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Part III - Cross-Cutting Issues Central to Transformative Biodiversity Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2022

Ingrid J. Visseren-Hamakers
Affiliation:
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
Marcel T. J. Kok
Affiliation:
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency

Summary

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022
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This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

5 One Health and Biodiversity

Hans Keune , Unnikrishnan Payyappallimana , Serge Morand and Simon R. Rüegg
5.1 Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to discuss linkages between nature and generic health from a One Health as well as transformative biodiversity governance perspective. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the interest in the linkages between nature and human health has increased drastically, in general but also in the biodiversity realm. The origin of the virus is still under investigation, but Reference Haider, Rothman-Ostrow and OsmanHaider et al. (2020) propose classifying COVID-19 as an “emerging infectious disease of probable animal origin.” The tens of millions of human COVID-19 infections reported internationally appear to have primarily emerged through human-to-human transmission. Thus, amidst the pandemic, the potential animal origin is of secondary interest for further containment of the disease. Still, in the public and international governance debate for example in the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Reference Daszak, Neves and AmuasiIPBES, 2020), a link is clearly made between zoonotic infectious diseases and the effects of human pressures on ecosystems. The dissemination of the virus, facilitated by intense global travel and high local connectivity, should also cause us to question our understanding of the fragilities of human health in a globalized world.

Early foundational steps regarding nature–human health linkages were present in the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) contribution to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (WHO, 2005) and the State of Knowledge Review that was jointly produced by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and WHO (WHO-CBD, 2015). Until recently, however, for many in the biodiversity domain, linkages with human health were little known or taken into account in science, policy and practice. The concept of One Health is now often mentioned as a “silver bullet” solution to challenges like the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. Reference Daszak, Neves and AmuasiIPBES, 2020). More or less in the background, One Health has been around for quite some time, including in the WHO-CBD knowledge review (2015), where it was proposed as an overarching concept for biodiversity and health governance. The concept was supported by the CBD member states in the final declaration of the Conference of the Parties in 2018, which “Invites Parties and other Governments to consider integrating One Health policies, plans or projects, and other holistic approaches in their national biodiversity strategies and action plans, and, as appropriate, national health plans” (CBD, 2018). But what does One Health entail, or rather, what can it entail, as we can question whether the beauty of One Health is the same in the eyes of many beholders? We do not have the ambition to present an exhaustive overview of nature–human health linkages or of One Health. We aim to discuss key aspects and challenges of One Health, highlight definitional diversity, and in doing so hope to give inspiration for transformative biodiversity governance.

5.2 Understanding the Concept of One Health
5.2.1 Biodiversity and Health

From the perspective of nature’s contributions to people (see Chapter 2 for more details on definitions of nature), it may seem that human health is only one of many elements of the ways in which nature and biodiversity can contribute to human well-being. This is illustrated by the fact that in modern scientific literature on the conceptual and operational development of the concept of ecosystem services, health is often “only” considered to be a subsection of cultural values (Reference Bryce, Irvine and ChurchBryce et al., 2016; Reference Bullock, Joyce and CollierBullock et al., 2018), or is even absent (Reference Cheng, Van Damme, Li and UyttenhoveCheng et al., 2019). An explanation is that the concept emerged in the realm of biological sciences, with biologists trying to link the importance of “their world” to societal relevance, with as a main first step economic valuation (Reference Ring, Hansjürgens, Elmqvist, Wittmer and SukhdevRing et al., 2010). This is the same the other way around: Until recently the word “ecology” in the health sector often had limited reference to nature, but rather to the social or societal environment of a patient (Reference Hoffmann, Ristl, George, Maier and PichlhöferHoffmann et al., 2019; Reference WhiteWhite, 1997), and nature was only considered to a limited extent in, for example, primary health care (Reference Lauwers, Bastiaens, Remmen and KeuneLauwers et al., 2020), and even the concept of “green prescription” initially had few linkages with nature, but mainly referred to environmental pollution and climate change challenges, lifestyle and nonmedicinal prescriptions (Reference Anderson, Taylor, Grant, Fulton and HofmanAnderson et al., 2015; Reference Patel, Schofield and KoltPatel et al., 2011; Reference Swinburn, Walter, Arroll, Tilyard and RussellSwinburn et al., 1997). A prominent exception is the WHO Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion (WHO, 1986: 1), which has highlighted the importance of a stable ecosystem: “The fundamental conditions and resources for health are peace, shelter, education, food, income, a stable ecosystem, sustainable resources, social justice and equity. Improvement in health requires a secure foundation in these basic prerequisites.” Apart from this example, the (more tangible) negative drivers relating to environment, like pollution, have dominated. There was relatively little discussion on the positive and negative contributions of ecosystems and biodiversity.

The mechanisms linking nature and biodiversity on the one hand and human health on the other are complex and intertwined, and can result in human health benefits and risks (IPBES, 2018a; WHO-CBD, 2015). Figure 5.1 (Reference Marselle, Hartig and CoxMarselle et al., 2021) shows how biodiversity and human health and well-being are related through diverse pathways and a wide array of moderating factors.

Figure 5.1 Pathways linking biodiversity to human health

Biodiversity supports the ecosystem services that mitigate heat, noise and air pollution, which all mediate the positive health effects of green spaces (see Chapter 14). In the topical domain of medicinal plants, significant work has been done regarding biodiversity and health, including a vast body of Indigenous traditional knowledge (Reference Rounsevell, Fischer, Torre-Marin Rando and MaderIPBES, 2018b; WHO-CBD, 2015). In more mainstream contemporary environmental health science, direct health outcomes of biodiversity have been understudied and underverified so far. There is evidence for positive associations between species and ecosystem diversity, and psychological and physical well-being and immune system regulation. There is more evidence for self-reported psychological well-being than for well-defined clinical outcomes. High biodiversity has been associated with both reduced and increased vector-borne disease risk (Reference Aerts, Honnay and Van NieuwenhuyseAerts et al., 2018).

Ecosystem change is recognized as a risk factor for disease emergence and spread, but a specific role for biodiversity is not always clear. Biodiversity may reduce disease risk by what is called the dilution effect. The dilution effect hypothesis proposes that high vertebrate species richness reduces the risk of infectious diseases among humans because pathogens are “diluted” among a high number of animal reservoir species that differ in their capacity to infect invertebrate vector species (Reference Schmidt and OstfeldSchmidt and Ostfeld, 2001). Under the dilution effect hypothesis, the transmission and burden of infectious diseases are expected to be lower in animal species-rich, natural environments through lower infection prevalence in vectors (Reference Johnson, Hitchens and Smiley EvansJohnson et al., 2015; Reference Ostfeld and KeesingOstfeld and Keesing, 2017), even when higher species richness also implies higher pathogen richness (Reference Dunn, Davies, Harris and GavinDunn et al., 2010). However, factors such as species composition, persistence of contacts between reservoirs and vectors, and the various ways in which reservoirs and nonreservoirs are affected by environmental change may all affect the dilution mechanism. The amplification effect, in which the infection prevalence in vectors increases following an environmental change affecting biodiversity, has also been observed (Reference Faust, Dobson and GottdenkerFaust et al., 2017). The conditions in which dilution or amplification will be observed are still the object of research (Reference Johnson, Hitchens and Smiley EvansJohnson et al., 2015; Reference Kilpatrick, Dobson and LeviKilpatrick et al., 2017; Reference Morand and HurstMorand, 2018). However, it has been established that the risk of disease spread appears higher in human-dominated and simplified habitats (Reference Morand and HurstMorand, 2018). Habitat fragmentation affects both pathogen diversity and pathogen prevalence. The perturbation hypothesis holds that if a habitat is fragmented, the sum of fragments will not be able to sustain the same diversity and prevalence of pathogenic species (but also reservoirs and vectors) as the original habitat (Reference Murray and DaszakMurray and Daszak, 2013). However, fragmentation also leads to a longer boundary between the habitat(s) and those of other communities. This in turn increases the chance of encounters between communities of hosts and vectors. The pathogen pool diversity hypothesis thus assumes that this intensified interaction raises the transmission of pathogens between habitats and species, and within populations. Hence, ongoing habitat fragmentation may both decrease and increase disease transmission risk. Beyond fragmentation, the ongoing “Anthropocene defaunation” leads to almost empty tropical forests (Reference Dirzo, Young and GalettiDirzo et al., 2014). The sharp decline of many animal populations has dramatic implications for zoonotic diseases, by both decreasing and increasing transmission risks. As the diversity of host populations decreases, so will the diversity of the microbes (including pathogens) they harbor. Decreasing host diversity means the loss of important interspecific regulations provided by predation or competition. The remaining pathogens hosted by more abundant but less diverse hosts or vectors released from competition or predation show enhanced transmission. This is particularly evident for pathogens able to switch host species easily and those living in synanthropic species such as rodents or some mosquito vectors. The recent study by Reference Gibb, Redding and ChinGibb et al. (2020) demonstrates how global land-use changes favor zoonotic reservoirs and increase the risks of zoonotic diseases, and more specifically in Southeast Asian environments with critical ongoing defaunation (Reference Morand and HurstMorand, 2018).

5.2.2 Integrative Concepts

Integrative approaches to health have quite a long history. The WHO Constitution in 1946 envisioned a comprehensive view of health: “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 2006: 1). In the WHO meeting in Alma-Ata (today Almaty, Kazakhstan) in 1978, a holistic and intersectoral conceptualization of health assumed importance: “[health] involves, in addition to the health sector, all related sectors and aspects of national and community development, in particular agriculture, animal husbandry, food, industry, education, housing, public works, communications and other sectors; and demands the coordinated efforts of all those sectors” (WHO, 1978: 2). As mentioned above, in 1986, the WHO Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion highlighted the need for a stable ecosystem as a basis for good health (WHO, 1986). In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development initiated the foundation for an inclusive framework: WEHAB (Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture [food, nutrition] and Biodiversity and Ecosystems) (United Nations, 2002). In 2005, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment identified key connections between biodiversity, ecosystems and human well-being (WHO, 2005), and in 2006 the Finnish presidency of the European Union presented the concept of “Health in All Policies” as a main health theme (Reference PuskaPuska, 2006). In the Finnish opinion, the core of “Health in All Policies” was to focus on health determinants mainly controlled by policies of sectors other than health. The wish was to address policies in the context of policy-making at all levels of governance. The idea in fact dates back even further: In 1978, at the WHO International Conference on Primary Health Care, the Alma-Ata Declaration emphasized the role of sectors other than health in the creation of public health: “the highest possible level of health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realization requires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector” (cited in Reference StåhlStåhl, 2018: 38). Health as overarching generic principle raises the question: Can One Health follow in these footsteps as an overarching governance integrator, while also being more inclusive by incorporating animal, plant and ecosystem health?

Several integrative governance perspectives regarding challenges with environmental (natural and built) determinants of health are gaining traction today, even if some of these concepts already have some history. This is driven by concern for emerging infectious diseases, rapid increases of noncommunicable diseases, rising morbidity due to ecosystem and climatic changes, and increased awareness of challenges of chemical use in human living environments and in livestock farming, including antibiotics, fertilizers and pesticides in agroecological systems and so on (WHO, 2012). One Health, EcoHealth, planetary health, global health, conservation medicine, biodiversity and health, agrihealth and health pluralism are examples of these broader frameworks, which aim for an integrated perspective on health and the living environment (Reference Assmuth, Chen and DegelingAssmuth et al., 2019).

EcoHealth encompasses ecosystem approaches to health, covering the biological, physical, social and economic environments and their relation to human health (Reference LebelLebel, 2003). The concept One Health originated at the interface of animal and human health (Reference Woods and BresalierWoods and Bresalier, 2014) with the aim of covering a larger diversity of expertise than health and veterinary sciences, and over time broadened its perspective to the environment (Reference Rüegg, McMahon and HäslerRüegg et al., 2017). Reference Zinsstag, Schelling, Waltner-Toews and TannerZinsstag et al. (2011) proposed One Health as an approach aimed at tackling complex patterns of global change, in which the inextricable interconnection of humans, pets, livestock and wildlife, along with their social and ecological environments, is evident and requires integrated approaches to human and animal health and their respective social and environmental contexts. The WHO and CBD State of Knowledge Review on biodiversity and health (2015) proposed One Health as an overarching framework for integrated efforts, while also recognizing and relating to other relevant approaches, such as EcoHealth. Earlier, a tripartite collaboration among the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO (2010) proposed a similar integrated effort, also called One Health. A related concept is One Welfare, which aims to relate animal, human and environmental welfare under one umbrella (Reference BourqueBourque, 2017; also see Chapter 9). Similarly, the Lancet Commission on planetary health (Reference Whitmee, Mace and HainesWhitmee et al., 2015) highlights the integrated nature of human and planetary health.

In a different vein, there has been fresh thinking on alternative worldviews and perspectives provided by diverse knowledge systems on health and well-being for tackling sustainability challenges. The idea of holistic health traditions has existed for centuries, but recently there have been new frames of reference that allow mainstreaming of such holistic approaches. According to some health cultures, optimal health is “To be established in one’s self or own natural state” (Reference Payyappallimana, Morandi and NambiPayyappallimana, 2013: 105). To achieve this, one must have a balance of physical, mental, spiritual, social and ecological dimensions of existence. Based on this philosophy, there are distinct epistemological principles and practices for the prevention of disease and promotion of health and health care in several Indigenous and Local Knowledge cultures. Shared explanatory frameworks, healing practices including rituals, physical healing environments and so on become central in such a context. Sacredness is attributed to trees, grains, animals, hills, forests, streams, mountains and caves that are worshiped through rituals, ceremonies, festivals and fairs. Such knowledge, belief systems and worldviews find expression in agroecological traditions, art, songs and other symbolic representations and practices linked to well-being. For instance, in a study among communities of coastal Tamil Nadu, Reference SujathaSujatha (2007: 178) states, “the body is seen as being constituted by food which is the vehicle by which the external ecology is internalized.”

A shared perspective across Indigenous and local communities in the Indian subcontinent is the inherent relationship between the “outside” and “inside” worlds. In Āyurveda and other traditional knowledge systems of medicine in the subcontinent, this is known in terms of “loka” (macrocosm) and “puruṣa” (microcosm). Similar traces of this principle form an underlying basis for all Indigenous and Local Knowledge traditions. Health in Āyurveda is understood as a positive state and is based on the outcomes of adaptive feedback that each person establishes with the environment and determined by the ability of a person to adapt and self-manage (Reference Morandi, Tosto, Roberti di Sarsina and DallaMorandi et al., 2011). Similarly, in other cultures the biopsychosocial model of health (Reference EngelEngel, 1977) brings the concept of health from a purely biological realm into, as the name suggests, the psychological and social realms of health. The concept has gained popularity with health professionals, making them consider the broader factors impacting on the health and well-being of individuals and communities, indicating that health care alone does not provide health. Likewise, the concept of “salutogenesis,” coined by Aaron Reference AntonovskyAntonovsky (1979), depicts an approach that focuses on the drivers of health and well-being rather than focusing on morbidities or pathogenesis.

Though seemingly quite similar in holistic and integrative ambition, these overarching concepts do not necessarily result in identical definitions of nature and linkages with human health, nor in common framing of challenges and remedies (Reference Keune and AssmuthKeune and Assmuth, 2018). Different expert groups may identify themselves differently with the concept of One Health. On the one hand, there is a community of expertise and practice focusing mainly on nature-related health benefits, and on the other one concerned mainly with its risks (Reference Keune and AssmuthKeune and Assmuth, 2018). While the former community advocates for nature-based solutions as a path to a better future, some prominent virologists representing the latter community label nature as an extreme threat to human health. Some of the latter group even state, “nature is the biggest bioterrorist,” from which yet unknown threats should be avoided: one must “intervene in the conditions of emergence of the future, before one may be besieged by nature’s own act of emergence” (Reference MutsaersMutsaers, 2015: 128). This biosecurity framing has led to the development of vaccines, but also brought forward preventative culling of wildlife and domestic animals, resulting in a strategy with questionable ethics. Clearly, a balancing of perspectives is needed to escape such paradigmatic deadlocks. An approach coined Structural One Health (Reference Wallace, Bergmann and KockWallace et al., 2015) extended the concept of One Health to include the socioeconomic perspective more clearly. It criticized the prior iteration of One Health for failing to address the fundamental structural, political and economic causes underlying collapsing health ecologies, similar to ideas of transformative change. Figure 5.2 illustrates Structural One Health compared to other approaches, highlighting different characteristics of different health approaches and interventions.

Figure 5.2 Structural One Health

“Structural One Health investigates the broader context of a disease, including out beyond the local, more proximate mechanisms of emergence on which more episodic One Health focuses. Preventive and emergency medicine are deployed in response to threats on the health of specific populations and individuals. For all mechanisms that promote disease (under ‘crisis’), the proximity in space, time and causal origin to any given outbreak increases up the pyramid. The relative importance of each point along the scale is dependent on the collective interplay between all parts of the pyramid. An array of inputs and outcomes for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Thailand is shown across the schematic”.

5.2.3 Dilemmas in Nature-Based Approaches to Health

Reference Horwitz, Finlayson and WeinsteinHorwitz et al. (2012) and Reference Roiko, Kozak, Cleary, Murray, Tibbetts, Rothlisberg and NeilRoiko et al. (2019) summarize the complex character of nature–health linkages with reference to the paradox of the health imperative, and the opposite of the environmentalist’s paradox: Where, from an ecosystem services point of view, one would expect a clear relation between a healthy ecosystem and human health, the environmentalist’s paradox points at the fact that degradation of an ecosystem, for example by using DDT for malaria control, can in fact be beneficial in the short-term for human health. The health imperative exemplifies cases where a healthy ecosystem can, in fact, pose human health threats, for example the presence of mosquitoes in urban nature conservation areas, which may support spreading infectious diseases under specific conditions.

Reference Bauer, Kenneth and PelikanBauer et al. (2006: 156) illustrate this dilemma by comparing the focus on pathogenesis to that on salutogenesis (Figure 5.3). With pathogenesis, the focus is mainly on health risk factors for individuals in their living environment, leading to “disease, disorders, subjective sickness, malfunctioning and impairment.” With salutogenesis, the focus is mainly on human health-supporting resources, including “fitness, subjective wellbeing, optimal functioning, meaningful life and positive quality of life.” Both concepts should be considered to be complementary and interacting throughout life.

Figure 5.3 Salutogenis and pathogenis

Balancing these two perspectives in relation to nature is also a clear challenge in primary health care (Reference Lauwers, Bastiaens, Remmen and KeuneLauwers et al., 2020). In the fast-growing body of scientific literature on nature–human health linkages, a role for primary health care is still only marginally present. Also, specific uptake tools for practical consideration of these linkages in primary health care seem lacking. Besides, the need for a primary One Health care approach has been highlighted (Reference Lauwers, Bastiaens, Remmen and KeuneLauwers et al., 2020).

Further scientific challenges on nature–human health linkages remain. One recent review on “types and characteristics of urban and peri-urban green spaces having an impact on human mental health and wellbeing” (Reference Beute, Andreucci and LammelBeute et al., 2020) illustrates this for an important subdomain of nature-related health benefits in the urban context (see Chapter 14). Clearly, the extensive review could not find a gold standard for a particular green space type or characteristic working best for everyone, everywhere and at every time. This heterogeneity may be explained in terms of differences in exposure duration and differences in experiences, and there are different effects for different target groups. This would lead to recommendations for a variety of green space types to capture all potential users, their different needs and their activities.

5.3 Challenges in One Health Governance

These apparent contradictions and dilemmas at the conceptual and practical level form the challenging landscape in which One Health governance should intervene. Currently, there is no clear agreement on, or understanding of, what is best practice regarding One Health knowledge (Reference Rüegg, Häsler and ZinsstagRüegg et al., 2018). A key challenge is knowledge integration (incorporating a diversity of knowledge related to different disciplines, topical areas and practices) and learning by doing. Clearly this takes time and effort: More mature initiatives become more holistic as they evolve in a trial and error process (Reference Buttigieg, Savic and CauchiButtigieg et al., 2018; Reference Fonseca, Torgal and de MeneghiFonseca et al., 2018; Reference Hanin, Queenan, Savic, Rüegg and HäslerHanin et al., 2018; Reference Paternoster, Tomassone and TambaPaternoster et al., 2017). In addition, the importance of knowledge integration and particularly the sharing of data is well-recognized but is often hampered by political boundaries. A phenomenon that has been reported for the governance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Reference Nilsson, Chisholm and GriggsNilsson et al., 2018) can also be observed in One Health (Reference Hanin, Queenan, Savic, Rüegg and HäslerHanin et al., 2018). The evaluation of an international effort for infectious disease surveillance showed that national as well as institutional borders are challenging for the sharing of data (Reference Hanin, Queenan, Savic, Rüegg and HäslerHanin et al., 2018). Whether this has structurally changed during the COVID-19 pandemic remains to be seen.

Another important One Health challenge is interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches, which appear to be one of the most demanding practices in the academic context (Reference Léger, Stärk, Rushton and NielsenLéger et al., 2018; Reference Muñoz-Prieto, Nielsen and Martinez-SubielaMuñoz-Prieto et al., 2018). There seems to be a disconnect between the ambition to work across disciplines and the cultural practice in science of evaluating achievements based on scientific, preferably high-impact, publications. The prevailing competitive mentality in academia is a serious obstacle to the trusted collaboration required for interdisciplinary progress. An explicit mandate to reach beyond academia and connect to practitioners can result in a surprisingly good alignment with the One Health concept (Reference Radeski, O’Shea, De Meneghi and IlieskiRadeski et al., 2018). Partnerships spanning collaborators from government, academia and practitioner circles may generate more holistic solutions.

5.3.1 The Scission between Human Health Benefits and Threats from Nature

As already mentioned above, although One Health acts as an integrating umbrella for talking about health, there appear to be two main opposing narratives around nature–human health linkages, under the same heading of “One Health” (Reference Keune, Kretsch and De BlustKeune et al., 2013). But even without explanatory causal links, a comprehensive conversation about the management of our environment requires a constructive dialogue between those two communities. To move from a struggle for prerogative of interpretation to a co-construction of understanding, it will be necessary to have more direct interaction and discourse between the different viewpoints and groups, through transdisciplinary governance.

5.3.2 Which Ethics?

As emphasized by Reference Morand and LajaunieMorand and Lajaunie (2019) and Reference Lainé and MorandLainé and Morand (2020), ethical reflection in the field of health and biodiversity would require examining the relevant scientific domains (i.e. biology, ecology, evolution, human medicine, animal medicine, political science, environmental studies, anthropology and law), their epistemology and, for some, deep roots in the colonial sciences based on a paternalistic perspective, dominated by the lens of the Western worldview on reality. Consequently, several ethical responses to public health crises have been proposed with “One Bioethics,” “One Health ethics,” “Global Health ethics” and, more recently, “Planetary Health ethics,” with no consensus among bioethicists. The need to recognize scientific pluralism appears essential for interdisciplinarity, but it requires acknowledging the values and practices of each scientific domain. It requires also a decolonized (less Western paternalistic) and a more-than-human (respecting also nonhuman health) One Health approach (Reference Lainé and MorandLainé and Morand, 2020). Further, it needs to be stressed that even though perspectives like One Health are more encompassing, they are to be implemented in a context of highly linear positivist science and a practice structure of current health systems that have limited capacities related to human resources, knowledge and so forth.

