarth, R. M. and Michaud, C. 2000. “The social capital of French and American managers,” Organization Science 11 (2): 123–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carati, G. and Tourani Rad, A. 2000. “Convergence of corporate governance systems,” Managerial Finance 26 (10): 66–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cheffins, B. R. 2001. “History and the global corporate governance revolution: The UK perspective,” Business History 43 (4): 87–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clift, B. 2007. “French corporate governance in the new global economy: Mechanisms of change within models of capitalism,” Political Studies 55 (3): 546–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cobb, J. B. 2007. “Person-in-community: Whiteheadian insights into community and institution”, Organization Studies 28 (4): 567–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conyon, M. and Muldoon, M. R. 2006. “The small world of corporate boards,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 33 (9–10): 1321–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crouch, C. 2005. Capitalist diversity and change: Recombinant governance and institutional entrepreneurs. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carolis, D. M. and Saparito, P. 2006. “Social capital, cognition, and entrepreneurial opportunities: A theoretical framework,” Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice 30 (1): 41–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. W. 1983. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields,” American Sociological Review 48 (2): 147–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Djelic, M.-L. 1998. Exporting the American model: The postwar transformation of European business. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Djelic, M.-L. and Quack, S. 2003a. “Introduction,” in Djelic, M-L. and Quack, S. (eds.), Globalization and institutions: Redefining the rules of the economic game. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Djelic, M.-L., and Quack, S. 2003b. “Conclusion,” in Djelic, M.-L. and Quack, S. (eds.), Globalization and institutions: Redefining the rules of the economic game. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 302–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franks, J.Mayer, C., Hardie, J. and Malinvaud, E. 1990. “Capital markets and corporate control: A study of France, Germany and the UK,” Economic Policy, 5 (10): 189–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frison-Roche, M.-A. 2002. “Le droit français des sociétés cotées entre corporate governance et culture de marché,” in Plihon, D. and Ponssard, J.-P. (eds.), Le Montée en puissance des fonds d'investissement. Paris: la Documentation française, pp. 77–92.Google Scholar
Gillies, J. and Dickenson, M. 1999. “The governance of transnational firms: Some preliminary hypotheses,” Corporate Governance: An International Journal 7: 237–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goergen, M. and Renneboog, L. 2001. “United Kingdom,” in Gugler, K. (ed.), Corporate governance and economic performance. Oxford University Press, pp. 184–200.Google Scholar
Granovetter, M. 1985. “Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grant, J. and Kirchmaier, T. 2005. “Corporate control in Europe,” Corporate Ownership and Control 2 (2): 65–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. 2001. “An introduction to varieties of capitalism,” in Soskice, D. and Hall, P. (eds.), Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford University Press, pp. 1–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harvey, C. and Maclean, M. 2008. “Capital theory and the dynamics of elite business networks in Britain and France,” in Savage, M. and Williams, K. (eds.), Remembering elites. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 105–20.Google Scholar
Hendry, J. 2005. “Beyond self-interest: Agency theory and the board in a satisficing world,” British Journal of Management 16: 55–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S. 1998. “Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO,” American Economic Review 88 (1): 96–118.Google Scholar
Higgs, D. 2003. Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. London: Department of Trade and Industry.Google Scholar
Kadushin, C. 1995. “Friendship among the French financial elite,” American Sociological Review 60 (2): 202–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knez, M. and Camerer, C. 1994. “Creating expectational assets in the laboratory: Coordination in ‘weakest link’ games,” Strategic Management Journal 15: 101–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
,Korn/Ferry International. 2002. Gouvernement d'entreprise en France en 2002. Paris.Google Scholar
Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 1998. “Corporate ownership around the world,” Journal of Finance 54: 471–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. 1991. Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lynall, M. D., Golden, B. R. and Hillman, A. J. 2003. “Board composition from adolescence to maturity: A multitheoretic view,” Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 416–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maclean, M. 2002. Economic management and French business from de Gaulle to Chirac. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maclean, M. and Harvey, C. 2008. “The continuing diversity of corporate governance regimes: France and Britain compared,” in Strange, R. and Jackson, G. (eds.), International business and corporate governance: Strategy, performance and institutional change. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 208–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maclean, M., Harvey, C. and Press, J. 2006. Business elites and corporate governance in France and the UK. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maclean, M., Harvey, C. and Press, J. 2007. “Managerialism and the post-war evolution of the French national business system,” Business History 49 (4): 531–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marini, P. 1996. La modernisation du droit des sociétés. Paris: La Documentation Française (Marini Report).Google Scholar
Marquis, C., Glynn, M. A. and Davis, G. F. 2007. “Community isomorphism and corporate social action,” Academy of Management Review 32 (3): 925–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mauduit, L. 2003. “Du capitalisme rhénan au capitalisme américain, la mutation de l'économie s'accélère,” Le Monde, July 29.
