In studying the Brazilian case of Transitional Justice, it can be seen that the end of a dictatorial regime and its political repression comprises a multilayered process of changes or shifts. These moves entail the development of a democratic institutional apparatus at the same time that the country is actually discovering and implementing ways to deal with past crimes and human rights abuses that correspond to its specific political and social context – a context which has been permeated by an authoritarian pattern since the colonial times and republicanera. Consequently, as Jelin has stated, the task of settling accounts with the past must converge at the same time with the need to build a different future. In Brazil, although there have been efforts to develop the institutional apparatus of democracy since 1985, the truth is that the exceptionally long and devious process of settling accounts with the past over 30 years is still subject to question and under evaluation by a society which is unsure of and divided about the moral value of remembering over forgetting.

The most general observation possible from the history of the democratic opening process in Brazil is that the revocation of a dictatorial political regime and the restoration of democratic forms of government are not necessarily achieved by an overthrow, or by a coupd’état, or by the rise of a popular movement. As Codato has noted, a democratic opening can also result, as in the case of Brazil, from an evolutionary process of changes. Hence, this approach to transition to democracy implies two possibilities: (i) either there is a “transfer of power” from the military to the politicians allied with the regime; (ii) or there is a (negotiated) submission by the military to moderate politicians in opposition to the regime. Indeed, in the Brazilian case, there was a modest dose of both options. The military did not transfer all their power to the ruling party (first with the Aliança Renovadora Nacional – ARENA, and later with the Partido Democrático Social – PDS); rather, they retained strategic positions inside the State organization and could negotiate their withdrawal according to their own ideas.