While “Global Health ethics” is essential in underlining the importance of justice and equity, a “One Health ethics” or a “Planetary Health ethics” could refer more to a metaethics regarding the ecological crisis and its implications for the study of nature or biodiversity. The question is, then: Is nature reducible to a simple mechanism such as the dilution effect, or is it a complex adaptive system of physical and sensible interactions between various life forms including humans? Considering what kind of nature is at play in a health crisis has profound consequences for the attitudes toward nature and people and for health policy responses. COVID-19, as well as previous pandemics, shows that crises are often systemic, which calls for the development of systemic actions with better nature stewardship, and resonates well with the ideas of transformative change.

5.3.3 Balancing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Health Norms and Challenges

Contemporary medical practice relies heavily on norms and reference values. A strong deviation from a mean is commonly considered as pathology, implying that regularity (i.e. the mean) is a healthy objective. Consequently, decision matrixes are often positivist, objective and deterministic, with the aim of reestablishing normalcy. Similarly, in public health, veterinary health and food safety, solutions are often prescribed top-down, implying singular linear pathways in isolated aspects of health. There are obvious advantages of this approach when it comes to health management at scale, such as decision-making for resource allocation in a national health service. However, current health management is in stark contrast to the observation that complex systems show fractal behavior, in a coherent variation and diversity (Reference WestWest, 2012). A complex adaptive systems approach in medicine would require moving away from preestablished medical problems with expected solutions, and working with people toward defining the medical goal itself. Such an approach requires, of course, an acceptance of unpredictability, uncertainty and ambiguity (Reference Strand, Rortveit and ScheiStrand et al., 2004) – something most health care systems are not set up to deal with. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many aspects were unknown. Nevertheless, in order to prevent its spread, swift action was needed. It proved more successful to take some generic assumptions to contain highly infectious diseases and to implement a crude strategy in Mongolia and Taiwan, for example, than to delay action waiting for sufficient detailed knowledge. The ambiguity of the evidence and the unclear relation to the situation in the field kept fueling public debates about the way to deal with the pandemic in many other democratic states, while lives were lost to the disease.

There is no doubt that norms and reference values have an important place in daily practice, but there is a risk that such norms may obliterate other potential pathways to health. In the context of One Health, the question arises: To what degree are such norms universal and time independent, and to what degree would they require contextualization? While a strong focus on individual choice in health care has the advantage of more tailor-made health strategies, the right to individualism stands in contrast with the needs of communities or societies. Especially in developed countries, when people make unhealthy choices, the health costs either result in a loss of solidarity because the community does not want to cover the consequences of individual behavior, or in rising health expenses for the community. Another example is the individual choice of vaccination, where people who may choose to abstain from vaccination contribute to lowering community or herd immunity and thereby increase disease risks. Here again, cohesion appears to be an important concept, that is, solidarity needs to be reciprocal: While individuals consider the resilience of the community in their acts, the community can offer solidarity in return. Importantly, at various levels of socioeconomic status, health should be discussed and co-produced. This shows that One Health is more than an integrated approach to emerging infectious diseases, but a way to address many health concerns, from malnutrition to traffic accidents, in an integrative and inclusive governance process. The impacts are considerable as they affect legislation and require, and represent, transformative change. Some possible approaches have been proposed such as social prescription (Reference Jani and GrayJani and Gray, 2019; Reference Jani, Pitini, Jungmann, Adamo, Conibear and MistryJani et al., 2019), positive health dialogue (Reference Huber, van Vliet and GiezenbergHuber et al., 2016), quintuple helix innovation (Reference Carayannis, Barth and CampbellCarayannis et al., 2012), critical complexity (Reference CilliersCilliers, 2005; Reference KeuneKeune, 2012), participatory action research (Reference Kincheloe, Kapoor and JordanKincheloe, 2009) and salutogenesis (Reference Lindström and ErikssonLindström and Eriksson, 2005; Reference Lindström and Eriksson2006).

5.3.4 What Are the Values Associated with Health?

In the search for generic validity of concepts and frameworks, it goes unnoticed that we know very little about the lives of those who experience the complex entanglements between humans, animals and ecosystems on a daily basis, and whose stewardship is decisive for change to occur. Although there are studies on more general values (World Values Survey Association, n.d.) – particularly the comparative value of health for oneself – people, animals and ecosystems have not been explored. While currently, with few exceptions, justice is an anthropocentric notion, the aim of achieving interspecies health equity as an outcome of One Health suggests that there may be a need to develop a framework for biocentric social justice (see Chapters 8 and 9).

5.3.5 The Need for a Scalable Definition of Health

Such a framework would need to be grounded in a generic understanding of health. Exchange across different disciplines and sectors in charge of different scales of life, from microorganisms to national and global economies, reveals a large variety of definitions of health. At the level of ecosystems, the concept of health is controversial (Reference RapportRapport, 1998). But also at an individual level, our concepts of personal health are diverse. Health can be regarded as a dynamic, adaptive process rather than a static state. A potential framing would be health as resilience at the individual level, with well-being and welfare as emerging properties of a functional co-adaptation between an individual and their direct environment. In some Indigenous cultures, an individual is also seen as a constantly changing substratum and thus health as interaction between two dynamic (in some contexts deteriorating) systems. The concept of resilience can be evaluated at multiple levels of social-ecological systems. Metrics for resilience are different at different scales, primarily because change occurs at much slower rates at larger scales and is faster at smaller scales, thus preventing the same relative time resolution at all scales. Nonetheless, the principal idea can be transferred across all scales and can also accommodate for cultural differences. Consequently, One Health approaches would need to foster resilience at all scales, and as a minimal requirement not reduce resilience at any scale in a social-ecological system. This would allow humans and nonhumans to live together and allow adaption to various challenges in the short and long term.

5.3.6 Will Egoism Define the Boundaries?

Inclusive governance – as used in the field of sustainable development – may help to make use of One Health opportunities and to promote dialogue and solutions for intergenerational health if there is propensity among participants to engage, connect, reflect and change. It is expected that economic activities that promote human well-being, sustainability and justice will need to be coupled with a steady-state or degrowth economy respecting planetary boundaries. This is essentially the premise of ecological economics. The future will show whether people are willing to rethink today’s concept of prosperity driven by continuous increase in economic growth. Data show that the link between income and life-satisfaction is only linear up to a certain point (Reference Clark, Flèche, Layard, Powdthavee and WardClark et al., 2018). Given that the paradigm from which a system arises has a high leverage on the system outcomes, it appears intuitive that there are important drivers of well-being, health and disease rooted in our current shared values (Reference MeadowsMeadows, 2008). It may be time for health professionals to engage in a broader conversation about transformative change.

5.4 Methodological Gaps

So far, many participatory methods rely on workshops and group facilitation. In order to operationalize participation at a larger scale, scalable tools must be developed. While these are available for example for smart cities, in the field of One Health this has not been developed. Furthermore, the call for transdisciplinarity would require multiple perspectives and the facilitation of interactions across many social boundaries.

While the skill set usually associated with public health, veterinary health or conservation relies strongly on natural science, it appears much more important to be equipped with skills unusual in these fields, such as nonviolent communication, philosophy of science, history of science, macroeconomics, systems thinking, designing thinking, dealing with scales, and (nonequilibrium) social sciences. Also, the importance of self-reflection can be stressed: dealing with ambiguity and uncertainty, and critiquing our own and others’ paradigms.

While we have discussed the concerns about the prescriptive nature of legislation previously, market mechanisms (see Chapter 6) are also failing to provide public health, animal health and welfare, and environmental protection, as the latter are not restricted to tangible entities and not tradable. Impaired health and reduced resilience at all scales is often a result of cumulative behavior. The current socio-ecological context does not seem to provide the appropriate feedback and incentives for sustainable behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience and nonequilibrium social sciences, it appears to be an achievable target to reflect on the processes and features needed in a social-ecological system for all life to thrive. Solutions may be found in ecological economics, where concepts of degrowth, green growth and similar are discussed to provide alternatives to the prevailing increasing economic growth theory. Reference DalyDaly (2003) observed that beyond a certain point, growth is uneconomic and that multiple forms of ill health and the costs thereof can increase faster than wealth. Consequently, novel conceptualizations of growth and their measurement tools provide an opportunity for different narratives, research and strategies, and relate well with, and are an integral part of, ideas of transformative change and governance.

5.5 Early One Health Lessons from COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic, a singular disruptive event in recent human history, has required rapid, innovative, coordinated and collaborative approaches to manage and ameliorate its worst impacts. However, the threat remains, and learning from initial efforts may benefit the response management in the future. One Health approaches to managing health challenges through multistakeholder engagement need an enabling environment, for example in terms of available budgets or the instigation of integrative and inclusive processes. Reference Häsler, Bazeyo and ByrneHäsler et al. (2020) described three case studies from state (New South Wales, Australia), national (Ireland) and international (sub-Saharan Africa) scales that illustrate different aspects of One Health in action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Ireland, a One Health team was assembled to help design complex mathematical and resource models. In New South Wales, state authorities engaged collaboratively with veterinarians and epidemiologists to leverage disease outbreak knowledge, expertise and technical and support structures for application to the COVID-19 emergency. The African One Health University Network linked members from health institutions and universities from eight countries to provide a virtual platform for knowledge exchange on COVID-19 to support the response. Themes common to successful experiences included a shared resource base, interdisciplinary engagement, communication network strategies and a global perspective for addressing local needs.

The authors concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic showed the need for improvement of emerging infectious disease (EID) preparedness, early warning and prevention. The cost of unpreparedness is high, leading to high mortality rates and draconic measures like lockdowns. Early warning systems in support of more targeted and rapid responses need to be strengthened. Better/broader understanding of the consequences of human–environment interactions is also needed. Several key drivers for EID clearly came to the foreground: 1. Human population density, with degrading natural ecosystems associated with increased disease transmission risk. 2. Global travel and trade. 3. Excessive consumption: resulting in the aforementioned environmental degradation, which is a defining factor for facilitating pandemics and exacerbating the effects. Barriers for overcoming these challenges are largely structural in character, both institutional (governance) and socioeconomic (see Chapter 4).

Next to direct COVID-19 / One Health related challenges, some generic challenges are relevant to One Health operationalization. The need for better interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary collaborative arrangements is one of the core ambitions of One Health. Structural barriers for collaboration remain, including a lack of mutual understanding regarding the expertise of others, meaning that work continues in silos within rigid structures. Also, attitudinal barriers remain, such as lack of openness toward collaboration. “Old” governance challenges appear even more prominent: well-coordinated multilevel, integrative governance at local, regional, national and global levels remains a crisis management challenge. Current governance structures clearly showed deficiencies in adequate crisis management, including a general lack of preparedness and lack of coordination. A better balance between relevant governance issues is needed, including social issues.

Enhanced scientific capacity is needed; there is currently insufficient long-lasting research capacity in all sectors: animal health, human health, plant health and ecosystem health. This warrants increased mutual understanding and overcoming silos: There is lack of sufficient knowledge of the expertise of the others. We need open science: sharing instead of competing on crucial knowledge. The connection between science and policy is problematic: The science-policy interface was already struggling at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, when early warnings from scientists were not taken seriously.

Systemic health challenges, like COVID-19, need a systemic approach, such as Structural One Health. This requires an integrative perspective, overcoming barriers between disciplines, sectors and topical foci. This also requires a One Health funding framework, in order to provide sufficient resources. The COVID-19 crisis clearly revealed some systemic weaknesses, and may offer momentum for change. Finally, we notice the positive role and importance of nature for health during the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting confinement measures. The lockdown policies adopted in several countries, encouraging outdoor physical activity, highlighted the role of nature recreation facilities in the urban context for human health, and the challenge of accessibility for many urban households. In situations where visits to natural surroundings were still possible, an increase in visits was observed, as shown, for example, by a public survey during the first COVID-19 wave in Belgium (Reference Lenaerts, Heyman and De DeckerLenaerts et al., 2021). People also reported a positive effect on human health and well-being. In situations where such visits were restricted, people looked forward to using parks and other natural areas, resulting in an increase in visits when allowed under lockdown restrictions. This highlights the need to account for social differences in options for contact with nature. The least deprived often live in single family dwellings with gardens and thus enjoy natural surroundings, even when confined to their homes. In preparation for future pandemics, policies should plan for socially equal access to natural surroundings (Reference Slater, Christiana and GustatSlater et al., 2020), including for human health care workers, who during a pandemic have to perform their tasks under severe pressure. In return, the increased visiting intensity of natural spaces in high density areas also poses a threat to those very spaces, and the related health benefits, and requires attention in a sustainable governance context.

5.6 Conclusions

We see many opportunities for applying One Health to transformative biodiversity governance. The transformative governance ambitions (see Chapter 1) resonate quite well with the One Health ambitions and challenges presented in this chapter. A synthesis is presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 One Health transformative biodiversity governance potential

Generic transformative governance challengesOne Health challenges
1. Practical implementation of One Health2. Integration of animal, human, plant and ecosystem health3. Integrated view on nature-related health risks and benefits4. Integration of structural societal One Health drivers
A. IntegrativeCombining different relevant ecosystem and health issues, sectors, and structural systemic drivers and outcomes
B. InclusiveChoosing how to deal with system complexity is inherently normative, which warrants the inclusion of societal deliberation next to scientific analysis
C. TransdisciplinaryCombining different relevant forms of knowledge, stemming both from different scientific disciplines and different societal perspectives
D. AdaptiveWe cannot wait for perfect understanding or consensus; we need to take One Health to iterative implementation: learning by doing
E. AnticipatoryComplexity, ongoing normative debate and development of insight need to be incorporated in analytical–deliberative transformative processes

We discuss the specific elements of the table and how they are linked in further detail. The specific One Health aspects concern the following challenges: (1) Practical implementation of One Health. This still is considered a challenge, especially when taking into account the other aspects (expectations, demands) mentioned below. Initially, (2) Integration of animal, human, plant and ecosystem health was mainly considered as the core aim of One Health. As described in the chapter, there are still challenges in that respect. This very much relates to (3) An integrated view on nature-related health risks and benefits: traditionally One Health was mainly focused on health risks, taking potential health benefits of nature contact far less into account. Finally, (4) Integration of structural societal One Health drivers, or Structural One Health, which can be seen as a more critical, fundamental and preventative turn in the One Health debate, taking it beyond the development of vaccines and culling of “dangerous” animals.

One Health, like transformative change, deals with systemic challenges. Taking into account and structuring complexity and decision-making, and dealing with inherent uncertainties, unknowns and ambiguities, is therefore at the core. The process of how to deal with complexity, also from the scientific perspective, can be perceived as a social and normative process in itself. Complexity can never be fully grasped and should encourage us to choose what has to be taken into account for understanding and action. These choices have an important framing effect and are normative in nature, requiring a combined scientific and deliberative effort (Reference CilliersCilliers, 2005; Reference KeuneKeune, 2012). In order not to stand still, we need to act wisely and deliberatively, in an adaptive learning-by-doing approach.

Collaboration is key to One Health to overcome silos. The implementation of One Health can benefit from transdisciplinary and iterative processes between policy, science and practice, and will enhance practical relevance of these collaborations (Reference Hitziger, Aragrande and BerezowskiHitziger et al., 2019). This also requires a collaborative attitude (soft skills) and a sharing attitude (open data, data sharing, integrated data base management).

In support of the above-mentioned One Health challenges, several elements of an enabling environment are to be considered. An important element is a dedicated network for professionals, practitioners and stakeholders. When the ambition of integration leads to the creation of large One Health institutions, this runs the risk of building fences rather than creating openness to (new) collaborations. This may be overcome by focusing on open, collaborative networks like Communities of Practice, which are less (institutionally) bound and more flexible, and are open to newcomers and new ideas and approaches (Reference Keune, Flandroy and ThysKeune et al., 2017). Such networks should not be limited to scientific experts, but also need to include policy experts, local knowledge holders, practitioners, grassroots organizations and all relevant stakeholders. The Network for EcoHealth and One Health (NEOH), the European chapter of EcoHealth International, is a good example, and so are other similar nature–health initiatives (Reference Keune, Friesenbichler, Häsler, Marselle, Stadler and KornKeune et al., 2019).

One Health approaches aim to overcome ad hoc reactive actions responding to emerging health challenges. It is better to develop proactive anticipatory governance capacity and preparedness, to allow us to better foresee health risks. The introduction of One Health concepts in primary, secondary and tertiary education, with the aim to raise awareness and create a natural understanding of systems and their interlinked nature, is important. Finally, the availability of sufficient financial and other resources for One Health science, policy and practice remains another crucial challenge. Current investment practices then have to put less focus on a purely economic rationale, and focus more on other rationales for society at large. A One Health funding framework could be supportive in allocation of funding, both in science, policy and practice.

6 Biodiversity Finance and Transformative Governance: The Limitations of Innovative Financial Instruments

Richard van der Hoff and Nowella Anyango-van Zwieten
6.1 Introduction

The urgency to halt and reverse the alarming rates of biodiversity loss is grounded in the most comprehensive and up-to-date evidence (e.g. Reference DasguptaDasgupta, 2021; Reference Díaz, Settele and BrondízioDíaz et al., 2019) and has been translated into a forward-looking governance agenda for stimulating biodiversity conservation (CBD, 2020a; see Chapter 1 for a more detailed overview). Preparations for this Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework have centralized the issue of raising the financial resources necessary for promoting this agenda. This outlook has spurred a wealth of new publications in recent years that address the financial challenges for the foreseeable future (OECD, 2019; 2020; Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021; Reference Turnhout, McElwee and Chiroleu‐AssoulineTurnhout et al., 2021; UNDP, 2018; 2020). Although the new challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic have postponed the development of the Post-2020 framework (see Chapter 1), they have also kindled debates on a reconfiguration of the global economic system through a “green recovery” that potentially benefits biodiversity conservation (Reference McElwee, Turnout and Chiroleu-AssoulineMcElwee et al. 2020; Reference Sandbrook, Gómez-Baggethun and AdamsSandbrook et al. 2020). These developments underline that now is the right time for critically reflecting on how to maintain and enhance a biodiverse world.

Building primarily on a critical review of literature on biodiversity finance instruments, in this chapter we aim to take these reflections a step further by assessing the role of finance from the transformative biodiversity governance perspective adopted in this book. This perspective emphasizes the necessity of a transformative change to address the underlying drivers of biodiversity loss. To realize this change, this book argues that governance approaches must be integrative, inclusive, adaptive, transdisciplinary and anticipatory (see Chapter 1). We start by defining biodiversity finance, classifying the diversity of instruments that it encompasses and exploring the challenges that it seeks to address. This sets the stage for a critique of the fundamental premises of what we refer to as “innovative financial instruments” (see below) based on four interrelated questions that capture the five dimensions of transformative governance.

  1. 1. How comprehensive is “financeable” biodiversity? Biodiversity finance conceptualizes nature from an anthropocentric, mechanical and managerial perspective;

  2. 2. Who values “financeable” biodiversity (and how)? Although transformative governance requires a recognition of value pluralism, biodiversity finance instruments inherently transpose monetary values;

  3. 3. How does biodiversity finance deal with uncertainty? Biodiversity finance instruments frame biodiversity loss as a (manageable) material risk;

  4. 4. How profound are the transformative changes fostered by biodiversity finance? There are many ways in which biodiversity finance can foster integrative governance, but it does not challenge the systemic drivers of biodiversity loss.

Our critical reflection on biodiversity finance instruments and their role in a broader governance setting points to the strengths and weaknesses of these instruments, which are presented and discussed in the concluding section.

6.2 Key Developments in Biodiversity Finance

In this section, we provide our understanding of biodiversity finance, which serves as the basis for critique in the subsequent section. We start by arguing that despite the broad range of instruments, most biodiversity finance instruments have common roots in a “nature-as-natural-capital” view (see Reference SullivanSullivan, 2018). Subsequently, we discuss three interrelated arguments found in the literature that reflect the core challenges for biodiversity finance (see Reference Anyango-van ZwietenAnyango-van Zwieten, 2021). First, it is generally asserted that there is a “funding gap” for biodiversity conservation, which leads to the argument that financial instruments need upscaling. Second, one of the primary candidates for this upscaling is a greater involvement of the private sector and market-based instruments, as most biodiversity finance still comes from public sources. Third, key to leveraging or “unlocking” private finance for conservation are financial instruments built on the view of biodiversity loss as material risk (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016). These three combined arguments are the primary target of our critical assessment in Section 6.3.

6.2.1 The Diversity of Biodiversity Finance

Biodiversity finance encompasses a diversity of instruments. A widely used definition provided by UNDP (2018: 6) describes biodiversity finance as “the practice of raising and managing capital and using financial and economic mechanisms to support sustainable biodiversity management” (see Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021). Alternatively, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2020: 7) refers to biodiversity finance as any “expenditure that contributes – or intends to contribute – to the conservation, sustainable use and restoration of biodiversity.” These definitions suggest a breadth of possibilities and require some sorting out. The lexicon offered by Reference PirardPirard (2012) offers some clarity. It states, firstly, that not all economic instruments are markets, pointing to regulatory price signals (e.g. eco-taxes) or voluntary price signals (e.g. certification, labels, norms) that intervene in existing markets to correct for market failures. There is also the establishment and regulation of “direct markets” for products and services directly derived from biodiverse ecosystems, such as ecotourism, forest and fisheries products, and others. Finally, we group together three remaining categories – Reference PirardPirard (2012) refers to these as “tradable permits” (e.g. carbon credits or fishing quotas), “reverse auctions” (e.g. payments for ecosystem services – PES) and “coasean-type agreements” (e.g. conservation easements or concessions) – that demand innovative ways of addressing biodiversity loss through processes of agreements, auctions or trade. Moreover, these categories encompass instruments that are highly heterogeneous with respect to the type of exchange and the involvement of public and/or private organizations (Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al., 2019; Reference Pirard and LapeyrePirard and Lapayre, 2014). This chapter primarily addresses this third heterogenous conglomerate of categories, also referred to as “innovative financial mechanisms” (Reference Anyango-van ZwietenAnyango-van Zwieten, 2021), which is distinct from other instruments that are premised on the stimulation or correction of existing social relations (i.e. direct markets and regulatory and voluntary price signals). They are innovative in the way in which they materialize specifically for biodiversity conservation in new hybrid forms of governance arrangements and represent new products and services, including through modifications to traditional mechanisms.

