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3 - The Corporate Veto

from Part I - Obstacles to Corporate Accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 April 2020

Leigh A. Payne
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Gabriel Pereira
Affiliation:
National University of Tucuman
Laura Bernal-Bermúdez
Affiliation:
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia
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Summary

This chapter aims to show with empirical evidence the veto power of business over corporate accountability.It starts discussing the underlying assumption that business veto power stems from its economic power, leading to a history of impunity. Although our judicial action data set seems to confirm patterns of impunity, it also indicates more variation than glib assumptions about economic actors’ power sustain. We explore what type of firm has proved more successful in vetoing judicial accountability, where that veto power over accountability occurs and when economic actors are most likely to successfully use their veto power over accountability. In the second part of the chapter, we explore the strategies economic actors have employed to maintain impunity, specifically legal, non-judicial, unlawful, and mobilizational. The third part of the chapter probes the notion of weakening economic actors’ veto power using our Archimedes’ Lever approach. To lift the weight of corporate accountability, either civil society actors must apply more force or the force of veto powers must be reduced. This section explores that possibility. The concluding section returns to Archimedes’ Lever to summarize the possibilities for change and what steps might contribute to reducing the power of veto players weighing down corporate accountability.

Type
Chapter
Information
Transitional Justice and Corporate Accountability from Below
Deploying Archimedes' Lever
, pp. 113 - 162
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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