,MEDEF/AFEP. 2002. Pour un meilleur gouvernement des entreprises cotées. (Bouton Report). Paris: MEDEF.Google Scholar
Morin, F. 2000. “A transformation in the French model of shareholding and management,” Economy and Society 29 (1): 36–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pedersen, T. and Thomsen, S. 1997. “European patterns of corporate ownership: A twelve-country study,” Journal of International Business Studies 4: 759–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Portes, A. and Sensenbrenner, J. 1993. “Embeddedness and immigration: Notes on the social determinants of economic action,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (6): 1320–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prowse, S. 1995. “Corporate governance in an international perspective: A survey of corporate control mechanisms among large firms in the US, UK, Japan and Germany,” Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 4 (1): 1–63.Google Scholar
Rhodes, M. and Apeldoorn, B. 1998. “Capital unbound? The transformation of European corporate governance,” Journal of European Public Policy 5 (3): 406–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roberts, R., McNulty, T. and Stiles, P. 2005. “Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom,” British Journal of Management 16: S5–S26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roe, M. J. 1994. “Some differences in corporate governance in Germany, Japan and America,” in Baums, T., Hopt, R. and Buxham, R. M. (eds.), Institutional investors and corporate governance. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 23–88.Google Scholar
Schatzki, T. R. 1996. Social practices: A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G. and Baumann, D. 2006. “Global rules and private actors: Toward a new role of the transnational corporation in global governance,” Business Ethics Quarterly 16 (4): 505–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scott, J. 1990. “Corporate control and corporate rule: Britain in an international perspective,” British Journal of Sociology 41 (3): 351–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Staples, C. L. 2007. “Board globalisation in the world's largest TNCs 1993–2005,” Corporate Governance: An International Review 15 (2): 311–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Staples, C. L. 2008. “Cross-border acquisitions and board globalization in the world's largest TNCs, 1995–2005,” The Sociological Quarterly 49: 31–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, M. 2005. “Structural and epistemic parameters in communities of practice,” Organization Science 16 (2): 151–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toms, S. and Wright, M. 2002. “Corporate governance, strategy and structure in British business history, 1950–2000,” Business History 44 (3): 91–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toms, S. and Wright, M. 2005. “Divergence and convergence within Anglo-American corporate governance systems: Evidence from the US and UK, 1950–2000,” Business History 47 (2): 267–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tönnies, F. 2002 [1897]. Community and society. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.Google Scholar
Weber, H. 1986. Le Parti des patrons: le CNPF (1946–1986). Paris: Seuil.Google Scholar
Weick, K. E. 1995. Sensemaking in organizations. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Westphal, J. 1999. “Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioural and performance consequences of CEO–board social ties,” Academy of Management Journal 42 (1): 7–24.Google Scholar
Whitley, R. 1999. Divergent capitalisms. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Yeo, H-J., Pochet, C. and Alcouffe, A. 2003. “CEO reciprocal interlocks in French corporations,” Journal of Management and Governance 7 (1): 87–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, S. 2000. “The increasing use of non-executive directors: Its impact on UK board structure and governance arrangements,” Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting 27 (9–10): 1311–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×