Although quite comprehensive, Reference PirardPirard’s (2012) lexicon does not encompass all biodiversity finance, as the role of the financial sector is becoming increasingly recognized in biodiversity conservation debates. Direct involvement of this sector was still incipient in the early 2010s. Early gray literature had already begun advocating for the pivotal role that the financial sector could play in stimulating biodiversity conservation (e.g. Reference Huwyler, Käppeli, Serafimova, Swanson and TobinHuwyler et. al., 2014; IUCN, 2012), but estimates of the contribution by such instruments were still absent from key biodiversity finance publications (e.g. Reference Parker, Cranford, Oakes and LeggettParker et al., 2012). Fast-forward a decade and the financial sector becomes increasingly important for its potential to “unlock” private capital for biodiversity conservation (UNDP, 2020). According to Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al. (2020), for example, green financial products like green bonds, green loans, equity funds and others account for US$3.8–6.3 billion (Table 6.1; see also Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021). Green (or blue) bonds, of which biodiversity is a small share of the total green bonds market, offer the possibility of raising financial resources for green development projects and natural assets (e.g. marine protected areas and sustainable fisheries management in Seychelles) in exchange for a return to the investor after the contract period ends (Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021). We distinguish between these biodiversity-related green financial products and other approaches that redirect existing investment flows without a clear link to biodiversity, such as “divesting,” environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria, positive and negative screening, or other norms and standards that guide investment portfolios away from unsustainable practices and sectors (e.g. the oil industry) and toward sustainable ones (Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020).

Despite myriad differences, most gray literature produced in recent years indicates that the overarching purpose of these innovative financial instruments is to redirect socioeconomic practices through value or price signals in a way that benefits biodiversity conservation. The UNDP (2018: 6) states that biodiversity finance “is about leveraging and effectively managing economic incentives, policies, and capital to achieve the long-term well-being of nature and our society” (see also Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021). Alternatively, Reference DasguptaDasgupta (2021) suggests that “finance is an enabling asset that facilitates investments in capital assets [… and …] plays a role in determining both the stock of natural capital and the extent of human demands on the biosphere” (p. 467). This means that a core function of finance is to “confer value to the three classes of capital goods [produced capital, human capital, natural capital] by facilitating their use” (p. 325). Moreover, Dasgupta argues that “the value of biodiversity is embedded in the accounting prices of natural capital” (p. 43). These conceptualizations suggest that the contribution of finance to biodiversity conservation is to value or price natural capital. This is the case even in the financial sector, where biodiversity loss may be viewed as a calculable material risk in terms of physical flows (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016), corporate reputation or broader impacts (e.g. Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020; DNP and PBL, 2020; see also Section 6.3.3). We therefore argue that the view of “nature-as-natural-capital” (Reference SullivanSullivan, 2018) forms the foundation for most innovative biodiversity finance mechanisms and, therefore, the critiques presented in this chapter are directly targeted at this view.

6.2.2 Principal Challenges for “Unlocking” Biodiversity Finance

Much biodiversity finance literature often proceeds from a compelling argument that, on the one hand, biodiversity conservation is economically important as many sectors rely on it, but, on the other hand, effective implementation of biodiversity conservation is costlier than is currently provided by financial instruments. The implementation of the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity (2011–2020), for example, would incur annual costs of US$150–440 billion (UNDP, 2018). More recently, Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al. (2020) have reported an annual funding need of US$722–967 billion by 2030 for the sustainable management of protected areas, landscapes and seascapes, and urban environments (see also Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021). Such estimates have been used as the basis for estimating what is called the “funding gap.”

Many studies that estimate the funding gap compare the funding needs discussed above with the financial resources spent on biodiversity conservation (see Table 6.1). Although an accurate comparison of these results needs to account for differences in definitions, methodologies, assumptions and epistemologies, they illustrate the general trends over time in emphasizing the funding gap. At the global level, for example, Reference Parker, Cranford, Oakes and LeggettParker et al. (2012) have estimated biodiversity finance resources to be US$50.8–52.7 billion in 2010, while Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al. (2020) estimated this to be US$123.6–142.9 billion in 2019. More important than the apparent growth of available biodiversity finance over time, both studies report a funding gap of US$99.2–387.3 billion and US$598.4–824.1 billion, respectively. This funding gap problem plays out at lower levels of governance as well, particularly with respect to protected areas. The European Union Natura 2000 network of protected areas, for example, requires a total investment of €5.8 billion per year for its maintenance and ecological improvement (Reference Kettunen, Torkler and RaymentKettunen et al., 2014), but the EU’s advance budgetary allocation between 2007 and 2013 was only €0.6–1.2 billion per year (Reference Kettunen, Baldock and GantiolerKettunen et al., 2011). Likewise, lion conservation in protected areas in Africa receives US$0.4 billion annually despite indicating a need for US$1.2–2.4 billion (Reference Lindsey, Miller and PetraccaLindsey et al., 2018), while the Brazilian protected areas had a funding deficit of nearly US$360 million for their management costs in 2016 (Reference Silva, Dias, Cunha and CunhaSilva et al., 2021). Notwithstanding the estimate variation or the scale of governance, the central argument remains the same: finance needs upscaling to address the funding gap.

Table 6.1 Overview of global biodiversity finance sources and needs. Amounts are in billion US$ (categories are based on Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020)

CategoryReference Parker, Cranford, Oakes and LeggettParker et al., 2012; UNDP, 2018OECD, 2020Reference Tobin-de la Puente and MitchellTobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021; Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020
Reference year20102015–20172019
Natural infrastructure1PublicUnspecifiedUnspecified26.9
Domestic budgets and tax policyPublic33.467.774.6–77.7
Official development aidPublic6.33.9–9.14.0–9.7
Other public finance flowsPublic<0.1–0.9Unspecified
Total public finance39.771.6–77.0US$ 105.5–114.3
Biodiversity offsetsPublic-Private2.5–4.12.6–7.36.3–9.2
Green financial productsPublic-PrivateUnspecifiedUnspecified3.8–6.3
Nature-based solutions and carbon marketsPublic-PrivateUnspecified<0.1–0.10.8–1.4
Sustainable supply chains and commoditiesPrivate6.62.3–2.85.5–8.2
Philanthropy, conservation NGOsPrivate1.4–1.71.4–2.71.7–3.5
Other private finance flowsPrivate0.4–0.50.2–0.9Unspecified
Total private and hybrid finance10.9–12.96.6–13.618.1–28.6
Total biodiversity finance50.8–52.778.2–90.6123.6–142.9
Total financing needs150–440Unspecified722–967
Finance gap99.2–387.3598.4–824.1

1 According to Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al. (2020: 121), natural infrastructure involves “networks of land and water bodies that provide ecosystem services for human populations, which produce similar outcomes to implemented gray infrastructure.”

In addition to the identification of a funding gap, the studies reported here identify another feature of biodiversity finance, which is that the bulk of this finance still comes from public sources. The comparisons in Table 6.1 demonstrate this clearly for global biodiversity finance, where contributions from public sources currently vary between 73.8 percent and 92.5 percent (percentages were based on the estimates reported by Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020). Moreover, public finance for biodiversity conservation competes with other important goals. For instance, international funding through conservation NGOs is less than 1 percent of official development assistance (ODA) to Africa (Reference Brockington and ScholfieldBrockington and Scholfield, 2010). While public finance alone is unlikely to be sufficient for closing the funding gap (Reference Huwyler, Käppeli, Serafimova, Swanson and TobinHuwyler et. al., 2014), private finance has been slow in directing financial resources to biodiversity conservation. Between 2004 and 2015, most private investments were made in (more) sustainable food and fiber production (US$6.5 billion), so outside the innovative financial instruments that we are focusing on here. Investments in habitat conservation (US$1.3 billion) and water quality and quantity (US$0.4 billion) were much lower, although the latter was still backed by substantial public investments (US$21.5 billion between 2009 and 2015) (Reference HamrickHamrick, 2016).

To address this gap, most studies argue for “unlocking” private finance (e.g. UNDP, 2020). In this respect, many innovative financial mechanisms are targeted at enhancing private sector funding, increasing involvement of private capital and implementing market-based instruments (Reference Anyango-van ZwietenAnyango-van-Zwieten, 2021; Reference Clark, Reed and SunderlandClark et al., 2018; EC, 2011; Reference Gutman and DavidsonGutman and Davidson, 2007; Reference MilesMiles, 2005; Reference PirardPirard, 2012; Reference Thiele and GerberThiele and Gerber, 2017; UNDP, 2020). Similarly, stakeholders have started to build the “business case” for biodiversity conservation to attract private sector involvement by pointing out cost reduction, return-on-investment and risk mitigation motives, among others (IUCN, 2012; OECD, 2019). The UNDP and the European Commission, for example, launched the Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN) in 2012 to seek new methodologies for “optimal” and “evidence-based” biodiversity finance plans and solutions (UNDP, 2018; 2020). The European Commission also launched its own EU Business @ Biodiversity Platform (B@B) in 2007. Arguably, the most promoted instruments for leveraging financial resources are deemed to be market-based, meaning that “biodiversity conservation [is] financed through and undertaken with the aim of generating profitable returns for their investors” (Reference Dempsey and SuarezDempsey and Suarez, 2016: 654). At the same time, such for-profit instruments still face challenges, including lack of scale (often the projects are too small), lack of financial track record, lack of so-called angel investors at the risky early-stage phase and poor project design without “investable, simple and understandable conservation asset classes” (Reference Anyango-van ZwietenAnyango-van Zwieten, 2020; Reference Huwyler, Käppeli, Serafimova, Swanson and TobinHuwyler et al., 2014: 27). The task ahead, these publications assert, is to address these challenges and scale up private finance to close the funding gap.

6.2.3 Toward a Critical Assessment of Biodiversity Finance

Unlocking private finance has a broader and more important role in mainstreaming biodiversity in all socioeconomic sectors by closing a “different gap” between the current state-of-affairs and a transformative change thereof. In practice, this requires catalyzing more structural transformations of economic and financial systems because “all economic sectors need to contribute to conserving biodiversity and ecosystems and their sustainable management” (CBD, 2020b; Reference Díaz, Settele and BrondízioDíaz et. al., 2019; UNDP, 2020: 12). In this context, the CBD’s Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework was, at the time of writing this chapter, expected to incite new and additional financial resources, stimulate corporate sector accountability and establish more rigorous safeguards for private sector engagement (Reference Ching, Lin and BeirutChing and Lin, 2019). Greening finance, then, involves a broader transition of biodiversity governance into a “whole-of-society approach” (Reference Van Oorschot, Kok and Van TulderVan Oorschot et al., 2020) where existing biodiversity finance instruments catalyze this transition rather than merely addressing the “funding gap” for biodiversity conservation. The establishment of the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) in 2017, for example, aims to “mobilize mainstream finance to support the transition toward a sustainable economy” (NGFS, 2020), promote the adoption of sustainable and responsible investment principles and address the environmental and societal impacts of the policy portfolios of central banks across the world (NGFS, 2019; see Section 6.3.3. for an example from Brazil). At the same time, this approach still faces substantial challenges, such as reshaping entrenched investment norms, risk definitions and investment practices in the financial sector (Reference Crona, Eriksson and LerpoldCrona et al., 2021).

Recognizing that the whole-of-society approach advocated by the Post-2020 Framework was still in the initial stages of development, the critical assessment of biodiversity finance presented in the remainder of this chapter focuses on the innovative financial instruments that aim to catalyze this approach. For purposes of clarity, we understand such instruments to encompass not only “tradable permits,” “reverse auctions” and “coasean-type agreements,” in Reference PirardPirard´s (2012) lexicon, but also new financial products like nature derivatives and weather insurances that mitigate the material risks of biodiversity loss (Reference Anyango-van ZwietenAnyango-van Zwieten, 2021). Our analysis thereby excludes price signals (e.g. US$274–542 of harmful subsidies, see Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020), although we acknowledge their importance within the broader context of biodiversity finance. Furthermore, we acknowledge the intense controversies around the extent to which instruments like biodiversity offsetting, PES or nature derivatives are market-based, economic or financial, but at the same time argue that this variety of instruments share common ontological and epistemological foundations. Focusing on innovative financial instruments is therefore our attempt to capture this common ground.

6.3 Deconstructing Biodiversity Finance for Transformative Change

This section addresses the four central questions that are in line with the core purposes of this book, as presented in the introduction. It also critically discusses innovative financial instruments in light of the five dimensions of transformative governance (i.e. integrative, inclusive, adaptive, transdisciplinary and anticipatory; see Chapter 1 for full definitions). Based on this framework, we first deconstruct discussions in the literature and then summarize each subsection with our critique.

6.3.1 How Comprehensive Is “Financeable” Biodiversity?

All innovative finance instruments have a material basis for making transactions possible. Many instruments tie financial resources to objects like credits, rights, quotas, offsets and permits that in many ways give access to natural capital (e.g. Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al., 2019; Reference May, Bernasconi, Wunder and LubowskiMay et al., 2015; Reference Van der Hoff and Rajãovan der Hoff and Rajão, 2020). This access to natural capital should be understood as its utilization either as a source of natural resources (e.g. permits to extract fish from Antarctic waters) or as a sink for the wasteful byproducts of economic activity (e.g. credits for greenhouse gas emissions or Tradable Development Rights). Nonmarket instruments like results-based payments require a clear definition of the “results” or “performance” (e.g. emissions reductions) in relation to conservation objectives (Reference Van der Hoff, Rajão and LeroyVan der Hoff et al., 2019). In the financial sector, we encounter bonds, derivatives, securities, swaps, futures and insurances, among others, that facilitate investments in conservation (e.g. green bonds) or hedge against the risk of biodiversity loss (e.g. weather derivatives) (Reference BrackingBracking, 2012; Reference Little, Parslow and FayLittle et al., 2014; Reference Ouma, Johnson and BiggerOuma et al., 2018; Reference SullivanSullivan, 2018). For purposes of argumentation, we will refer to this material basis as “financeable objects.”

Following Reference Callon and MuniesaCallon and Muniesa (2005: 1233–1234), these financeable objects are the outcome of processes of “objectification” and “singularization” of (parts of) biodiversity and by which financial transactions become possible. Objectification emphasizes the materiality of this object, which means that they have tangible and objective properties that characterize them as a “good” (e.g. rubber), “service” (e.g. pollination) or more abstract (financial) products like derivatives. These objects become financeable through “singularization,” which “consists in a gradual definition of the properties of the product [or object], shaped in such a way that it can enter into the consumer’s world and become attached to it.” This means that the object can be assigned a value (see below) and appropriated by others. Take biodiversity offsets as an example (Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al., 2019): In most schemes, the biodiversity in areas with natural vegetation is assessed based on indicators of habitat type, species, threat level, richness, rarity, diversity and connectivity, among others. These indicators are then used to classify these areas and establish biodiversity offset credits. The number of credit types range from only one (e.g. the Rio Tinto QIT Madagascar Minerals [RTQMM] offsets) or two (e.g. species and ecosystem credits in the New South Wales Biodiversity Conservation Trust), to up to eight (wetland mitigation banking in the United States). These credits are the financeable objects of biodiversity offsetting that can be acquired by developers to compensate for their impact on nature. Even in cases where such exchange does not take place (say, results-based payments for REDD+), one may argue that financing parties may obtain other gains from the “investment,” like satisfying domestic political constituencies (e.g. Reference AngelsenAngelsen [2017] calls this “political offsets”).

The translation of biodiversity into “financeable objects” poses several challenges to transformative biodiversity governance because it denotes a very managerial approach to nature conservation. Reference SullivanSullivan (2017, Reference Sullivan2018) calls this approach a “nature-as-natural-capital” view that is enacted through processes of commensuration (i.e. enhancing the comparability of nature), aggregation (i.e. a preference of total quantities over qualitative specificity) and capitalization (i.e. producing natural assets or, in this chapter, financeable nature). It embodies an ontological understanding of nature as mechanically composed of “gears and bolts” (Reference WorsterWorster, 1994) or “rivets” (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016) that, epistemologically, can be fully known and, more importantly, used and managed to meet human needs and preferences, thereby representing instrumental values (see Chapter 2). Although this ontological and epistemological view is enormously powerful (think about the ecosystem services concept), the downside is that it excludes a vast array of alternative ways of knowing and interacting with nature, which precludes possibilities for transdisciplinary governance. Although ecologists and economists have been working closely together on nature conservation issues since the 1980s, Reference DempseyDempsey (2016) argues that this collaboration leans more toward economic than ecological pragmatics. Many studies have lamented the ecologically reductionist conceptualizations of nature hidden in the “nature commodification” of PES schemes (e.g. Reference Kosoy and CorberaKosoy and Corbera, 2010; Reference WilsonWilson, 2013), the metrics of biodiversity offsetting (Reference Marshall, Wintle, Southwell and KujalaMarshall et al., 2020) and the methodology of biodiversity valuation (Reference Farnsworth, Adenuga and de GrootFarnsworth et al., 2015). Finally, such objects exclude alternative sources of intrinsic, spiritual and other forms of meaning (Reference LabandLaband, 2013) in order to only reflect the measurable and delineable properties of the financeable object.

Another problem with financeable objects is that they need to be rigid in order to become operational, which allows little space for adaptation. The market for Tradable Development Rights (TDRs) in Brazil, also called Environmental Reserve Quota (or Cota de Reserva Ambiental – CRA), is a case in point. Rural landowners in Brazil are obliged by law to conserve native vegetation on their properties (up to 80 percent in the Amazon), demanding restoration in case of a deficit and allowing deforestation in case of surplus. The CRA market offers an alternative option: Landowners with a surplus may issue and sell CRAs rather than deforest, while those with a deficit may acquire CRAs instead of restoring native vegetation (Reference May, Bernasconi, Wunder and LubowskiMay et al., 2015). For over two decades of political development, this market has been subject to substantial expansions, one of which involves the geographical boundaries of trade (i.e. from trade within watershed to trade within biome and across states) (Reference Van der Hoff and Rajãovan der Hoff and Rajão, 2020). These expanded trade boundaries, the outcome of political pressure from the rural caucus, were challenged by a supreme court ruling that demanded a proof of similar “ecological identity” of properties engaged in a CRA exchange. Although this ruling is considered positive from a biodiversity conservation standpoint, it also poses significant challenges to ecologists to establish a workable indicator and thus slows down the operationalization of the market (Reference Rajão, Del Giudice, van der Hoff and de CarvalhoRajão et al., 2021).

Our critical assessment of the nature of financeable objects denotes an argument against the role of finance in transformative biodiversity governance. Such objects necessarily build on an economic conceptualization of nature that emphasizes its measurability, its manageability, its anthropocentrism and its instrumentalism. More importantly, this economism can potentially drown out other approaches to nature conservation, such as arguments for conserving pristine nature (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016) or a harmonious relationship with nature that embeds local livelihoods (e.g. buen vivir, see Chapters 2, 8 and 9), which attests to poor inclusive governance. The difficulty (if not impossibility) of other ontologies and epistemologies to shape this financeable object also preclude the manifestation of a truly transdisciplinary governance. Moreover, this constrained transdisciplinarity limits possibilities for adaptive governance, as the CRA trade in Brazil exemplifies.

6.3.2 Whose Values Does “Financeable” Biodiversity Represent (and Whose Are Excluded)?

The process of singularization does not stop at defining the financeable object. According to Reference Callon and MuniesaCallon and Muniesa (2005: 1233), “the thing that ‘holds together’ [the financeable object] is a good if and only if its properties represent a value for the buyer.” Applied to biodiversity finance, it suggests that financing biodiversity conservation occurs only if the destination (i.e. the financeable object) of these resources is considered to be valuable. Biodiversity indicators by themselves do not immediately prompt a mobilization of financial resources, but once they are packaged in, say, development rights or biodiversity offsets, they become valuable to potential financers. This value perception is fundamental. Results-based payments to the Brazilian Amazon Fund, for example, were based on demonstrated deforestation reductions in the Amazon region,Footnote 1 but its financers (mainly the Norwegian government) had slightly different criteria for “valuable” results than Brazil. Brazil held the belief that it deserved to be rewarded for past achievements (deforestation fell from nearly 30,000 km2 in 2004 to less than 5,000 km2 in 2012) and therefore maintained that annual results accumulate over time. By contrast, financers retained the preference for financing only the most recent results (e.g. Norway’s payments in 2017 referred to results obtained in 2016). As deforestation rates went up in the 2010s, annual “results” significantly declined and financers were compelled to stop payments due to lack of “valuable results” (Reference Van der Hoff, Rajão and Leroyvan der Hoff et al., 2018). In other words, the financeable object – be it an offset, a bond or a permit – needs to be perceived as valuable by the financer, otherwise financing is unlikely to take place.

Innovative financial instruments communicate the value to financiers in monetary terms. Section 6.2 already noted Reference DasguptaDasgupta’s (2021) conceptualization of biodiversity finance as a conveyor of biodiversity value through natural capital accounting prices. Economists claim that the previous inexistence of such prices was (and still is) the underlying problem of biodiversity loss. Reference Pearce, Markandya and BarbierPearce, Markandya and Barbier (1989: 5), for example, argued that when “something is provided at a zero price, more of it will be demanded than if there was a positive price.” For landowners in the Brazilian Amazon, for example, standing forests have little value and legislation obliging them to conserve forests is perceived as an obstruction to land development (e.g. agriculture) and thus incurs high opportunity costs (Reference Metzger, Bustamante and FerreiraMetzger et al., 2019; Reference Stickler, Nepstad, Azevedo and McGrathStickler et al., 2013). Putting a price on these forests could change these perceptions. One of the main ideas behind the CRA market in Brazil, for example, was to allow landowners with vegetation beyond legal requirements to sell quota to those with deficits (in the final regularization, this was expanded to include PES as well) instead of legally clearing the land for, say, agricultural development (Reference Van der Hoff and Rajãovan der Hoff and Rajão, 2020; see also Section 6.2.1). Other finance instruments raise the costs of development projects (Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al., 2019) or risks related to biodiversity loss (Reference Little, Parslow and FayLittle et al., 2014). The value of biodiversity reflected in these prices transposes the idea that using (or destroying) nature is no longer for free, but involves foregone opportunities or additional costs.

Prices, however, muddle the value of biodiversity in two ways. Firstly, the anthropocentrism implied in the type of biodiversity knowledge that forms the foundation of financeable objects (see Section 6.3.1), to which economists assign a “use value” and, subsequently, an exchange value. The ecosystem services concept is a notable reflection of these use values of biodiversity and there is currently a wealth of different tools to inform decision-makers (Reference Grêt-Regamey, Sirén, Brunner and WeibelGrêt-Regamey et al., 2017; Reference Martinez-Harms, Bryan and BalvaneraMartinez-Harms et al., 2015). According to critical scholars, however, this use value of biodiversity overemphasizes those aspects of nature that instrumentally benefit humankind, but downplays, excludes or even fails to perceive others that may be otherwise valuable. Economists have come a long way in identifying future use or non-use values (e.g. option, bequest and existence values; [see Reference Tietenberg and lewisTietenberg and Lewis, 2018]), but other uses of ecosystems that reflect cultural, aesthetic, spiritual and intrinsic values are extremely hard to express numerically (Reference Small, Munday and DuranceSmall et al., 2017; see also Chapters 2, 8 and 9). Recognition of such value pluralism is not new, but has been advocated in predominantly noneconomist disciplines like anthropology (e.g. Reference GraeberGraeber, 2001) and environmental ethics (e.g. Reference HourdequinHourdequin, 2015) and has become an important theme in the critical discipline of ecological economics (Reference SpashSpash, 2017). Even Reference Costanza, de Groot and BraatCostanza et al. (2017), who famously and controversially valued the world’s ecosystem services at US$16–54 trillion per year, acknowledge that the economic definition of value is too narrow as individuals are unable to appreciate or even perceive how some ecosystem services are valuable to them. The prevalence of use values in biodiversity finance (see Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016) is a far cry from this value pluralism, which attests to its constrained ability to promote transdisciplinary governance.

The second layer of problems with the prices of financeable objects refers to the repercussions of translating nature into use values and exchange values. Firstly, prices exacerbate the commensurability of inherently distinct dimensions of nature that are reflected in nonmonetary numeric assessments of biodiversity (Reference SullivanSullivan, 2017). Monetary valuation reduces “the problem of scarcity [of nature] into a problem of scarcity of capital, considered as an abstract category expressible in homogeneous monetary units” (Reference NaredoNaredo, 2003: 250). Commensurate nature can thus be considered on a par with economically or technologically alternative actions. For instance, Brazilian landowners can choose their preferred course of action depending on their situation. Those with conservation deficits can choose between restoring degraded land or acquiring CRA, while those with vegetation beyond legal requirements can choose to legally clear it or sell CRA credits (Reference May, Bernasconi, Wunder and LubowskiMay et al., 2015). Secondly, an emphasis on prices widens the gap between what innovative financial instruments define as valuable and the local perceptions and values of peoples on the ground. For example, the Brazilian Amazon Fund disburses financial resources to a myriad of projects that contribute to regional sustainability despite unclear contributions to emissions reductions (Reference Correa, van der Hoff and RajãoCorrea et al., 2019), which become prejudiced as Brazil’s basis for receiving donations is eroded (see above; Reference Van der Hoff, Rajão and LeroyVan der Hoff et al., 2018). Conversely, the introduction of monetary values for biodiversity through, say, PES initiatives may risk “crowding out” the intrinsic motivations of local people to conserve nature (Reference Akers and YasuéAkers and Yasué, 2019). Nonmonetary values thus become sidelined, while “valuable” development and conservation projects prevail (see also Reference Laschefski, Zhouri, Puzone and MiguelLaschefski and Zhouri, 2019; Reference Villén-Pérez, Mendes, Nóbrega, Gomes Córtes and De MarcoVillén-Pérez et al., 2018). These problems pose significant challenges for integrative and inclusive governance.

6.3.3 How Does Biodiversity Finance Deal with Uncertainty?

There are many similarities between the “nature-as-natural-capital” view and what Reference DempseyDempsey (2016) calls the “biodiversity loss as material risk” perspective. The central tenet is that biodiversity loss is a financial and economic risk that has (or will have) an impact on the bottom line. This is a fast-developing awareness: in 2010 biodiversity loss featured inconspicuously as “less prominent” in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Risks Landscape report but dominated its global risks reports in 2021 (WEF, 2010; 2021). Two key responses to this growing awareness are that biodiversity loss needs to be managed as a business risk as well as treated as an opportunity for profit-making. The management and commodification of biodiversity risks have translated into new financial products including green bonds, rainforest bonds and climate bonds, biodiversity and nature derivatives, weather derivatives, catastrophe bonds and commodity index funds (Reference Ouma, Johnson and BiggerOuma et al., 2018; Reference SullivanSullivan, 2018). This calculative management of biodiversity risks is different from a precautionary approach that acknowledges the difficulty or impossibility of such calculations, preferring not to seek out the threshold of the “critical rivet” (Paul and Anne Ehrlich, cited in Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016). The agricultural sector, for example, may insure itself against unpredictable climate patterns like low precipitation, severe drought and destructive storms (e.g. Reference Souza and AssunçãoSouza and Assunção, 2020), but cannot account for the full complexity of impending ecosystem “tipping points” to irreversibly transition to unfavorable landscapes (e.g. Reference Lovejoy and NobreLovejoy and Nobre, 2019). The calculative, managerial approach to uncertainty adopted by the financial sector, therefore, does not correspond with the precautionary definition of anticipatory governance.

In terms of inclusive and transdisciplinary governance, risk management instruments such as biodiversity derivatives, bonds and futures are designed to give preeminence to financial actors, their expertise and knowledge (Reference BrackingBracking, 2012). Though “spark[ing] the interest and imagination of investors” (Reference Brockington, Büscher, Dressler and FletcherBrockington, 2014: 123), these instruments are severed from actual conservation (Reference BüscherBüscher, 2013). Take regional precipitation patterns as an example. Reference Strand, Soares-Filho and CostaStrand et al. (2018) estimate that a decreased capacity of Amazonian forests to provide this climate regulation service reduces rents and productivity for the soybean, beef and hydroelectricity sectors, incurring an average cost of US$1.81, US$5.43 and US$0.32 per hectare per year, respectively. Although understanding how these sectors negatively impact their own business through land clearing has the potential to raise awareness about the “real costs” of biodiversity loss, the challenge is to make these costs felt at the individual company level (see Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016). Reference Rode, Pinzon and StabileRode et al. (2019: 7) found that the identification and valuation of ecosystem services does not readily attract investments, but “require[s] specific stakeholder processes and verification procedures” for this information to become part of these stakeholders’ worlds (see also Reference Callon and MuniesaCallon and Muniesa, 2005). Using the concepts of Reference SullivanSullivan (2018), investable nature requires not only its understanding as capital (qualification) in numeric or monetary terms (quantification), but also its subsequent “fabrication” into a “leverageable” asset class (materialization). Some risks become financeable objects (e.g. bonds, futures and other derivatives), while others become quantitative indicators that inform decision-making.

Not all uncertainties can readily become “calculated” risks and require substantial initial investment to catalyze private sector interest. In this respect, according to Reference ChristiansenChristiansen (2021: 96), blended finance emphasizes the role of public finance “to pursue so-called ‘crowding-in’ of investments by either lowering [real or perceived] risks or increasing [anticipated] returns for private investments,” especially during the initial “seed-stages” of conservation projects. Blended finance is the use of public and philanthropic funds to leverage private finance. Evaluating the Unlocking Forest Finance (UFF) project in Brazil and Peru, Reference Rode, Pinzon and StabileRode et al. (2019: 7) emphasize that investor expectations and requirements do not “reflect the realities of the current scale, return and risk structures of sustainable landscape investments on the ground.” These challenges, they argue, could be mitigated through the mobilization of blended finance that includes philanthropy to ensure direct conservation benefits or impact monitoring, NGOs to offer technical support for implementation, and governments to reduce risk of investment. Blended finance, then, may offer a “proof of concept” to build investor confidence in making sustainable investments (Reference ChristiansenChristiansen, 2021). It is in these initial stages that learning – or adaptive governance – is most likely to take place (Reference Rode, Pinzon and StabileRode et al., 2019). At the same time, the investor requirements related to financial returns and risk exposure tend to drown out other criteria for assembling the investment portfolio, at least in the case of sustainable agriculture. In catering to these requirements, blended finance adheres to the predominant investor milieu and thereby risks relinquishing aspects of inclusive (not all projects are financed) and transdisciplinary (not all criteria are weighed equally) governance.

In practice, businesses, farmers, investors and corporations perceive biodiversity losses as reputational or regulatory risks (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016). With respect to the latter, for example, introducing sustainability performance as a condition for granting rural credit has great potential to prompt the immediate behavioral change of rural producers (e.g. Reference Rode, Pinzon and StabileRode et al., 2019). In Brazil, the introduction of such sustainability criteria in 2008 by the Central Bank has had significant repercussions for its agricultural sector and contributed to the declining deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon at the time (Reference Assunção, Gandour, Rocha and RochaAssunção et al., 2019). In this case, biodiversity loss comes at a price: restricted access to finance. This example underscores that consideration of biodiversity loss as a material risk by private sector organizations still requires strong encouragement through blended finance initiatives and strong governmental institutions. Moreover, it signals that economic efficiency continues to prevail even in the “triple bottom-line” over environmental protection and social equality (Reference ChristiansenChristiansen, 2021). Despite its contribution to internalizing externalities, the “biodiversity loss as material risk” perspective still denotes a limited contribution to transformative governance.

6.3.4 How Profound Are the Transformative Changes Fostered by Biodiversity Finance?

Innovative financing instruments for biodiversity conservation commonly involve multiactor networks. Firstly, they establish connections between the “users” and “providers” of biodiversity. Examples abound: the CRA market links landowners with vegetation beyond legal requirements to landowners with legal deficits (Reference May, Bernasconi, Wunder and LubowskiMay et al., 2015; Reference Van der Hoff and Rajãovan der Hoff and Rajão, 2020); biodiversity offsetting ties potentially harmful development projects to conservation efforts (Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al., 2019); responsible investors can buy green bonds from organizations or governments that develop sustainable economic activities or strengthen conservation (for examples, see Reference Deutz, Heal and NiuDeutz et al., 2020); and polluting countries make results-based payments to forested countries (Reference AngelsenAngelsen, 2017; Reference Van der Hoff, Rajão and Leroyvan der Hoff et al., 2018). Secondly, the actor networks of innovative finance instruments often extend beyond “users” and “providers.” Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al. (2019) make this abundantly clear with respect to biodiversity offsetting. In Germany, for example, municipal governments are responsible for matching the supply side (i.e. buying or leasing land for conservation) and the demand side (i.e. reviewing assessments of biodiversity losses at impact sites) of development impact compensation. Alternatively, wetland mitigation banking in the United States is a mandatory market arrangement under the Clean Water Act (1980) that potentially harmful development projects must adhere to. Reference Koh, Hahn and BoonstraKoh et al. (2019) also argue that many biodiversity offsetting schemes include conservation NGOs (e.g. England, South Africa, Madagascar), consultancies (nearly all schemes evaluated), trust funds (e.g. Australia), and brokers (England, Australia, United States). Reference Barton, Benavides and Chacon-CascanteBarton et al. (2017) have taken this argument a step further by describing Costa Rica’s PES program as a policy mix that combines different actor types in different roles following specific rules (“rules-in-use”) in order to attain conservation objectives (see also Reference Ring, Barton, Martínez-Alier and MuradianRing and Barton, 2015). These examples suggest a potential of some biodiversity finance instruments to foster coordination among different actors toward biodiversity conservation objectives.

Some finance instruments also link conservation actions across governance levels. In the case of the Amazon Fund, the financial resources are passed on by the recipient (i.e. Amazon Fund) to projects that correspond with core categories of Brazilian environmental policies, most notably (1) monitoring and control, (2) land tenure and regularization and (3) sustainable economic activities. More importantly, the Amazon Fund, mediated by the Brazilian Development Bank, acts more like a mediator than a recipient. The transaction of financial resources from investors (e.g. the Norwegian government) to the Amazon Fund is not the final objective, since these resources are passed on to a plethora of other stakeholders across Brazil that comply with specific access requirements (e.g. project documentation). For example, this allowed the Amazon Fund to strengthen and empower protected areas with an investment of over US$66 million (Reference Correa, van der Hoff and RajãoCorrea et al., 2019; Reference Van der Hoff, Rajão and LeroyVan der Hoff et al., 2018). Such an arrangement of transactions enacts what some REDD+ scholars have called a “nested approach,” where individual projects are embedded in broader national and international governance networks (Reference Angelsen, Streck, Peskett, Brown and LuttrellAngelsen et al., 2008). More recent efforts at integration aim to build an architecture for REDD+ transactions (ART) that demand upscaling efforts to national levels and subsuming lower-level performance (e.g. biome or states) within national accounting (see ART, 2021).

Despite the potential of innovative financial instruments to contribute to integrative governance through coordination (e.g. a “nested approach” to REDD+) and combination (e.g. PES policy mix) (see Chapter 1), some nuancing is appropriate here. Firstly, the very rules-in-use that enable such integration to take place also constrain the finance instruments that apply them. For instance, the Brazilian Amazon Fund distributes financial resources based on criteria that include organizational capacity to comply with its strict reporting demands, making it harder for finance to flow to smaller (but no less important) projects (Reference Correa, van der Hoff and RajãoCorrea et al., 2019; Reference Van der Hoff, Rajão and Leroyvan der Hoff et al., 2018). It must further be noted that these rules are politically negotiated. In Brazil’s CRA market, smallholders may supply credits that represent all vegetation on their properties (even when they have a legal deficit), while uncompensated properties located inside protected areas (already protected by law) may supply credits representative of their legal surpluses (Reference Van der Hoff and Rajãovan der Hoff and Rajão, 2020).Footnote 2 The degree to which biodiversity finance instruments are inclusive depends to a large extent on how these rules-in-use are defined.

Another limitation, closely related to the former, is that there are limits to the degree of integration that innovative finance instruments can foster. Outcomes of PES programs, for example, challenge the characterization as a policy mix (see above) evidenced by contextual factors that are unaccounted for and that (positively or negatively) affect their performance. The Costa Rican government actively portrays its PES program as a market instrument, whereas in practice the program has been accepted by recipient farmers as a recognition of their stewardship, more than the prospect of being rewarded, which enhances the likelihood of positive outcomes (Reference Chapman, Satterfield, Wittman and ChanChapman et al., 2020), and the PES program in Chiapas, Mexico, has faced substantial social conflict that threatens its continuity (Reference Corbera, Costedoat, Ezzine-de-Blas and Van HeckenCorbera et al., 2020). Mixed outcomes were also found for biodiversity offsets (Reference Bidaud, Schreckenberg and RabeharisonBidaud et al., 2017). Alternatively, deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon have been rising since 2012 despite increased disbursements from the Amazon Fund, which denotes that such instruments rarely operate in isolation and that conservation outcomes are just as much the result of the synergetic effects of factors like a hostile political climate (e.g. the Amazon Fund was extinguished in 2019) and broader commodity market developments. These examples illustrate that the outcomes of innovative financial instruments are affected by contextual factors that cannot be fully accounted for, which suggests that they themselves need to be integrated into a broader policy or governance mix.

Finally, and most importantly, biodiversity finance does not challenge the foundations of the capitalist system that is often argued to reinforce many of the known drivers of biodiversity loss (Reference Díaz, Settele and BrondízioDíaz et al., 2019), because it reproduces the existing (skewed) power relations that this system builds on. The adoption of the CRA market in Brazil, for example, does not challenge the notion that, by federal constitution, private land needs to be used “productively” and could not prevent the “flexibilization” of nature conservation requirements via a new Forest Code in 2012 that mostly benefits dominant agribusiness interests (Reference Rajão, Del Giudice, van der Hoff and de CarvalhoRajão et al., 2021; Reference Van der Hoff and RajãoVan der Hoff and Rajão, 2020). In addition, blended finance exacerbates global economic imbalances by giving preferential treatment to donors’ own private sector firms and focusing on middle income countries (Reference PereiraPereira, 2017). These instruments typically aim to influence decision-making processes at the individual level (for example institutional investors) but do not challenge systemic or structural drivers of biodiversity loss. These perennial issues jeopardize the inclusive dimension of transformative governance. By insufficiently challenging the indirect drivers of biodiversity loss, moreover, they cannot be considered transformative as they do not correspond with the definition of transformative governance in Chapter 1, which states that addressing these indirect drivers is fundamental.

6.4 Conclusions and Ways Forward

The challenges for innovative financial instruments to support transformative biodiversity governance are substantial as they pose multiple limitations for transformative governance both in terms of its five dimensions and with respect to addressing the drivers of biodiversity loss. Starting with the dimensions (see Table 6.2), our analysis shows that while these instruments may foster integrative governance to some extent (see Section 6.3.4), they exacerbate the marginalization of local communities and values. In addition, the emphasis on financeable objects and monetary values promotes the biodiversity-as-natural-capital and biodiversity-loss-as-material-risk views that underpin the mobilization of financial resources. At the same time, these traits advance an ontological and epistemological understanding of biodiversity that is inherently narrow in terms of both its substance and its value, which undermines the inclusive and transdisciplinary dimensions of transformative governance. Other dimensions contain mixed considerations. With respect to adaptive governance, evidence in the reviewed literature indicates processes of learning taking place, although these mostly tend to occur in the initial stages of instrument development (see Section 6.3.3). In addition, the incorporation of biodiversity-related uncertainties into financial decisions, although in itself positive, follows a managerial and calculative approach that translates these into material risks. In terms of the five dimensions of transformative governance, therefore, innovative financial instruments must be approached cautiously and critically.

Table 6.2 Assessment summary for innovative financial instruments. Symbols refer to positive (+), negative (−) and mixed or neutral (*) assessments and reflect author interpretations

GovernanceAssessmentEvidencePotential ways forward
IntegrativeMixed(+) Potential for multiactor and multilevel governance•“Whole-of-society approach” (Reference Van Oorschot, Kok and Van TulderVan Oorschot et al., 2020)
(−) Capitalist foundations remain unchallenged
InclusiveNegative(−) Does not foster value pluralism•Participation and deliberative valuation (Reference KenterKenter, 2016)
(*) Rules-in-use govern and restrict participation
AdaptiveMixed(*) Responsive to political pressure•Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN) (UNDP, 2018; 2020)
(−) Slow to adapt to new knowledge
(*) Lessons learned during initial/pilot stages
TransdisciplinaryNegative(*) Anthropocentric ontology of nature•Participation and deliberation
(−) Mechanic epistemology of nature
(*) Emphasis on capital and risk management
AnticipatoryMixed(+) Biodiversity risks mobilize financial resources•Precautionary financial policy (Reference Chenet, Ryan-Collins and van LervenChenet et al., 2021)
(−) Uncertainties as manageable calculated risks

Some scholars have pointed to interesting measures for moving toward transformative governance. Reference KenterKenter (2016) suggests that deliberative and participatory approaches to valuation could be an appropriate format for supplementing monetary approaches to valuing ecosystem services, which would improve the inclusive governance dimension. Participation and deliberation may also counterbalance the emphasis on anthropocentric, mechanistic and managerial approaches to nature conservation, building toward transdisciplinary governance. With respect to anticipatory governance, innovative financial instruments (and biodiversity finance in general) may consider what Reference Chenet, Ryan-Collins and van LervenChenet et al. (2021) refer to as “precautionary financial policy” to better deal with uncertainties that escape biodiversity risk assessments, thereby improving the anticipatory governance dimension. The limits to strengthening integrative governance through innovative financial instruments underscores the importance of developing a “whole-of-society approach” (Reference Van Oorschot, Kok and Van TulderVan Oorschot et al., 2020). For improvements in the adaptive governance dimension, one may look to the BIOFIN as a platform for learning and feedback (UNDP, 2018; 2020).

It is doubtful, however, that such developments can shape up innovative financial instruments to manifest the transformative governance envisioned in this book. As this chapter has made abundantly clear, the prevailing logics of innovative financial instruments often fall short of the five dimensions discussed above. One may even argue that their proper functioning depends on clear definitions of “financeable objects,” their monetary values and the rules-in-use that govern financial transactions. Moreover, they fail to address the deeper (capitalist) structures that indirectly drive biodiversity loss. In this respect, the new Forest Code in 2012 marked a turning point in Brazilian environmental politics that prompted rising deforestation rates, expanding agricultural production and exports, and dismantling of environmental political structures, among others, that neither the CRA market, the Amazon Fund, REDD+ or PES schemes were able to avoid (Reference Rajão, Del Giudice, van der Hoff and de CarvalhoRajão et al., 2021). To borrow loosely from IPBES’ list of key indirect drivers of transformation (Reference Balvanera, Pfaff, Vina, Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoBalvanera et al., 2019), this underscores that we need to rethink the ways in which we conceive of and value nature; how we live, learn, move and appreciate one another; how we produce, consume and trade; and how we govern and confer rights and obligations. It calls for wider structural and systemic changes to our economies, societies and cultures where finance is a component of a broader system of transformative governance (see Chapter 4 on governance mixes). Biodiversity finance, even if optimally funded, is an iota in the world of global finance and trade that drive biodiversity loss, which means that a serious consideration of the ideas proposed throughout this book is warranted.

7 Emerging Technologies in Biodiversity Governance: Gaps and Opportunities for Transformative Governance

Florian Rabitz , Jesse L. Reynolds and Elsa Tsioumani
7.1 Introduction

Emerging technologies potentially have far-reaching impacts on the conservation, as well as the sustainable and equitable use, of biodiversity. Simultaneously, biodiversity itself increasingly serves as an input or source material for novel technological applications. In this chapter, we assess the relationship between the regime of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, or “the Convention”) and the governance of three sets of emerging technologies: geoengineering, synthetic biology and gene drives, as well as bioinformatics. The linkages between biodiversity and technology go beyond these cases, with, for example, geographic information systems, satellite imagery or possibly even blockchain technology playing potentially important roles for implementing the CBD’s objectives. Here, however, we focus on technologies that have been subject to extensive debate and rulemaking activity under the CBD.

First, geoengineering, that is, the “deliberate intervention[s] in the planetary environment of a nature and scale intended to counteract anthropogenic climate change and its impacts” (Reference Williamson and BodleWilliamson and Bodle, 2016: 8), includes both carbon dioxide removal and solar radiation management (or modification) techniques. Geoengineering techniques could mitigate climate change and its impacts on biodiversity but could also cause harmful effects. Assessing these benefits and risks is complicated by great uncertainty as well as normative and political contestation. Second, synthetic biology applications, including so-called gene drives, fall within the scope of biotechnology as defined by the CBD: “any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use” (CBD, Art. 2). Such applications may have positive impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (and, possibly, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out the utilization of genetic resources); yet they also imply diverse and potentially severe biosafety risks, as well as possibly problematic socioeconomic impacts (SCBD, 2015: 39–40). Third, bioinformatics allows for the extraction of digital sequence information (DSI), that is, the genetic information that is derived from genetic resources. DSI is increasingly used in basic and applied research, replacing the need for access to “physical” genetic resources. While DSI has the potential to facilitate research on genetic resources, its use poses challenges with regard to the CBD’s objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing (Reference 154TsioumaniTsioumani, 2020: 24).

The Convention facilitates political, technical and scientific deliberation on biodiversity-related technologies and partially provides for their regulation. This takes place through technical guidance, legally binding international rules under the Convention and its protocols, as well as different layers of governing body decisions. These two general functions are essential to implementing the CBD’s objectives. Regarding facilitating deliberation and cooperation, the Convention created a standing Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) to assist the Conference of the Parties (COP). The Convention also provides for access to and transfer of technology (Art. 16), exchange of information including research results (Art. 17) and scientific and technical cooperation (Art. 18) as means toward bridging capacity asymmetries in achieving its objectives. Aichi Target 19 under the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 holds that by 2020, “technologies relating to biodiversity, its values, functioning, status and trends, and the consequences of its loss, are improved, widely shared and transferred, and applied.” With respect to regulation, the preambular text of the CBD, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and a host of COP decisions refer to the precautionary approach, thus acknowledging its applicability in regard to relevant technological issues. The customary rule of transboundary environmental harm, enshrined in CBD Article 3, applies to technologies and activities in general that may “cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Environmental impact assessment, mandated under Article 14, bears relevance for technological projects “that are likely to have significant adverse impacts” on biodiversity.

The CBD regime has responded relatively quickly to specific emerging technological opportunities and challenges: hrough publication of technical reports, deliberations at COP and SBSTTA meetings and the creation of various consultation processes and ad hoc technical expert groups (AHTEGs). This has led to diverse COP decisions on a broad range of technological issues, as well as the adoption of a series of guidelines on both methodological and substantive aspects of governing technological change. In addition, rules have been put in place for the systematic monitoring of technological developments relating to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, with SBSTTA being mandated to “[i]dentify new and emerging issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity” (Decision VIII/10). However, none of the technologies we discuss in this chapter has been classified as such as of yet.

The following three sections map the rules, institutional responses and regulatory gaps with regard to climate-related geoengineering; synthetic biology, including gene drives; and bioinformatics and DSI. In the conclusions, we assess the extent to which governance of those technologies under the CBD regime can support transformative change in order to address indirect drivers of biodiversity loss (see Chapter 1). While the CBD seems reasonably effective and appropriate in most of those regards, we point out that adaptation is limited to soft-law governing body decisions as well as technical guidance, limiting its efficacy for mitigating risks or capturing potential benefits associated with technological change. This raises questions regarding the effectiveness and stringency of technology regulation within the context of the CBD’s Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework, which, at the time of writing, contracting parties are expected to adopt in 2022.

7.2 Climate-Related Geoengineering

Anthropogenic climate change is closely related to the CBD’s goals, especially the conservation of biological diversity (Reference Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller and CourchampBellard et al., 2012). The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services estimates that climate change is the third most impactful direct driver of biodiversity loss (IPBES, 2019), and deleterious effects are expected to increase as the climate further changes. However, it is not only climate change that could have impacts on biodiversity but also our responses to mitigate it, including through two sets of technology that are often collectively referred to as “geoengineering.” In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that greenhouse gas emissions reductions in line with the relevant international agreements will likely be insufficient for limiting global warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Decision-makers, climate modelers and other scientists began to turn to anthropogenic activities and technologies that would remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and durably sequester it for long timescales. Such carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques are diverse, and some hold the potential to significantly reduce net emissions and atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (The Royal Society, Royal Academy of Engineering, 2018). Proposed CDR techniques include: (1) bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS), in which plants are grown and burnt to produce energy, with the resulting CO2 captured and stored; (2) direct air capture (DAC), in which CO2 is captured from ambient air, and stored; (3) enhanced weathering, in which minerals are processed to accelerate natural chemical CO2 sequestration; and (4) ocean fertilization, in which nutrients are added to accelerate natural marine biological CO2 sequestration. CDR could make ambitious climate change targets more achievable, could later compensate for initially exceeding emissions limits, and appears essential to meeting internationally agreed-upon climate change goals. Indeed, the favorable scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assume very large-scale BECCS (IPCC, 2018). The 2015 Paris Agreement implicitly endorses this technique (Articles 4.1, 5). Likewise, some states have implicitly committed to them through “net zero” emissions targets (Reference DarbyDarby, 2019). At the same time, these techniques pose environmental risks and social challenges. Furthermore, CDR techniques affect atmospheric concentrations only slowly, are relatively expensive and are unlikely to be available at scale in the short term.

In addition to CDR, the other form of geoengineering is a set of technological responses to climate change referred to as solar radiation modification (SRM), which would intentionally modify the Earth’s shortwave radiative budget with the aim of reducing climate change (IPCC, 2018: 558). Models indicate that at least some approaches could reduce climate change effectively, rapidly, reversibly and at low direct financial cost (National Research Council, 2015). The leading proposal would replicate volcanoes’ natural cooling effect by injecting aerosols into the stratosphere. Another proposal is to spray seawater as a fine mist, the droplets of which would, after evaporation, brighten low-lying marine clouds. Like CDR, SRM could reduce climate change but poses environmental risks and social challenges. As it is presently understood, SRM is necessarily global, which points to issues of international decision-making that are further complicated by its low resource requirements which, in principle, might allow for its deployment by smaller clubs or even single countries. Among the social challenges are a need for long maintenance and only gradual phase-down, displacing emissions cuts, claims of blame and demands for compensation for harm, and biasing future decision-making through sociotechnical lock-in (Reference ReynoldsReynolds, 2019).

Although geoengineering is typically envisioned as a means to reduce global climate change, it could be done in ways that have local effects. This is particularly salient with respect to biodiversity, which is unevenly distributed and mostly concentrated in hotspots. These might constitute priority areas for local deployment. Consider coral reefs, which are among the most biodiverse and threatened ecosystems. Coral reefs face the double threat of warmer marine waters and ocean acidification due to dissolved CO2, both of which result in coral bleaching. Ocean alkalinization, a marine CDR method akin to enhanced weathering, may be able to locally prevent and reduce ocean acidification (Reference Feng (冯玉铭), Keller, Koeve and OschliesFeng [冯玉铭] et al., 2016). Local SRM through marine cloud brightening or biodegradable ocean surface films could protect corals by locally limiting warming during heat waves (Reference McDonald, McGee, Brent and BurnsMcDonald et al., 2019).

Geoengineering’s effects are uncertain. At a gross level, if a technology were to reduce climate change, then it would also reduce climatic impacts on biodiversity. This general claim is subject to a number of qualifications. First, geoengineering would have secondary effects, some of which would be negative. For CDR, these are relatively local, whereas the benefits of reduced atmospheric CO2 would be global. In order to substantially reduce atmospheric CO2 concentrations, BECCS would require vast amounts of arable land, which could reduce natural habitat, especially in (sub)tropical regions (Reference Stoy, Ahmed and JarchowStoy et al., 2018). BECCS and DAC need storage, which could leak, posing risks to species and ecosystems. Enhanced weathering involves large-scale excavation, transportation and processing, and could adversely affect ocean chemistry. Ocean fertilization alters marine ecosystems in uncertain ways (Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection, 2019). For SRM, impacts would be geographically distant or global. It would compensate changes to temperature and precipitation differently, imperfectly and heterogeneously. Stratospheric aerosol injection could slow the recovery of the protective stratospheric ozone layer. Other environmental risks remain unknown. A second qualification is that geoengineering’s positive and negative impacts on biodiversity would be socially mediated. Although it could be used rationally to reduce climate change, it – especially SRM – might be poorly implemented. In that case, it could be deployed too rapidly or at too high of an intensity, or it could be stopped too suddenly (but see Reference RabitzRabitz, 2019a; Reference Trisos, Amatulli and GurevitchTrisos et al., 2018). Similarly, BECCS could be scaled-up carefully, with relatively little biodiversity impact, or haphazardly. Third and finally, much remains unknown. Research to date has been limited, especially on SRM and on biodiversity impacts (Reference McCormack, Born and IrvineMcCormack et al., 2016).

Given the CBD’s broad scope and geoengineering’s potential to help conserve or potentially harm biodiversity, it is unsurprising that the Convention’s bodies have engaged with the governance of geoengineering. However, the path that it took there has been somewhat reactive and arguably suboptimal. The catalyst for action was commercial firms’ plans to undertake ocean fertilization, which at the time seemed to some observers to have substantial potential to remove CO2. In response to agitation by some nongovernmental organizations and “in accordance with the precautionary approach,” in 2008 the COP requested that states not allow ocean fertilization activities until there is “adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities … and a global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanism,” and even then, only if they are noncommercial, scientific, subject to prior environmental impact assessment and “strictly controlled” (Decision IX/16.C). Although, as a COP decision, this statement is necessarily nonbinding, it appears to have contributed to the subsequent halt of legitimate, noncommercial ocean fertilization research, which had been occurring for about a decade (Reference Williamson, Wallace and LawWilliamson et al., 2012). The Parties to the London Convention and London Protocol, which regulate marine dumping, issued similar decisions on ocean fertilization in 2008 and 2010 (Resolutions LC- LP.1 and LC- LP.2). Parties to the latter agreement also approved an amendment that, when and if it comes into effect, would regulate marine geoengineering more broadly, although low ratification numbers indicate that this is unlikely to happen in the short term (Resolution LP.4[8]).

Since then, the CBD COPs have adopted three decisions regarding geoengineering. The first of these, in 2010, expanded the ocean fertilization decision to apply to geoengineering more broadly (Decision X/33.8[w]). In this, the COP invited Parties and other governments to consider not allowing any “climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity unless three criteria are met: a) ‘science based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms’; b) an ‘adequate scientific basis’; and c) ‘appropriate consideration of the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural impacts’.” This decision has received significant attention. Some journalists and activists call it a moratorium or even a ban (e.g. Reference TollefsonTollefson, 2010). However, that is an incorrect description (Reference Reynolds, Parker and IrvineReynolds et al., 2016). The COP does not have the authority to issue rules that are binding under international law. The text here uses particularly qualified language, in which it merely “invites” states to “consider the guidance.” Both CBD reports on the topic call the decision “a comprehensive non-binding normative framework” (SCBD, 2012: 106; Reference Williamson and BodleWilliamson and Bodle, 2016: 144). Finally, its reference to being “in accordance with […] Article 14” suggests that the decision is further limited to climate-related geoengineering activities that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity. In the absence of threshold criteria, it remains unclear beyond which point an activity would be classified as causing such effects.

In 2012, the Parties issued a decision on climate-related geoengineering. This, however, added little substance, only noting that no single geoengineering approach “meets basic criteria for effectiveness, safety and affordability,” that significant knowledge gaps remain, and “the lack of science-based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for climate-related geoengineering” (Decision XI/20). Somewhat more substantive was Decision XIII/14 of 2016, which “notes that more transdisciplinary research and sharing of knowledge … is needed in order to better understand the impacts of climate-related geoengineering on biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services, socioeconomic, cultural and ethical issues and regulatory options.” Finally, the Secretariat of the CBD has commissioned and published two major reports on geoengineering with respect to the Convention (SCBD, 2012; Reference Williamson and BodleWilliamson and Bodle, 2016).

These COP decisions are important to the global governance of geoengineering, as they remain the only explicit statements from the international community regarding geoengineering in general (notably, the UN Environment Assembly was unable to reach a consensus in a 2019 discussion). Although the Parties to the London Convention and London Protocol, as well as the International Maritime Organization, have since 2008 largely assumed the international governance of ocean fertilization, the CBD’s 2010 and 2016 decisions offer significant guidance in a domain that arguably lacks it. They express caution, calling on states to ensure that geoengineering activities beyond a certain expected magnitude of impact do not take place until particular criteria are satisfied. At the same time, important ambiguities persist. Are “small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting” limited to indoor activities, or could they include low-risk and/or well-contained outdoor experiments? And given that geoengineering could reduce dangerous climate change, that it poses its own threats of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity and that full scientific certainty is lacking, what are the implications of anticipatory governance for decision-making under uncertainty? Furthermore, the 2016 COP decision and report have important implications for the global governance of biodiversity: that large-scale interventions in natural systems, such as climate geoengineering, have the potential to help conserve biodiversity and that more research is consequently needed. Furthermore, the COP decisions push the boundary of the CBD’s scope, engendering real and potential conflict with other international legal institutions such as the London Convention and London Protocol, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (see Reference van Asseltvan Asselt, 2014).

Geoengineering activities, including those that may affect biodiversity, are governed by several legal and nonlegal mechanisms beyond the CBD, including the UNFCCC, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, and the London Convention and London Protocol (Reference ReynoldsReynolds, 2019). However, almost all of these were developed without geoengineering in mind and do not explicitly reference geoengineering and/or biodiversity. Exceptions in both regards are the above-noted resolutions on ocean fertilization and amendment on marine geoengineering that the Parties to the London Convention and London Protocol have approved. The frameworks under the 2010 resolution and 2013 amendment include assessing potential impacts on marine ecosystems, and the resolution explicitly refers to biodiversity.

7.3 Synthetic Biology and Gene Drives

Synthetic biology comprises a broad variety of technologies that are at different stages of the research and development pipeline and that differ widely in terms of their practicability as well as potential benefits and risks for biodiversity. Work under the Convention is guided, for the time being, by a 2016 operational definition developed by the AHTEG on synthetic biology but not endorsed by the COP, which defines synthetic biology as “a further development and new dimension of modern biotechnology that combines science, technology and engineering to facilitate and accelerate the understanding, design, redesign, manufacture and/or modification of genetic materials, living organisms and biological systems” (Decision XIII/17; Reference Keiper and AtanassovaKeiper and Atanassova, 2020). How this differs from “traditional” biotechnology, such as defined under CBD Article 2, is not clear. Regardless, this includes, for instance, approaches for the computer-based design of genomes, the synthesis of DNA nucleobases that do not exist in the known universe and the deliberate engineering of metabolic pathways within cells (SCBD, 2015). Current and near-term commercial and industrial applications of synthetic biology aim mainly at creating microorganisms that synthesize products for fuels, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, flavorings and fragrances (Reference El Karoui, Hoyos-Flight and FletcherEl Karoui et al., 2019). Potential positive impacts may include pollution control through microorganisms designed for bioremediation and reduction of overharvesting of threatened wild species through development of synthesized products (SCBD, 2015). Synthetic biology may also serve a role in enhancing the resilience of agricultural systems by developing crops with improved resistance to environmental stress, chemical pollution, pesticides and fertilizers. One – currently hypothetical – application of synthetic biology of relevance to biodiversity conservation is de-extinction: the cloning of extinct species by grafting ancestor DNA onto the genome of existing species with a similar genetic profile (Reference Church and RegisChurch and Regis, 2014). As the history of agricultural biotechnology suggests a pattern of overpromising and underdelivering on the supposed environmental benefits of genetic engineering, many of these claims may warrant skepticism. What sets the case of synthetic biology and gene drives apart from the debate on agricultural biotechnology during the 1990s is that, at least for the time being, a significant amount of research and development is being carried out in the public and philanthropic sectors rather than in the for-profit private sector. Patent activity remains relatively limited (Reference Oldham and HallOldham and Hall, 2018). In addition, as synthetic biology technologies become less expensive and more widely accessible, several small-scale, publicly accessible community laboratories, do-it-yourself and open science collaborations are emerging that may lead to a democratization of science (Reference Laird and WynbergLaird and Wynberg, 2018).

However, the release (including from small-scale, “do-it-yourself biology”) of organisms created via synthetic biology may raise environmental concerns in regard to biosafety, as well security, socioeconomic and ethical issues. Biosafety issues include, for example, the potential for survival, persistence and transfer of genetic material to other microorganisms, possible negative effects on nontarget organisms and transfer of genetic material to wild populations. Indirect negative impacts could arise from the increase in the utilization of biomass required for synthetic biology applications. Security considerations arise from the potential malicious or accidental use of synthetic biology applications. Socioeconomic considerations relate to potential impacts on community livelihoods in developing countries where traditional crops and other natural resources are replaced. Ethical concerns relate to the socially accepted level of uncertainty and predictability of its impacts and the threshold between the modification of existing organisms and the creation of new ones (SCBD, 2015). More fundamentally, transformative change may also entail deeper ethical concerns regarding the very creation of artificial life or the genetic modification of entire species.

As a specific set of emerging technologies, gene drives are conceptually easier to pin down. These are often understood as “systems of biased inheritance in which the ability of a genetic element to pass from a parent to its offspring through sexual reproduction is enhanced” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016: 1). Within the CBD process, gene drives have generally been considered part of the broader issue of synthetic biology. From a technical perspective, however, gene drives are based on techniques for genome editing, such as CRISPR/Cas9, that are already firmly established in the contemporary life sciences and, while falling within the broad definition of “biotechnology” in the Convention’s Article 2, do not necessarily fall within the operational definition of “synthetic biology” (Reference Esvelt, Smidler, Catteruccia and ChurchEsvelt et al., 2014). By increasing the probability with which genetic traits are passed on to later generations, gene drives offer the possibility of rapidly and efficiently modifying the genetic profile of entire target populations (meaning the interbreeding members of a species that typically live in a geographic place) of sexually reproducing organisms with short gestation cycles (Reference Esvelt, Smidler, Catteruccia and ChurchEsvelt et al., 2014). A major motivation for the development of gene drives is the control of disease vectors such as mosquitoes. However, they are also under discussion as a tool for combating invasive alien species, which is a crosscutting issue under the CBD (Reference Leitschuh, Kanavy and BackusLeitschuh et al., 2018). Examples of such species include rats and other rodents, as well as organisms such as certain mussels, jellyfish and sea stars that have been introduced into vulnerable marine ecosystems through ballast water tanks. At the same time, the rapid environmental diffusion of gene drives, the potential of unforeseen effects on target species and ecosystems, the possibility for the introduction of new diseases through the replacement of the population of the original disease vector by another vector species, unpredicted mutations in the drive or unintended off-target effects raise serious biosafety questions (SCBD, 2015). Thus, while synthetic biology and gene drives could potentially contribute to the CBD’s objectives of conservation and sustainable use by protecting or restoring ecosystems, or by reducing anthropogenic pressures from agricultural practices, they also pose novel and unpredictable risks and regulatory challenges.

The CBD COP started addressing synthetic biology and gene drives as a recurring agenda item in 2014. Yet by 2010, COP decision X/37 on biofuels and biodiversity urges Parties and non-Parties to apply precaution regarding “the field release of synthetic life, cell or genome into the environment.” Decision XII/24 of 2014, which addresses synthetic biology in general but does not cover gene drives, urges Parties to take a precautionary approach, including by having “effective risk assessment and management procedures” or other types of regulation in place prior to any deliberate release. That decision also installed an AHTEG for collecting and synthesizing different stakeholder perspectives, for identifying existing regulatory gaps and for elaborating the operational definition of synthetic biology quoted above. Decision XIII/17 of 2016 notes the future need for developing new approaches to assessing the risks associated with synthetic biology; notes that some organisms produced through synthetic biology may fall outside the functional scope of the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol; and invites Parties to engage in further stakeholder consultations, research and knowledge synthesis for identifying potential biodiversity-related risks and benefits of synthetic biology. In that decision, the COP for the first time engages with gene drives, noting that they may fall within the category of synthetic biology, and thus may partially fall within the scope of the earlier decision XII/24. In 2018, the COP finally agreed on the need for systematic monitoring and horizon-scanning for technological developments in synthetic biology, under decision XIV/19. This decision for the first time provided more specific guidance in regard to gene drives, calling upon Parties and non-Parties to require “[s]cientifically-sound case-by-case risk assessment” as well as adequate risk management procedures prior to a deliberate release.

The primary barrier to the effective governance of synthetic biology and gene drives under the CBD framework is the stark contrast in perceptions of the Parties of the associated risks and benefits, as well as their distribution. Reminiscent of CBD debates in the 1990s with regard to modern biotechnology and LMOs, the highly politicized deliberations reflect different understandings of technology, perceptions of environmental risk and precaution, expectations regarding benefits (including commercial ones), and scientific and regulatory capacities to assess associated risks (Reference ReynoldsReynolds, 2020). At the same time, an important difference between past biotechnology debates and the current ones regarding gene drives is that, while private firms were developing and advocating for the former, they are absent from the latter, presumably due to insufficient commercialization perspectives (Reference Mitchell, Brown and McRobertsMitchell et al., 2018). While there is general consensus among Parties that the use of those technologies should be subject to the precautionary approach (see CBD preamble, recital 9), how exactly precautions would be operationalized is a matter of ongoing dispute. Bracketed text in SBSTTA recommendation 22/3 of July 2018 – later rejected by the COP – illustrates this divergence of views: Whereas some Parties prefer precaution regarding the extent and timeframe of the release of gene drives, others, such as Bolivia at the time, interpret precaution as implying refraining from such releases (ENB, 2018a). To some extent, the debate revolves around questions of regulation of synthetic biology as an inherently risky new and emerging technology versus case-by-case assessment of its products and applications, or even prohibition of environmental releases until further knowledge is available.

Regardless of the merits of any of these approaches, nonuniversal participation in the CBD and, particularly, the Cartagena Protocol poses additional challenges and creates the risk of jurisdiction-shopping. Notably, the USA is neither a party to the Convention nor to the Cartagena Protocol, and some of the countries with strong biotechnology industries, such as Argentina, Australia and Canada, are not parties to the Protocol. Addressing this issue under both the Convention and the Protocol thus poses challenges for effective decision-making because of their different memberships. Regulating or even prohibiting environmental releases of gene drives and organisms produced via synthetic biology may generate incentives for operators to carry out such releases in jurisdictions where regulatory standards are less restrictive. Especially regarding initial, small-scale field testing that might only entail limited transboundary effects, the insufficient geographic coverage of the CBD regime severely limits the scope for effective international regulation (Reference RabitzRabitz, 2019b).

Beyond the CBD regime, a range of other international institutions potentially bear relevance for the governance of synthetic biology and gene drives. The WHO has developed a Guidance Framework for Testing of Genetically Modified Mosquitoes, incorporating cost–benefit analysis and precaution. The Review Conferences of the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention have, in recent years, started considering the biosecurity implications of both synthetic biology and gene drives. Other institutions may be relevant without necessarily addressing either technology directly. International patent law might matter to the extent that the patent protection of first-generation gene drive organisms might extend to their progeny. The use of synthetic biology in the food sector would likely create a role for the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures as well as the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Yet in all those cases, the governance implications of synthetic biology and gene drives are even less clear than they are for the CBD regime.

7.4 Bioinformatics and Digital Sequence Information

Synthetic biology applications have largely become possible due to advances in bioinformatics, an interdisciplinary field of knowledge that develops and uses methods and software tools to extract knowledge from biological material. It includes the collection, storage, retrieval, manipulation and modelling of data from biological resources for analysis, visualization or prediction through the development of algorithms and software. Bioinformatics tools allow for generating and analyzing large quantities of genotypic, phenotypic and environmental data. Techniques for high-efficiency genomic sequencing have been followed by methods for measuring the current molecular state of cells and organisms, for predicting classical phenotypes in an automated manner and even for reengineering the content and function of living systems. These technologies have led to the rapid generation of large amounts of data describing biological systems, and the analysis and interpretation of these data using statistical and computational expertise (Reference Can, Yousef and AllmerCan, 2014; Reference Diniz and CanduriDiniz and Canduri, 2017).

Developments in bioinformatics pose challenges for access and benefit-sharing (ABS) frameworks. This includes the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol on ABS, which aim to ensure that users of genetic resources share (commercial and other) benefits that arise from utilization. They result in what is described as the “dematerialization” of genetic resources, suggesting that “the information and knowledge content of genetic material [could increasingly be] extracted, processed and exchanged in its own right, detached from the physical exchange of the … genetic material” (Secretariat of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2013).

Within the CBD, the term DSI is understood to refer to nucleic acid sequence reads and the associated data, and information on the sequence assembly, its annotation and genetic mapping, describing whole genomes, individual genes or fragments thereof, barcodes, information on gene expression, and behavioral data, among others (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2018). The origin of debates on DSI can be traced to the report of the 2015 meeting of the AHTEG on synthetic biology. Participating experts identified potential adverse effects of synthetic biology for the CBD objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing, including inappropriate access without benefit-sharing due to the use of DSI, and a “shift in the understanding of what constitutes a genetic resource” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2015: 10). As explored below, such a shift in understanding lies at the heart of the highly polarized debate on DSI (see also Reference Keiper and AtanassovaKeiper and Atanassova, 2020).

The issue of regulation of DSI-use has also arisen in ABS-related processes beyond the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, including the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for access to vaccines and other benefits (PIP Framework) under the WHO, and the ongoing negotiations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on marine biodiversity beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (BBNJ), albeit with differing terminologies and varying political progress. While significant advances in deliberations have been made under the PIP Framework, DSI turned out to be a deal-breaker for efforts at reforming the ITPGRFA’s Multilateral System, leading to the collapse of six years of negotiations at the end of 2019 (ENB, 2019; Reference 154TsioumaniTsioumani, 2020).

The availability and easy exchange of large amounts of sequence data have the potential to facilitate research on genetic resources, especially for actors in developed countries who have the capacities to analyse and use such data. At the same time, it poses two main regulatory issues: the possibility of appropriation of genetic sequence data, including data placed in the public domain, through intellectual property rights (IPRs), in particular patents; and the question of value generation from the use of such data, and related benefit-sharing obligations (Reference Laird and WynbergLaird and Wynberg, 2018; Reference Welch, Bagley, Kuiken and LouafiWelch et al., 2017). Opinions diverge in particular as to whether and how its utilization should give rise to benefit-sharing obligations supporting the CBD’s objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing, which is intended to incentivize nature conservation, provide the financial and other means for doing so, and inject fairness and equity in bio-based research and development (Reference MorgeraMorgera, 2016; Reference TsioumaniTsioumani, 2018). The latter question further involves a series of legal interpretation issues concerning the scope of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and implementation concerns involving the identification of users and monitoring/tracking of uses of such data. These issues will be briefly addressed below, in turn. Additional normative questions arise with regard to benefit-sharing from the utilization of human genetic resources which, however, fall outside the scope of the CBD and thus this chapter.

As evidenced from several open-access registries and projects, the synthetic biology community – which brings together most DSI users – has a strong open source sharing ethos and encourages the release of genomic and other datasets as public goods (Reference Tsioumani, Muzurakis, Ieropoulos and TsioumanisTsioumani et al., 2016). At the same time, as in all technological fields, researchers tend to patent research tools and sequences strategically, with clear commercial applications (Reference Welch, Bagley, Kuiken and LouafiWelch et al., 2017). As patent law is territorial in nature, and legal debates on social and moral concerns regarding patent eligibility of genetic sequences continue to rage in several jurisdictions, the patent landscape varies around the globe (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002). In the United States, the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics held that DNA segments and the information they encode are not patent-eligible simply because they have been isolated from surrounding genetic material, thus reversing years of prior jurisprudence and confirming a shift in the broad scope of the patentability of genetic sequences. Under the EU’s Biotechnology Directive (98/44/EC), biological material that is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention, even if it previously occurred in nature. The European Court of Justice subsequently clarified, in Monsanto Technology v. Cefetra BV, that, in order to meet the requirements for patent eligibility, the “functionality” of the genetic sequence must be disclosed in the patent application. Developing countries have also sought to set their own standards. Brazil, for instance, excludes living beings or biological materials found in nature from patentability, even if isolated, and this includes the genome or germplasm of any living being (Reference CorreaCorrea, 2014). Navigating the patent landscape is further complicated by the uncertainty generated by those patent applications that are still pending, resulting in an inability to locate the ownership of patents, as well as by the fees usually required for searching patent databases (Reference HopeHope, 2004). Moreover, while ownership of a patent is usually a matter of public record, ownership of the rights transferred through licenses is not. Most jurisdictions do not impose a responsibility on licensees to disclose, making it almost impossible for a researcher to assemble all the licenses needed to proceed with their research (Reference JeffersonJefferson, 2006). This complexity has devastating consequences for public sector researchers, particularly in developing countries. Adding the specificities of ABS legislation to the mix can only increase the degree of complexity and legal uncertainty, further restricting access to DSI.

Unrestricted access to DSI, in the form of public and open-access databases, can be considered an important form of nonmonetary benefit-sharing, as long as it is accompanied by capacity-building measures to ensure its fair and equitable use by actors in developed and developing countries alike. Nonmonetary benefit-sharing, via information exchange, capacity-building and technology transfer, may allow for an increase of endogenous research capacities for genetic resource utilization and thus assist in bridging the gap between developed and developing countries. However, in view of the increasing use of DSI in bio-based research and development, alongside potential restriction of its availability through IPRs, biodiversity-rich developing countries have been calling for the application of monetary benefit-sharing requirements to the use of DSI arising from genetic resources, according to the provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. Debates have centered mainly around the interpretation of the scope of the CBD and the Protocol. At the time of writing, most developed countries oppose any benefit-sharing from DSI and argue that the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol have been developed to address exchanges of “material” resources. Their legal argumentation points to the definition of “genetic resources,” as genetic “material” that contains “functional units of heredity” (CBD Art. 2 and Nagoya Protocol Art. 2). Therefore, exchanges of “immaterial” information such as DSI would fall outside the scope of the two instruments. In contrast, developing countries argue that letting DSI-use escape benefit-sharing obligations would make the Nagoya Protocol obsolete, and thus negate any progress toward the redistribution of benefits from countries that have the capacity to use genetic resources toward those that have stewarded them. In addition, developing countries hold that the use of DSI qualifies as “utilization” of genetic resources (Nagoya Protocol Art. 2), thus giving rise to benefit-sharing obligations. The issue attracted more attention than any other item under negotiation at the 2018 meeting of the COP in Egypt and is expected to be central at the negotiations for a Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework. In fact, several countries from the global South declared that there will be no agreement on a Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework unless benefit-sharing from DSI-use is ensured (ENB, 2018b; 2019).

The CBD and Nagoya Protocol objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing has opened new ground in environmental agreements with regard to the distribution of benefits of scientific progress. However, its implementation in the bilateral system of exchanges between providers and users of genetic resources envisaged by these instruments poses challenges, particularly with regard to the determination of the value of the genetic resource under consideration, the determination of benefits, the development of mutually agreed terms for benefit-sharing and their application in the context of an interlinked web of national laws and policies, and ensuring compliance by users (Reference Morgera, Tsioumani and BuckMorgera et al., 2014). These challenges are exacerbated in the case of DSI. Implementation concerns involve in particular the identification of the value of DSI, its origin and its user, as well as ensuring compliance by monitoring its use (Reference Laird and WynbergLaird and Wynberg, 2018). Digitalization raises fundamental questions regarding the long-term viability of the bilateral approach to benefit-sharing under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. That said, a number of CBD Parties have already enacted benefit-sharing obligations from DSI-use as part of their domestic ABS measures, including, among others, Brazil, Malaysia and South Africa.

Despite the intense political controversies, COP decision 14/20 of 2018 established a science and policy-based process that is expected to shed light on many of the regulatory challenges related to DSI. The COP invited submission of views aiming to clarify the concept, including relevant terminology and scope, as well as submission of domestic ABS measures and benefit-sharing arrangements considering DSI. It further called for submission of information on capacity-building needs, and commissioned a series of peer-reviewed studies focused on some of the more technical issues explored above, including: the concept and scope of DSI; traceability; databases; and domestic ABS measures addressing benefit-sharing arising from DSI commercial and noncommercial use. In anticipation of deliberations in the CBD subsidiary bodies and the Working Group on the Post-2020 Framework, these studies informed the debates of the AHTEG established to address the issue. The AHTEG offered clarifications on the scope of DSI; options on terminology regarding categories of information that could be considered DSI; implications concerning traceability, use, exchange of information and ABS measures; and key areas for capacity-building (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020).

7.5 Toward the Transformative Governance of Emerging Technologies

While our cases address different issues, all highlight the challenges the CBD regime faces in governing biodiversity-related technologies. In general, the CBD regime is relatively quick to pick up novel technological issues and to process them in an inclusive manner, based on high-quality scientific and technical expert advice. In the output dimension, rulemaking has been limited to nonbinding (and frequently heavily qualified) COP decisions and assorted technical guidance. The rapid identification and addressing of governance gaps associated with novel technologies thus does not necessarily translate into strengthened international regulation. This appears linked to the Convention’s broad scope and objectives, complex overlaps with other intergovernmental organizations, system of consensual and participatory decision-making, lack of compliance and enforcement mechanisms, and, crucially, frequently stark divergences in the regulatory preferences of its contracting parties.

To assess the extent to which the CBD can support transformative governance of biodiversity with respect to emerging technologies, we follow the criteria introduced in Chapter 1. The capacity of the CBD regime to integrate governance activities varies across our cases. For geoengineering, we witness an institutional division of labor with the London Convention / London Protocol (see Reference Reynolds, Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt and ForsterReynolds, 2018). On DSI, the parallel processes under the CBD, the WHO and the ITPGRFA are characterized by polycentric cross-institutional linkages, although debates focus more on the differences between them with regard to mandate, scope and objectives, rather than the need to address such implications in a systematic manner across sectors and processes. For synthetic biology and gene drives, the lack of rulemaking activities outside the CBD regime limits the scope for integration from the outset. At the same time, the CBD possesses a high degree of inclusiveness, illustrated by the establishment of an open-ended online forum on synthetic biology and stakeholder participation regarding DSI, including by representatives of Indigenous peoples and local communities, civil society, academia and research, and the private sector, as well as relevant international bodies. The CBD processes on DSI, as well as synthetic biology and gene drives, are also characterized by relatively strong transdisciplinarity, drawing on natural sciences, law and social sciences, as well as the knowledge of Indigenous peoples. In contrast, information uptake with regard to deliberations on geoengineering is less structured and arguably weak, with relevant COP decisions having been criticized as poorly informed (Reference Sugiyama and SugiyamaSugiyama and Sugiyama, 2010). Regarding adaptiveness, all our cases are characterized by COP decisions that are vague, use heavily qualified language and fail to clarify important operational criteria. However, institutional adaptation to emerging technologies is a frequent challenge that is not necessarily specific to the CBD (Reference Marchant, Abbot and AllenbyMarchant et al., 2013). Finally, anticipation requires addressing the Collingridge dilemma, in which developing governance faces few barriers early on but too little is then known, while later on there is greater knowledge, but interests have arisen and legislation has ossified (Reference CollingridgeCollingridge, 1980). From this perspective, governance responses under the CBD have indeed been anticipatory. This is most evident in the SBSTTA’s mandate to identify “new and emerging issues.” Also, in all three cases considered here, the CBD initiated governance processes in the very early stages of technological development. This may be a consequence of the relatively prominent position given to precaution in the CBD and in the COP’s interpretation thereof. If anything, there is a reasonable argument that the CBD has engaged too early in these areas, before sufficient knowledge of potential technological impacts, limits and risks became available.

To conclude, it is important to keep in mind that the three technologies discussed above not only pose potential threats, but also offer potential benefits for the objectives of the CBD. DSI may either undermine effective benefit-sharing (by allowing users to shirk their obligations) or enhance utilization of genetic resources (by obviating the need for physical specimens), thus improving research on environmentally useful innovations as well as increasing the overall size of the “pie” from which benefits may subsequently be shared. Some proposals for geoengineering could arguably have adverse effects on biodiversity but equally have an important function for its conservation. Synthetic biology and gene drives create novel biosafety risks and could cause significant harm for species and ecosystems, yet may also contribute to the conservation objective by allowing for greater biological control of invasive alien species, pests and diseases.

Such technological solutions to environmental challenges are frequently critically referred to as “techno-fixes.” On one hand, they may enable overreliance on unproven, ineffective or unsafe technologies while displacing regulatory or socioeconomic solutions that could address root causes of biodiversity loss, such as habitat loss and alteration, pollution and overexploitation of species. Faith in technological solutions further can ignore the complexity of biological diversity and interdependence of living systems, which, coupled with lack of data and knowledge, can translate into uncertainties and even ignorance. On the other hand, the history of biodiversity governance demonstrates the limited efficacy of conventional solutions and the lack of sufficiently powerful political coalitions to address the root causes of biodiversity loss. History also suggests that technological evolution is, to a certain degree, inevitable and often faster than regulation. In addition, technologies can catalyze structural social, political and economic change, often in surprising ways. The emerging synthetic biology community, for instance, could be a source of great risk, although it may in the future also produce valuable social and institutional advancements in how the CBD and other bodies govern emerging biotechnologies, including through their open data and sharing ethos.

However, within the context of the CBD, interest constellations reflect differences in socioeconomic development and innovative capacity, as well as normative disputes over the role of technology in environmental governance. Shifting toward inclusive, effective and outcome-oriented technology regulation in the post-2020 era, together with the fair distribution of costs, risks and benefits of the technologies involved, is likely to be one of the main challenges of the CBD deliberations for the years to come. In this context, given the divergences in Parties’ priorities and interests and the realities of intergovernmental decision-making, it is doubtful that transformative governance of technology will originate in the realm of the CBD, or any other intergovernmental process; it will rather reflect and follow deep socioeconomic and behavioral changes.

8 Rethinking and Upholding Justice and Equity in Transformative Biodiversity Governance

Jonathan Pickering , Brendan Coolsaet , Neil Dawson , Kimberly Marion Suiseeya , Cristina Y. A. Inoue and Michelle Lim
8.1 Introduction

Justice and equity are fundamental to the complex choices that societies need to make to achieve transformative change (Reference Bennett, Blythe, Cisneros-Montemayor, Singh and SumailaBennett et al., 2019; Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019; Reference Leach, Reyers and BaiLeach et al., 2018; Reference MartinMartin, 2017). Evidence that more socioeconomically unequal societies tend to experience higher rates of biodiversity loss (Reference Holland, Peterson and GonzalezHolland et al., 2009; Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019) suggests that injustice and threats to biodiversity are closely intertwined. Injustice can function as an underlying cause of biodiversity loss, such as where colonial expropriation of Indigenous peoples’ land paves the way for its exploitation (Reference Martinez-AlierMartinez-Alier, 2002). Similarly, biodiversity loss can create new injustices or exacerbate existing ones, for example where the destruction of ecosystems accelerates risks such as climate change or pandemics that disproportionately affect the poor (Reference Kashwan, Biermann, Gupta and OkerekeKashwan et al., 2020). Alleviating unjust conditions could provide a catalyst for environmentally sustainable governance (and vice versa), as where respecting and securing the land rights of marginalized groups enhances the ecological integrity of biologically diverse areas (Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). However, a major challenge for achieving transformative governance in practice is that measures to address biodiversity loss or social injustice can give rise to trade-offs between these goals. Accordingly, efforts to pursue transformative biodiversity governance need to acknowledge social-ecological complexity, expose existing conditions of injustice and embrace opportunities to overcome them.

In the context of this chapter, we understand justice and equity as crucial features of both the means and the ends of transformative biodiversity governance: they are important not only for their instrumental role in addressing biodiversity loss, but also because they are among the core social values that transformative governance aims to rethink and pursue (throughout the chapter, we generally use the term “justice” as shorthand for “justice and equity” unless otherwise specified; Section 8.2 notes different usages of the two terms). Accounts of transformative governance – such as the one that informs this collection – often see inclusive governance as an integral feature of the concept (Chapter 1; Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). Including different groups with diverse worldviews, experiences, knowledge systems and values requires respect, trust, mutual understanding and dialogue, and can be seen as a key requirement of procedural justice. The idea of inclusive governance provides an important conceptual entry point for recognizing justice as a core element of transformative governance. However, as we will show, inclusion is only one among several principles of justice that transformative governance needs to take into account. More broadly, the pursuit of justice speaks to another key feature of transformative governance, which is that it must be integrative in seeking synergies and minimizing incoherence not only across sectors, institutions and policy instruments, but also across societal goals, including justice and sustainability (Chapter 1; Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019).

The question of what justice involves is complex, contested and often overlooked in policy-making. Despite considerable advances in theorizing social and environmental justice and applying these theories to biodiversity governance, there has been little exploration to date of whether and how justice could strengthen the transformative potential of biodiversity governance. This gives rise to the overall question that this chapter addresses: How should principles of justice and equity be interpreted and upheld in efforts to pursue transformative biodiversity governance?

To address this question, we begin in Section 8.2 with an overview of evolving theories and norms of justice and equity in biodiversity governance. In Section 8.3 we illustrate how the need for transformative change demands a rethink about what justice entails and requires in the context of biodiversity governance. Then in Sections 8.48.6 we address justice in three key stages of transformative governance to address the direct and indirect drivers of biodiversity loss: How should decision-making processes be structured (Section 8.4)? How should financial resources for achieving transformative change be mobilized and allocated (Section 8.5)? And how should transformative biodiversity initiatives be designed and implemented (Section 8.6)? These three areas offer a framework for discussing several important areas of debate about justice in biodiversity governance, including the roles of Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC) (Section 8.4), relations between the Global South and North (Section 8.5) and the social impacts of protected area expansion and biodiversity mainstreaming (Section 8.6). While our review does not exhaustively cover all aspects of justice in transformative biodiversity governance, it is complemented by other chapters in this collection, including on emerging technologies (Chapter 7), animals (Chapter 9), and access and benefit-sharing (Chapters 10 and 15). Section 8.7 sets out policy recommendations emerging from the preceding sections, and Section 8.8 concludes.

Throughout the chapter we conduct an integrative review (Reference SnyderSnyder, 2019) that critically assesses key theoretical and empirical literature (mainly spanning the period 2010–2020) on justice and equity in biodiversity governance, while also drawing parallels with related areas of environmental governance. Our review is supplemented by the analysis of documents produced by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as presented in Figure 8.1. While our primary focus is on governance at the global scale – in particular the CBD – we also discuss how concerns of justice and equity arise in local and national governance, given that these concerns are linked across multiple scales.

Figure 8.1 Frequency of references to equity and (in)justice in CBD and UNFCCC documents

Source: CBD and UNFCCC conventions and COP reports compiled for this chapter, excluding equity financing and names of organizations containing *equit* and/or *justice. The CBD COPs take place every other year. Peaks in CBD equity data generally coincide with heightened attention to equity in access and benefit-sharing, notably the Nagoya COP in 2010

A core set of claims advanced in the chapter is that the depth, scale and urgency of transformative change: (a) demand heightened attention to justice in biodiversity governance; (b) reinforce the need for understandings of justice that are multidimensional (encompassing just processes and recognition as well as distributively just outcomes); and (c) underscore the importance of ensuring justice for the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in processes of transformative change. These claims converge on the idea that transformative biodiversity governance entails a “just transformation” toward a more sustainable planet.

8.2 Theories and Norms of Justice and Equity in Biodiversity Governance

Why are justice and equity so important for biodiversity governance? A first rationale rests on the idea that justice is of intrinsic moral importance. As an essential foundation for sustaining human and nonhuman wellbeing, biodiversity could be seen as a prerequisite for achieving justice (Human Rights Council, 2017). Yet, societies have strong incentives – often but not always grounded in concerns for their own wellbeing – to exploit biodiversity rather than conserve it. Whatever combination of exploitation and conservation is pursued, its impacts are unevenly distributed across human and nonhuman communities, spaces and generations (Reference Blythe, Silver and EvansBlythe et al., 2018; Reference Howe, Suich, Vira and MaceHowe et al., 2014; Reference McShane, Hirsch and TrungMcShane et al., 2011). This recurrent imbalanced distribution of costs and benefits poses fundamental moral questions about what a just state of affairs is and who should be responsible for envisioning and achieving it.

A second rationale relies on the instrumental importance of justice for biodiversity governance, as in the claim that injustice is an indirect driver of biodiversity loss (Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). According to this view, if governance is just (or at least widely perceived to be so) it will produce better ecological outcomes (Reference Martin, Armijos and CoolsaetMartin et al., 2020). Evaluating both of these rationales requires clarifying how the terms “justice” and “equity” are used in theory and practice.

8.2.1 Theories of Justice, Equity and Biodiversity: A Brief Overview

The meanings of justice and equity are necessarily plural and contested (see Reference RawlsRawls, 1999; Reference SenSen, 2009; Reference Shelton, Bodansky, Brunnée and HeyShelton, 2007). In the literature reviewed in this chapter, justice, equity and fairness are frequently considered to be synonymous or interchangeable, and our analysis does not rely on drawing a clear-cut distinctions between these terms. However, theorists often see justice as a more stringent set of moral (and sometimes legal) responsibilities that social institutions owe to humans (and sometimes also to nonhumans) as a matter of right, whereas equity may refer to a wider notion of fair, proportionate or nonarbitrary treatment (see e.g. Reference ArmstrongArmstrong, 2019). As outlined in later sections, applied definitions frequently depart from the theoretical foundations of these terms, and the term “equity” tends to be invoked in policy contexts and at project level more than “justice.”

A range of theories and conceptions of justice have emerged that relate to biodiversity. These include environmental and ecological justice (Reference KopninaKopnina, 2016; Reference SchlosbergSchlosberg, 2007), social-ecological justice (Reference Gunnarsson-Östling, Svenfelt, Holifield, Chakraborty and WalkerGunnarsson-Östling and Svenfelt, 2018), multispecies justice (Reference Celermajer, Schlosberg and RickardsCelermajer et al., 2021), just conservation (Reference Gavin, McCarter and MeadGavin et al., 2015; Reference MartinMartin, 2017), just sustainabilities (Reference Agyeman, Bullard and EvansAgyeman et al., 2003), equitable sustainability (Reference Leach, Reyers and BaiLeach et al., 2018) and planetary justice (Reference Dryzek and PickeringDryzek and Pickering, 2019; Reference Kashwan, Biermann, Gupta and OkerekeKashwan et al., 2020). One could also refer to the idea of “biodiversity justice” (Reference Godden, O’Connell, Martin, Bigdeli, Daya-Winterbottom, du Plessis and KennedyGodden and O’Connell, 2015) or “just biodiversity governance” (Reference AdamAdam, 2014). Each of these conceptualizations of justice varies in several respects.

First, theories vary depending on who or what are the subjects of justice or rights-holders (Reference Martin, Coolsaet and CorberaMartin et al., 2016). These are commonly disaggregated to include gender, socioeconomic, racial, ethnic or cultural differences, while taking account of intersectionality across these characteristics (Reference Schlosberg and CarruthersSchlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). Conventional accounts of environmental justice tend to be anthropocentric, while ecological and social-ecological accounts recognize nonhumans (e.g. animals, plants or ecosystems) as subjects of justice (Reference SchlosbergSchlosberg, 2007; Chapter 9). Second, the theories operate over different spatial, temporal and sectoral scales. Some see the state as the primary site of justice, while others foreground a global perspective or underscore the agency of local communities and institutions (Reference Sikor and NewellSikor and Newell, 2014). Some theories focus on duties toward those living now, while others emphasize intergenerational justice (Reference Dryzek and PickeringDryzek and Pickering, 2019). A range of theories – particularly those that call for the explicit adoption of critical, decolonial, feminist and other lenses – situate questions of justice and biodiversity within broader processes that continue to perpetuate injustice, such as colonial exploitation and gender inequality (Reference Alvarez and CoolsaetAlvarez and Coolsaet, 2020; Reference ElmhirstElmhirst, 2011; Reference PellowPellow, 2017).

Three core dimensions have gained prominence in environmental justice scholarship over the last two decades: distribution, procedure and recognition (Reference SchlosbergSchlosberg, 2007, building on Reference FraserFraser, 1995). Distributive justice is the most widely researched and commonly recognized dimension. It encompasses who receives the benefits and opportunities versus who bears the costs and risks of social cooperation (Reference WalkerWalker, 2012). Theories vary considerably as to what kinds of principles should determine a just distribution, such as equality, need or aggregate social utility/wellbeing (Reference Kaswan and CoolsaetKaswan, 2020). Procedural justice engages with the processes by which decisions are made (Reference Davoudi and BrooksDavoudi and Brooks, 2014; Reference Dawson, Coolsaet, Martin, Schreckenberg, Mace and PoudyalDawson et al., 2018a). Recognition pertains to the status afforded to multiple social groups, worldviews and cultural values and identities, and to issues of self-respect and self-esteem (Reference Martin, Coolsaet and CorberaMartin et al., 2016; Reference WhyteWhyte, 2011; Reference Whyte, Holifield, Chakraborty and Walker2018) Examples of how each dimension of justice applies to biodiversity governance are outlined in Table 8.1 . A final aspect of justice that is not always explicit in this tripartite categorization is corrective or remedial justice, which involves measures to correct or remedy unjust actions or omissions, such as sanctions for “ecocide” or violence against environmental defenders (Reference Gonzalez and TecheraGonzalez, 2012; Reference WhyteWhyte, 2011). Space constraints preclude a detailed discussion of this aspect, but related issues are discussed under distributive and procedural justice.

Table 8.1 Dimensions of justice in biodiversity governance

Dimension of justiceExamples in biodiversity governance
Procedural justice
  • Inclusion and representation in formal processes (e.g. CBD negotiations or government policy-making) or informal/customary institutions and interactions (e.g. meetings of IPLC)

  • Access to information and justice (e.g. judicial review of environmental decisions)

Recognition
  • Acknowledgment of and respect for Indigenous and local knowledge, diverse worldviews and ways of valuing nature

  • Recognition of customary land rights

Distributive justice
  • Measures to address distributional impacts of biodiversity loss or of biodiversity policies (e.g. through area-based measures or mainstreaming)

  • International finance for conservation and sustainable use

  • Equitable sharing of benefits from use of genetic resources

This chapter does not advocate any one of the conceptions of justice outlined above, but instead takes elements from each to adopt a pluralist approach spanning both social and ecological aspects, and all three dimensions of justice across multiple temporal, spatial and sectoral scales.

8.2.2 Norms of Justice and Equity in Global Biodiversity Governance

Debates about justice and equity – particularly between the Global South and North – have pervaded the politics of global biodiversity governance since its emergence (Reference Broggiato, Dedeurwaerdere, Batur, Coolsaet, Coolsaet, Batur, Broggiato, Pitseyes and DedeurwaerdereBroggiato et al., 2015; Reference SwansonSwanson, 1999). Discussions on global environmental governance since the 1970s prompted the Global South to develop a set of common demands on environmental issues (Reference WilliamsWilliams, 1993), including on what Christopher Reference Stone and RensStone (1996) called the “most difficult moral question” regarding the Convention: the distribution of costs associated with conserving biodiversity. Most of the world’s biodiversity is located in nonindustrialized countries, which generally have more limited capacity to pay for conservation than industrialized countries (see also Section 8.5). As a result, conservation has increasingly shifted toward more “people-friendly” and decentralized interventions such as “integrated conservation and development projects,” driven by the belief that poverty was the main cause of environmental degradation (Reference RoeRoe, 2008).

Against this political backdrop, norms of equity, rights and justice have gained traction in key documents and practices of global biodiversity governance.Footnote 1 The CBD and the UNFCCC – both of which were adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit – were among the first multilateral environmental agreements to explicitly integrate equity. The CBD’s third objective is “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (UN, 1992, Article 1; emphasis added). While intergenerational equity (i.e. equity between generations) was foundational to the narrative of sustainable development in the 1987 Brundtland Report, the CBD and the UNFCCC raised the profile of intragenerational equity (i.e. equity among groups within a single generation) on the international environmental agenda (Reference OkerekeOkereke, 2006). A comparison of official documents associated with each treaty body shows how references to equity in the CBD are far more common than references to equity in the UNFCCC or to justice in either treaty (see Figure 8.1).

This evidence reflects a broader observed tendency that equity is more commonly invoked than justice in international agreements (see also Reference OkerekeOkereke, 2008). In policy contexts, equity is often applied to specific policies or with a focus on a single dimension (most frequently distribution), allowing more politically sensitive issues such as historic land rights to be sidelined (Reference Coolsaet, Dawson, Rabitz and LoveraCoolsaet et al., 2020).

Today, international policy norms on conservation cover most of the dimensions of justice introduced above (Reference Dawson, Coolsaet, Martin, Schreckenberg, Mace and PoudyalDawson et al., 2018a; FAO, 2001, Article 1.1; Reference Marion SuiseeyaMarion Suiseeya, 2017). In 2010, the CBD extended equity-related wording, which for a long time had been limited to access and benefit-sharing (ABS), to conservation efforts: Aichi Target 11 called for the conservation of biodiversity to take place through “effectively and equitably managed” protected areas (Reference Zafra-Calvo, Pascual and BrockingtonZafra-Calvo et al., 2017).

Global norms entrenched in other international frameworks – especially ideas of rights – have played an increasingly important role in shaping debates about justice and equity in biodiversity governance (Reference Coolsaet, Dawson, Rabitz and LoveraCoolsaet et al., 2020). Indigenous Peoples, for example, steward 85 percent of the world’s remaining biodiversity, yet their ability to do so is threatened by weak and/or infringed political, economic and social rights (Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019; Reference Tauli-CorpuzTauli-Corpuz, 2016). In recent years, the global Indigenous movement has worked to secure references to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in texts negotiated at the CBD and the UNFCCC as ways to recognize their rights to self-determination, but also to protect their ability to steward lands and forests critical for biodiversity conservation (Reference Marion Suiseeya and ZanottiMarion Suiseeya and Zanotti, 2019). Linking biodiversity to the human rights to life and health, adequate standards of living and nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of rights, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment recognized that “the full enjoyment of human rights … depends on biodiversity, and the degradation and loss of biodiversity undermine … human rights” (Human Rights Council, 2017: 3). These developments have been complemented by the institutionalization of procedural environmental rights – particularly in regional agreements such as the Aarhus Convention and the Escazú Agreement – such as the right to participate in environmental decision-making and the recognition of rights to a healthy environment in many national constitutions (Reference GellersGellers, 2017).

Despite these advances, biodiversity continues to decline at unprecedented rates, giving rise to calls to transform existing governance systems (see e.g. Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). The section that follows highlights justice and equity considerations that need to be taken into account specifically when moving toward transformative governance of biodiversity.

8.3 Rethinking Justice and Equity in the Context of Transformative Governance: Toward Just Transformation

What does transformation mean for justice and equity in biodiversity governance? Adopting the definition of Chapter 1, transformative governance embraces the multiple enabling processes that facilitate “fundamental system-wide reorganisation” (Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). Transformative governance “seeks to achieve desired societal values” (Reference Chaffin, Garmestani and GundersonChaffin et al., 2016: 408; see also Chapters 1 and 4). However, determining what is desirable – including whether transformation is desirable at all – and how to achieve a desired transformation involves contestation over values, interests and worldviews. Indeed, rethinking core societal values can be seen as a constitutive feature of transformative governance (Chapters 1 and 4; Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). Questions about who should be involved in this contestation, how values should be rethought and who has the authority to make decisions underscore the political character of transformation (Reference Blythe, Silver and EvansBlythe et al., 2018; Reference Patterson, Schulz and VervoortPatterson et al., 2017), hence posing concerns of justice. Nevertheless, existing accounts of sustainability transformations have been criticized for their lack of attention to justice (Reference Martin, Armijos and CoolsaetMartin et al., 2020; Reference Patterson, Schulz and VervoortPatterson et al., 2017). In contrast to more conventional or incremental approaches to biodiversity governance, the depth, scale and urgency of change associated with transformative biodiversity governance demand reflecting on its association with social and environmental justice.

First, transformative change requires deep shifts in existing patterns of production and consumption, disrupting inequalities of power that drive and arise from these patterns. Not only could misguided attempts at transformation result in an unjust redistribution of resources, but powerful vested interests may also resist transformative change and defend an unjust status quo. While transformative governance is often portrayed as universally beneficial, transformations inevitably produce winners and losers (Reference Blythe, Silver and EvansBlythe et al., 2018; Reference Morrison, Adger and BrownMorrison et al., 2017; Reference Patterson, Schulz and VervoortPatterson et al., 2017). Even if the normative ideal of transformative governance entails justice (as stipulated in the Introduction), the implications of different policy options can be difficult to predict, and some forms of social transformation may in practice yield injustice, e.g. if the creation of protected areas deprives Indigenous peoples and local communities of access to their traditional lands (Chapters 2, 11, 12). Moreover, policy-makers and other powerful actors may manipulate discourses of transformation for unjust ends, for example to justify business as usual or to shift responsibility for behavioral change away from themselves and onto consumers or citizens (Reference Blythe, Silver and EvansBlythe et al., 2018).

Second, the geographic and temporal scale of transformative change magnifies the justice challenges for transformative governance. Transformative change will require attention to the drivers of biodiversity loss emanating in one part of the world while affecting another (Reference Liu, Hull and BatistellaLiu et al., 2013; Chapters 1 and 4), e.g. where demand for beef or soy in Europe drives land clearing in the Amazon rainforest. Moreover, addressing transformative change over large geographic regions will inevitably need to deal with a tremendous diversity of meanings and claims of justice. Yet conventional understandings of social justice often center on relationships among participants in a domestic social contract and struggle to conceptualize relations of justice at a global level (Reference Sikor and NewellSikor and Newell, 2014). With regard to temporal scale, a strong argument for transformative biodiversity governance is that the continued loss of biodiversity, even if equitably distributed for present generations, will inevitably disadvantage future generations (Reference Alvarez and CoolsaetAlvarez and Coolsaet, 2020). However, the costs of initiating transformative change rest initially on the present generation, raising questions of intergenerational equity (Reference Martin, McGuire and SullivanMartin et al., 2013).

Third, the urgency of transformative governance intensifies questions about the feasibility of pursuing justice. Invoking an ecological or climate emergency risks circumventing democratic safeguards and resulting in unjust reforms (Reference NiemeyerNiemeyer, 2014). However, while halting biodiversity loss is long overdue, the urgency of the task does not make it impossible to consider the justice implications of critical decisions. Indeed, if hasty action results in further injustice, this is likely to damage public support for transformative governance and ultimately be counterproductive (Reference Dryzek and PickeringDryzek and Pickering, 2019).

The remaining sections explore in more depth how questions of justice and equity can be addressed in specific areas of transformative governance. Our discussion builds on ideas of a “just transition” to more sustainable societies. While the term has become prominent in climate policy – underscoring that the transition to renewable energy should not disproportionately affect groups such as coal miners or low-income electricity consumers (Reference Stevis and CoolsaetStevis, 2020) – scholars and activists have applied the term to environmental justice more broadly (Reference Ciplet and HarrisonCiplet and Harrison, 2020). Thus, one could think of a just transition (Reference Newell and MulvaneyNewell and Mulvaney, 2013; Reference SwillingSwilling, 2019) or even a “just transformation” (Reference Bennett, Blythe, Cisneros-Montemayor, Singh and SumailaBennett et al., 2019; Reference Schlosberg, Collins and NiemeyerSchlosberg et al., 2017) of biodiversity governance.Footnote 2 The idea of just transformation speaks to the notion that transformative governance must be integrative and inclusive (Chapter 1), and calls attention to the interests of disadvantaged or marginalized groups in the context of transformation, including nonhuman species and ecosystems. One might object that, since the ideal of transformative governance necessarily entails justice, the idea of “just transformation” is tautologous. We believe, however, that processes of transformation (as distinct from transformative change) may be just or unjust (see also Reference Bennett, Blythe, Cisneros-Montemayor, Singh and SumailaBennett et al., 2019). Moreover, considerations of justice can easily be overshadowed by the pursuit of transformations toward environmental sustainability; hence the need to foreground a just transformation (Reference Martin, Armijos and CoolsaetMartin et al., 2020).

8.4 How Should Decision-Making Processes Be Structured?

Transformative change demands a fundamental reordering and rescaling of how problems are defined, solutions are deliberated and decisions are reached. One of the five key ingredients of transformative governance set out in Chapter 1 is inclusive governance (“governance approaches through stakeholder engagement, including Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, in decision-making processes.” Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019: 894). Transformative governance needs to be inclusive in order “to empower … those whose interests are currently not being met and who represent values that constitute transformative change toward sustainability” (Chapter 1). Similarly, Chapter 1 stipulates that transformative governance needs to be transdisciplinary, “in ways that recognize different knowledge systems.” Attention to inclusive and informed governance highlights the importance of procedural justice and recognition. At the same time, a just transformation further demands greater attention to the underlying forces that structure and constitute decision-making landscapes.

Relative to other environmental problems, the CBD is generally considered to be a rather inclusive arena (Reference Coolsaet and PitseysCoolsaet and Pitseys, 2015; Reference Cordonier Segger and PhillipsCordonier Segger and Phillips, 2015), even though debates on these questions are ongoing (Reference ReimersonReimerson, 2013). At a local level, however, biodiversity governance most commonly remains in the control of external actors, both public and private, through management regimes that seek to amend local practices and override customary institutions (Reference Coolsaet, Dawson, Rabitz and LoveraCoolsaet et al., 2020). Biodiversity conservation initiatives that fail to include affected communities in decision-making often fail to achieve their conservation objectives (Reference Bell, Carrick, Holifield, Chakraborty and WalkerBell and Carrick, 2017; Reference Bennett and SatterfieldBennett and Satterfield, 2018; Reference Dawson, Martin and DanielsenDawson et al., 2018b). Unjust decision-making processes can spark new conflicts (Reference PaavolaPaavola, 2004), compound injustices (Reference SikorSikor, 2013), foment distrust of the decision-making process and its proponents (Reference Brechin, Fortwangler, Wilshusen and WestBrechin et al., 2003; Reference Hotes and OpgenoorthHotes and Opgenoorth, 2014), and undermine broader biodiversity governance objectives (Reference MartinMartin, 2017).

Drawing on a growing body of literature examining concepts and practices for ensuring broad representation and inclusive decision-making (see e.g. Reference WalkerWalker, 2012), we direct attention to three key questions: Who should be included in decision-making processes? On what terms should decision-making processes take place? At what point do requirements of recognition and procedural justice begin?

8.4.1 Who Should Be Included in Decision-Making Processes?

At a minimum, procedural justice requires the inclusion and representation of affected parties in decision-making processes (Reference SchlosbergSchlosberg, 2007). The authority to decide who should be included typically rests with powerful actors (e.g. governments or intergovernmental organizations) who may misuse this authority to entrench existing inequalities of power. However, that authority can be subjected to scrutiny and challenge by social movements or other actors. The task of assessing who counts as affected – and determining what sorts of processes justice requires – becomes even more complex in the context of transformative biodiversity governance, which may both extend and amplify the effects of ecological and policy change across different social groups.

Scholars and practitioners broadly agree that affected parties include those groups who are vulnerable to biodiversity loss and/or who might be adversely impacted by conservation policies (Reference Martin, McGuire and SullivanMartin et al., 2013). These groups include IPLC and other marginalized groups with land-, water- or sea-based identities and lifeways. Attending to how demographic features, such as gender, age, race, class and ethnicity, shape different groups’ experiences with biodiversity governance is critical for understanding who affected parties are and how they are differentially affected (Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019; Reference Malin and RyderMalin and Ryder, 2018; Reference Marion Suiseeya and ZanottiMarion Suiseeya and Zanotti, 2019). Efforts to address distributive injustice or lack of recognition may be undermined when those most affected are not part of decision-making processes (Reference Marion SuiseeyaMarion Suiseeya, 2016). More contentious is how other actors affected by conservation policy – such as corporations whose practices contribute to biodiversity loss – should be included in decision-making processes in ways that do not reinforce or exacerbate asymmetries of power (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2016).

8.4.2 On What Terms Should Decision-Making Processes Take Place?

Procedural justice requires attention to at least four characteristics of affected actors’ roles in decision-making processes: (1) physical presence of affected actors or their representatives in decision-making settings; (2) access, meaning the authority to be an active participant in decision-making processes rather than only an observer; (3) capacity to leverage access to exercise agency (e.g. the ability to initiate a proposal or make a statement without being first invited to do so) and (4) capacity to influence decision-making processes (Reference Marion Suiseeya and ZanottiMarion Suiseeya and Zanotti, 2019; Reference Witter, Marion Suiseeya and GrubyWitter et al., 2015). Numerous studies have shown that presence and access alone are insufficient for procedural justice (Reference Cooke and KothariCooke and Kothari, 2001; Reference HollandHolland, 2017).

The CBD has been a leader among multilateral treaty bodies in the inclusion of IPLC in its decision-making processes (Reference Jones-Walters and ÇilJones-Walters and Çil, 2011). Unlike the UNFCCC, which severely limits how nonstate actors can directly engage in their proceedings, the CBD moves beyond presence as a measure of inclusion. For example, representatives from the IPLC constituency colead negotiations on issues that have direct implications for the wellbeing and lifeways of Indigenous peoples, such as the Convention’s Working Group on Article 8(j) (which deals with traditional knowledge, innovations and practices) and related provisions. Indigenous peoples have similarly forged new ground in intergovernmental scientific bodies such as IPBES by securing formal mechanisms for integrating diverse knowledge and value systems into its processes (Reference Tengö, Hill and MalmerTengö et al., 2017).

Procedural justice also requires attending to power inequalities and political representation. Uneven power relations – such as states’ control over multilateral governance processes or the privileged access of some stakeholders to the ear of government – affect the ability of actors to contribute to decision-making processes (Reference SchroederSchroeder, 2010). Tools such as Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) show how institutions can help to address power imbalances and dismantle barriers to direct engagement. If fully implemented, FPIC creates a formalized channel for marginalized groups to leverage their power by requiring that affected parties give consent to receiving biodiversity governance initiatives in their communities (Reference Colchester and FerrariColchester and Ferrari, 2007).

In practice it is not feasible for everyone affected to directly engage in decision-making processes; all the more so in deliberation at a global level that affects billions of people. Not all actors may have the financial, linguistic, physical or social capabilities to participate directly (Reference ReimersonReimerson, 2013). Where feasible, actors who cannot participate directly should be able to select their own representatives. In the case of nonhuman subjects (e.g. animals, plants and ecosystems), which cannot select humans to represent them, options include legally appointed custodians, or nongovernmental organizations or experts working on conservation or animal welfare and rights. Similarly, custodians may be formally appointed to represent future generations (Reference Dryzek and PickeringDryzek and Pickering, 2019; Reference SchlosbergSchlosberg, 2007).

8.4.3 When Do Requirements of Recognition and Procedural Justice Begin?

Although most studies of procedural justice focus on collective decision-making processes, those processes only begin following the identification of a problem or issue. Public policy and political ecology scholars have demonstrated the extraordinary power held by those who are able to define problems and set agendas (Reference Bardach and PatashnikBardach and Patashnik, 2019; Reference Corson, Gruby and WitterCorson et al., 2014) and the extended effects of agendas that often carry forward beyond the initial decision-making process (Reference Hughes and VadrotHughes and Vadrot, 2019; Reference MacDonald and CorsonMacDonald and Corson, 2012). The resulting problem definitions, agendas and venues influence which actors and issues engage and are privileged in the process. Attending to the ways in which different power hierarchies and inequalities inform the phase before decision-making on a given problem begins (the “decision-impetus phase”) is critical for advancing procedural justice (Reference Marion Suiseeya and CoolsaetMarion Suiseeya, 2020).

One example of the importance of the decision-impetus phase is the problem of biodiversity itself. The framing of the biodiversity problem was initially driven largely by conservation biologists (Reference Haila, Meadowcroft and FiorinoHaila, 2017; Reference TakacsTakacs, 1996). The idea of biodiversity subsequently gained wider acceptance but still carries certain connotations that affect power relations and may not resonate with certain groups, e.g. seeing biodiversity loss as the depletion of a resource rather than as the disruption of a harmonious relationship between humans and nonhumans (see Chapter 9; Reference Martin, McGuire and SullivanMartin et al., 2013). This example highlights that while inclusion of affected actors in established decision-making processes is a critical element of transformative governance, just transformation requires earlier and broader attention to procedural justice and recognition.

8.5 How Should Resources Be Mobilized and Allocated?

While transformative governance is likely to yield net economic benefits over the longer term, it will require large-scale mobilization of financial resources and a shift away from financing activities that harm biodiversity (CBD, 2020; Reference Chaffin, Garmestani and GundersonChaffin et al., 2016; Reference McCarthy, Donald and ScharlemannMcCarthy et al., 2012; Chapter 6). However, given vast disparities in incomes worldwide, capacity to mobilize resources domestically varies widely. Justice requires that higher-capacity countries support those with more limited capacity (Reference ArmstrongArmstrong, 2019).

The CBD obliges developed countries to “provide new and additional financial resources” to enable developing countries to meet their obligations under the Convention (UN, 1992: Article 20.2). Subsequently, Aichi Target 20 aimed for the mobilization of financial resources to “increase substantially from the current levels.” A high-level panel of the CBD (2012) estimated the cost of meeting the Aichi targets globally at US$150–$440 billion per year, and it is likely that the cost of meeting more ambitious post-2020 targets will be at least within this range (CBD, 2020). Accordingly, resource mobilization has emerged as a key priority for the post-2020 framework.

In this section, we focus on two key questions that a just scale-up of resources for transformative biodiversity governance must address:

  1. 1. How should the global effort of mobilizing resources be shared among nation-states and nonstate actors?

  2. 2. How should resources be allocated across countries and communities?

Both questions raise complex issues of distributive justice but have been addressed far less in the literature on biodiversity finance than in literature on development assistance and climate finance. The discussion below draws on relevant findings from these other bodies of work.

8.5.1 Effort-Sharing

Recognizing the differentiated capabilities of its parties, the CBD notes “the importance of burden-sharing” among contributing parties in providing finance for developing countries (Article 20.2). This leaves open the question of which actors (whether states, international organizations, civil society or private actors) should contribute the most toward a scaled-up international financing effort: is it those who have contributed the most to biodiversity loss, those with the greatest capacity to mobilize resources or those who stand to gain the most (economically or otherwise) from conservation? These three principles – sometimes referred to as the contributor/polluter pays principle, the capacity to pay principle and the beneficiary pays principle – have been widely debated in the literature on climate justice (see e.g. Reference Dellink, Den Elzen and AikingDellink et al., 2009; Reference PagePage, 2011) but have so far received only modest attention in the literature on biodiversity finance (for notable contributions, see Reference ArmstrongArmstrong, 2019; Reference Balmford and WhittenBalmford and Whitten, 2003).

While some argue that the extent to which actors will benefit from conservation should be the primary factor in distributing costs (Reference Balmford and WhittenBalmford and Whitten, 2003), others argue that a pluralist approach combining all three principles is necessary, not least because those who stand to benefit most – e.g. forest communities – may have little capacity to pay for additional conservation efforts, even though they are often the most active participants in existing conservation practices (Reference ArmstrongArmstrong, 2019). Moreover, it would be unfair to expect potential beneficiaries to pay the most when others (e.g. consumers in other countries) may be driving biodiversity loss in those areas despite the availability of less destructive alternatives (Reference DowieDowie, 2011).

To date, parties to the CBD have not been able to agree on how to translate principles of equity into transparent, quantified effort-sharing measures. Sharing the overall conservation financing effort typically operates more informally.Footnote 3 However, improved transparency about how much parties are providing could help to clarify which parties are fulfilling their obligations, and inclusive deliberation could help to build shared understandings about broad parameters for effort-sharing (Reference Pickering, Jotzo and WoodPickering et al., 2015).

8.5.2 Allocation

Evidence indicates that conservation spending is more effective in lower-income countries than higher-income ones (Reference Waldron, Miller and ReddingWaldron et al., 2017), suggesting potential synergies between just allocation and effective ecological outcomes. However, when it comes to the question of allocating finance among lower-income countries, justice and effectiveness could pull in different directions.

Allocation according to need is a prominent justice-based principle for determining distribution, but in practice it competes with other principles of allocation. Existing patterns of allocation for environmental aid reflect a mix of donors’ interests (e.g. supporting neighboring countries or trade partners) and equity considerations such as recipients’ needs (e.g. national income and extent of the environmental problem) (Reference Hicks, Parks, Timmons Roberts and TierneyHicks et al., 2008). Reference Miller, Agrawal and RobertsMiller et al. (2013) find that a country’s biodiversity need (measured using indicators such as the number of threatened species or species richness) and quality of governance are strong predictors of the level of biodiversity aid it receives; income is negatively but weakly correlated with levels of biodiversity aid.

Trade-offs may arise in allocation decisions because the countries with the greatest levels of need may not be the ones with the greatest capacity to manage funds effectively, for example where low-income status coincides with limited institutional capacity. Managing these trade-offs is further complicated by different interpretations of need (e.g. degree of risk of biodiversity loss or capacity for domestic resource mobilization: Reference Miller, Agrawal and RobertsMiller et al., 2013).

A massive scale-up of biodiversity finance would place considerable stress on existing institutional capacity to manage resources, particularly in countries with more constrained capacity (Reference PresbiteroPresbitero, 2016). While this needs to be taken into account in efforts to maximize effective use of biodiversity finance, there is a risk that low-income countries could be further marginalized if the lion’s share of funding goes to middle-income countries with stronger institutional capacity (Reference Arndt and TarpArndt and Tarp, 2017). Demand-driven mechanisms for allocating biodiversity finance may help to manage (if not fully resolve) these trade-offs, as recipient countries’ level of demand for finance may reflect a mix of need and institutional capacity. Enhancing recipient countries’ control over subnational allocation of biodiversity finance could enhance the effectiveness of implementation as well as furthering principles of procedural justice (Reference Duus-OtterströmDuus-Otterström, 2015).

8.6 How Can Transformative Governance Be Implemented Equitably?

In this section we discuss concerns arising for two prominent strategies that aim to address the drivers of biodiversity loss: (1) scaling up area-based conservation, and (2) mainstreaming biodiversity considerations across all sectors of decision-making.

8.6.1 Equitably Scaling Up Area-Based Conservation Initiatives

There is considerable debate regarding the expansion of area-based conservation and visions to achieve this, including whether expansion should comprise protected areas or “other effective area-based conservation measures” (OECMs) (Reference Büscher, Fletcher and BrockingtonBüscher et al., 2017; Reference Dudley, Jonas and NelsonDudley et al., 2018; Chapters 11 and 12). Here we focus on two key questions of justice that arise in scaling up conserved areas: (1) redistributive effects and (2) questions of procedural justice and recognition in decision-making.

Efforts to expand protected areas commonly curtail existing patterns of resource use in those areas. Recent pledges by many world leaders involve expanding protected areas to cover 30 percent of the Earth’s land and ocean surface by 2030. Proposals to expand this to 50 percent – e.g. the Half Earth Project (inspired by Reference WilsonWilson, 2016) and Nature Needs Half (Reference Kopnina, Washington, Gray and TaylorKopnina et al., 2018) – could impact as many as one billion people (Reference Schleicher, Zaehringer and FastréSchleicher et al., 2019). Such efforts could meet considerable political resistance from rural populations, particularly if they ignore the legacy of colonial land reallocations, displacement of IPLC and “green grabs” (Reference Büscher, Fletcher and BrockingtonBüscher et al., 2017). Equally, resistance may emerge from powerful groups (e.g. resource extraction or infrastructure industries) that are exploiting areas slated for protection. Although the redistributive effects of protected area expansion are often understood in human terms, an ecological justice perspective – which extends compassion, caring and rights to the entire living community – draws attention to the ways in which protected area expansion redistributes the Earth’s resources between humans and nonhumans (Reference Kopnina, Washington, Gray and TaylorKopnina et al., 2018). A perspective on justice that encompasses both human and nonhuman concerns could highlight possible areas of convergence between ecocentric conservationists and social justice activists. In the Amazon, for example, coalitions have formed between conservation biologists and social scientists, or between grassroots popular movements and environmental organizations, that have resulted in the creation of protected areas that combine zones for sustainable use (encompassing subsistence or commercial exploitation) and conservation (Reference Inoue, Franchini, Tickner and SmithInoue and Franchini, 2020). The more ambitious the protected area target, the more challenging it is likely to be to achieve such convergence.

Protected area expansion raises complex governance issues relating to rights, access and control, such that the question of how protected areas are managed is as important as what is to be protected (Reference Büscher, Fletcher and BrockingtonBüscher et al., 2017; Reference Coolsaet, Dawson, Rabitz and LoveraCoolsaet et al., 2020). In implementing international commitments on protected areas (such as Aichi Target 11), governments have tended to focus on the “headline” numbers of how much area is protected, with less emphasis on qualitative factors such as Aichi Target 11’s call for protected areas and OECMs to be “equitably managed” (CBD, 2010). This is partly due to practical and conceptual difficulties of measuring equity. Some impact assessment and evaluation tools (see e.g. Reference Schreckenberg, Franks, Martin and LangSchreckenberg et al., 2016; Reference Zafra-Calvo, Pascual and BrockingtonZafra-Calvo et al., 2017) and conceptual frameworks (Reference Pascual, Balvanera and DíazPascual et al., 2017) incorporating the three dimensions of justice have been developed and adopted by the CBD as voluntary guidance (CBD, 2018). However, barriers remain both to the adoption of these tools and to the achievement of equitable management, particularly where national legal frameworks do not recognize customary land rights.

International recognition of the global network of Indigenous and community conserved areas (ICCAs), along with evidence of their mutual benefits for human wellbeing and nature, offers an example of an emergent transformative change in biodiversity governance (Reference Armitage, Mbatha, Muhl, Rice and SowmanArmitage et al., 2020; Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019: chapter 6: 61; Reference Tran, Ban and BhattacharyyaTran et al., 2020). Establishment of an ICCA or “territory of life” requires the autonomy of local people to govern and manage their territories. In many instances, this necessitates an overhaul of land and other laws or policies to transfer power to local institutions, in addition to redressing discriminatory social and political norms. Thus, while a transformative scale-up of area-based conservation will pose significant challenges to existing power relations, it also offers an opportunity to redress a range of injustices (Reference Tauli-Corpuz, Alcorn, Molnar, Healy and BarrowTauli-Corpuz et al., 2020).

8.6.2 Justice and Equity in Mainstreaming Transformative Governance

Transformative governance beyond protected areas remains essential, as the main direct and indirect drivers of biodiversity loss emanate from outside these areas (Chapter 1; Reference Büscher, Fletcher and BrockingtonBüscher et al., 2017). Here we address risks of injustice when conservation interventions adversely affect marginalized groups. In implementing biodiversity governance, just transformation requires at a minimum (a) careful assessment to identify implementation options that avoid or minimize adverse effects on marginalized groups; and (b) where adverse effects cannot reasonably be avoided, incorporating additional measures to ensure that the wellbeing of these groups is protected.Footnote 4 As outlined in the Introduction, injustice may arise not only from practices that adversely impact biodiversity but also from measures to address biodiversity loss.

Taking the example of subsidies harmful to biodiversity (which are addressed in Aichi Target 3), some subsidies (e.g. for fossil fuel extraction) may benefit wealthy interests at the expense of disadvantaged groups, so dismantling them could yield a double dividend for biodiversity and social justice. However, other subsidies (e.g. for fuel or fertilizer) may be designed to benefit disadvantaged groups, so dismantling those subsidies may adversely affect those groups. More broadly, policies that seek to shift people’s livelihoods away from practices that degrade biodiversity can exacerbate inequalities of gender, education, ethnicity or socioeconomic status (Reference Bidaud, Schreckenberg and RabeharisonBidaud et al., 2017; Reference Blythe, Silver and EvansBlythe et al., 2018). While in some cases unequal impacts can be avoided by choosing an alternative option, in other cases there may be no reasonable alternatives, in which case supporting measures are required to mitigate those impacts.

We highlight four types of additional measures: monetary compensation, localized in-kind support for livelihoods, broader social protection mechanisms and a wider-ranging reconfiguration of social and political relations.

First, economic theories of reform often emphasize monetary transfers to alleviate or compensate for adverse impacts (or conversely monetary incentives to adopt sustainable practices). International biodiversity finance, as outlined in Section 8.5, may help to reduce the risk that conservation efforts will impede the ability of developing countries to address other pressing development priorities. Similarly, payment for ecosystem services (PES) initiatives may enable communities to participate in conservation without endangering their livelihoods (Reference Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoIPBES, 2019). However, there remains the risk that a compensatory perspective will fail to recognize the incommensurability of different values attached to nature, the agency of affected groups and other options for enhancing their wellbeing (Reference Lliso, Pascual, Engel and MarielLliso et al., 2020).

A second option is localized support for livelihoods, such as through integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). Most case studies report that local integrated approaches to conservation have yielded very little benefit to people, even in cases that led to more effective conservation (Reference Lund and Saito-JensenLund and Saito-Jensen, 2013; Reference Twinamatsiko, Baker and HarrisonTwinamatsiko et al., 2014). The emerging understanding from this experience is that conservation effectiveness should be conceived as linked to social justice, rather than to a narrow economic understanding of development. In other words, for biodiversity governance to be transformative it is necessary to shift from an “integrated conservation and development” model to one of “integrated conservation and justice” (Reference MartinMartin, 2017; Reference Vucetich, Burnham and MacdonaldVucetich et al., 2018). This would include, for example, stronger recognition of local visions of nature in decision-making processes and support for local environmental stewardship instead of separating local livelihoods from ecosystems or resources of conservation value.

The need to scale up and mainstream biodiversity objectives beyond individual projects points to the importance of exploring a third kind of measure: broad-based social protection mechanisms. These could take the form of unemployment insurance, welfare payments or cash transfers for low-income families (e.g. the Bolsa Floresta program in Brazil), universal basic income or other instruments (Reference de Haande Haan, 2014). Unlike project-specific support, these measures would help to safeguard communities against a wider range of risks to their wellbeing. However, broader redistributive measures may be difficult to implement effectively – particularly in low-income countries – and may need to be supplemented by international support.

Finally, a fourth strategy is to combine conservation measures with broader systemic reform that advances all dimensions of justice, particularly for marginalized groups and environment and human rights defenders (Reference Bille Larsen, Le Billon and MentonBille Larsen et al., 2021; Reference Scheidel, Del Bene and LiuScheidel et al., 2020). This could occur through formal recognition of the rights of IPLC (e.g. through constitutional recognition, parliamentary representation or treaty processes), strengthening social safeguards in conservation policy (to address concerns of displacement and impacts on livelihoods), reform of land tenure legislation, or other measures (Reference Tran, Ban and BhattacharyyaTran et al., 2020). This fourth strategy underscores the importance of thinking well beyond the conventional policy toolkit of financial transfers if just transformation is to be achieved.

8.7 Policy Implications

Our review confirms that action is required at multiple levels to reinterpret and uphold justice in transformative biodiversity governance across diverse geographic, temporal and spatial scales. Key areas for policy innovation emerging from the preceding sections that could enhance justice in transformative governance – especially through the implementation of the Global Biodiversity Framework – are outlined in Box 8.1.

Box 8.1 Policy options for advancing justice in transformative biodiversity governance

  • Norm development and fulfillment: Further development of international norms of equity and justice in global sustainability governance could take the form of new norms (e.g. just biodiversity governance) or further diffusion or expansion of existing norms (e.g. the application of human rights to biodiversity governance, or entrenchment of the principle of equity across all three objectives of the CBD). However, norm development by itself is insufficient: indeed, it could be argued that the CBD already has a range of well-developed norms to work with, and that the key issue is compliance with or fulfillment of those norms – an issue that we address in the subsequent points in this list.

  • Policy integration: There is a need for stronger integration of justice concerns in biodiversity policy-making, policy implementation and policy review at all levels of governance. One option for doing so would be to build on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework – which includes goals on biodiversity and on social and economic equity, along with other socioeconomic objectives – and associated tools for mapping and managing synergies and trade-offs across goals (e.g. Reference Griggs, Nilsson, Stevance and McCollumICSU, 2017).

  • Decision-making: Greater attention to how existing approaches to decision-making can exacerbate injustices could be coupled with further entrenchment of procedural rights (including through the Aarhus Convention and related international agreements), practices and measures (e.g. FPIC) to ensure that marginalized groups can shape and influence collective decision-making.

  • Resource mobilization: This could take the form of credible, time-bound, multilateral, national and nonstate commitments to scale up resource mobilization to support biodiversity policy in developing countries – including meaningful progress on the long-discussed idea of a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (Nagoya Protocol, Article 10; see Chapters 6, 10 and 15) – along with efforts to build shared understandings about equitable effort-sharing and allocation of resources.

  • Implementation: Alongside more conventional measures to alleviate the impacts of conservation initiatives on marginalized groups (including social impact assessment and financial transfers), just transformation is likely to require strengthening broad-based social safety nets, international recognition of ICCAs and other measures to remedy unjust asymmetries of power in political systems (e.g. land reform and recognition of Indigenous rights).

  • Monitoring, evaluation and accountability: Meaningful mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating equity in conservation, sustainable use and benefit-sharing need to be developed, incorporated into decision-making, and used in reporting on national and collective performance under the post-2020 framework. Existing voluntary guidance for assessing equity in protected area management could be implemented as standard, used to hold decision-makers accountable and extended to other areas of biodiversity governance. Stronger measures are required to ensure that policy-makers and other actors are held accountable for their commitments to transformative change, and that legal sanctions are strengthened for those who persecute environmental defenders or wantonly destroy biodiversity on a large scale.

8.8 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that in both conceptualizing and implementing transformative biodiversity governance, issues of justice need urgent attention. Justice is at the core of how to envision and achieve transformative change, and how to maintain a desired future state. Failure to take account of preexisting unjust conditions – or the potential for misguided governance strategies to create further injustice – may not only result in morally reprehensible decisions but may also provoke resistance that ultimately blocks transformative change and results in a failure to address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss. Transformative governance requires not only inclusive governance but a broader integrative vision of justice and sustainability, exemplified by the idea of just transformation.

The literature reviewed in this chapter emphasizes the need for a multidimensional view of justice – comprising not only distributive justice but also procedural justice and recognition – as well as attention to global, intergenerational and interspecies aspects, while also remaining cognizant of diverse social values and local circumstances. The depth, scale and urgency of transformative change underscore the importance of a multidimensional perspective. Achieving a simultaneous transformation toward justice and sustainability remains a daunting challenge replete with complex trade-offs. Nevertheless, it remains vital to strive for a just transformation in which everyone – especially those most often excluded in society – is able to participate in, influence and benefit from more just and sustainable biodiversity governance.

9 Mainstreaming the Animal in Biodiversity Governance: Broadening the Moral and Legal Community to Nonhumans

Andrea Schapper , Ingrid J. Visseren-Hamakers , David Humphreys and Cebuan Bliss
9.1 Introduction

The individual animal has often been neglected in biodiversity governance debates, with animals mainly considered in terms of species, biodiversity, wildlife or natural resources. Indeed, and somewhat counterintuitively, biodiversity governance is not always animal-friendly. Think, for example, of the issues of wildlife management, (“sport”) hunting, captive breeding, reintroduction and relocation of endangered species, and the use of animal testing in conservation research (Reference De MoriDe Mori, 2019). For some issues, the relationship is more complex, for example the “management” of Invasive Alien Species (IAS), which is detrimental to the individuals of the species considered “invasive” but beneficial to native species and habitats (Reference BarkhamBarkham, 2020). Elsewhere, economic development and incentives impact both biodiversity and animal concerns, such as the negative effects of animal agriculture (see Reference Visseren-HamakersVisseren-Hamakers, 2018a; Reference Visseren-Hamakers2020 for more detailed overviews of these relationships). How can we transform biodiversity governance in order to incorporate individual animal interests (Reference SteinBernstein, 2015)? That is the central question of this chapter.

To answer this question, we apply an integrative governance perspective to link animal and biodiversity governance systems. Integrative governance can be defined as the theories and practices focused on the relationships between governance instruments (policies and rules) and systems (the entirety of instruments on a specific issue at a certain level of governance, from the global to the local) (Reference Visseren-HamakersVisseren-Hamakers, 2015; Reference Visseren-Hamakers2018a; Reference Visseren-Hamakers2018b). Our main argument focuses on integrating the interests of the individual animal in order to enable a shift from dominant anthropocentric ontologies to a more ecocentric approach, thereby improving human–nonhuman relationships and preventing further biodiversity loss without compromising our ethical obligations. The chapter argues that transformative biodiversity governance requires integrating animal rights and rights of nature approaches to enable a shift from dominant anthropocentric ontologies to a more ecocentric approach.

We review relevant literature and policy developments through an integrative governance perspective (Reference Visseren-HamakersVisseren-Hamakers, 2015) that brings together debates which, to date, have remained rather disconnected, including those in philosophy, political science, law and veterinary sciences. We also discuss attempts to integrate these debates. We have organized the review into academic and policy debates around: animal rights; animal welfare; rights of nature and integrative approaches, including One Health, One Welfare and compassionate conservation. Our literature review outlining academic debates is based primarily on secondary sources, but also includes gray literature and documents including legislative texts, policy papers, and reports by international and civil society organizations. The chapter does not provide a comprehensive overview of animal and biodiversity governance around the world, but rather aims to show how different concepts are operationalized in various contexts. Below, we first review the different debates and practices. The discussion section integrates the debates and reflects on their transformative potential, and the conclusion reflects on their implications for transformative biodiversity governance.

9.2 Animal Rights
9.2.1 The Academic Debate

The idea that animals are rights-holders has origins in political theory, philosophy and law. Until today, the discourse and practice on animal rights, including the animal rights movement, has been inspired by normative thinking on interspecies justice, in other words justice for and between human and nonhuman animals (Reference Donaldson and KymlickaDonaldson and Kymlicka, 2011; Reference NussbaumNussbaum, 2006; Reference ReganRegan, 1983; Reference SingerSinger, 1975). Cavalieri, for example, proposes deleting the word “human” from human rights (Reference CavalieriCavalieri, 2001), thus expanding our understanding of rights to other species.

Two influential monographs on animal ethics were published in the 1970s and early 1980s: Animal Liberation by Peter Reference SingerSinger (1975); and The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Reference ReganRegan (1983). Singer proposes a more sophisticated account of equality, extending it to all beings irrespective of gender, ethnicity or, indeed, species. He builds on the concept of speciesism (Reference Ryder, Godlovitch, Godlovitch and HarrisRyder, 1971), which, analogous with racism, discriminates against species other than one’s own. Following the eighteenth/nineteenth century philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who suggests that we should not ask whether animals can reason or talk but whether animals can suffer, Singer proposes we consider their sentience. He argues that the capacity to suffer gives one the right to equal consideration with others. To avoid vast suffering of nonhuman animals, humans need to make radical changes not only to their diet, farming methods, scientific experiments, practices of hunting, trapping and wearing fur, but also to entertainment, including circuses, zoos and rodeos (Reference SingerSinger, 1975). Singer is not against using animals but argues that their interests should be considered on an equal basis to those of humans.

Reference ReganRegan (1983) agrees with Singer that speciesism is unjust and wrong. However, what he conceives as wrong is to view animals as human resources, that is, to eat them, to exploit them for entertainment, sport, or any commercial activity, or to surgically manipulate them for medical research. Regan denies that animal husbandry methods should become “more humane”; he supports the complete abolition of commercial animal agriculture (Reference ReganRegan, 1983: 337). He also criticizes the utilitarian perspective of Singer: the value of animals cannot be reduced to their usefulness for the greater good of others (Reference ReganRegan, 1983: 343). It is our duty to recognize their rights and, as such, Regan views the animal rights movement as part of the human rights movement. Thus, in animal ethics one can differentiate between interest theories of rights for eliminating animal suffering, such as Singer’s, and anti-use theories supported by Regan (Reference ReganRegan, 1983; see also Reference Ahlhaus and NiesenAhlhaus and Niesen, 2015: 16).

More recently, in Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (2011), Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka argue for a more comprehensive approach to animal rights that varies according to the relational nature of specific groups of animals to humans. Such an approach integrates universal negative rights, such as the absence of suffering, with differentiated positive rights, such as healthcare for domesticated animals, depending on the character of the human–animal relationship (Reference Donaldson and KymlickaDonaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 11; see also Reference Ahlhaus and NiesenAhlhaus and Niesen, 2015: 18). Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that liberalism today combines universal human rights with more relational, bounded and group-differentiated rights. Upon this base, they claim, citizenship theory can be fruitfully used to “combine traditional animal rights theory with a positive and relational account of obligations” (Reference Donaldson and KymlickaDonaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 14).

When referring to human–animal relationships, Donaldson and Kymlicka differentiate between: (a) animals living in the wild forming sovereign communities in their own territories, (b) animals that, similar to migrants or denizens, move into areas of human habitation and (c) domesticated animals that have been bred over generations to coexist with human beings. Domesticated animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue, should enjoy citizenship rights (Reference Donaldson and KymlickaDonaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 14). Acknowledging domestic animals as citizens with rights is a moral obligation that arises from their integration into human societies, which removes their independence and ability to survive in the wild. Wild animals, in contrast, should be conceived as citizens of their own sovereign communities whose autonomy and territory should be respected. Non-domesticated “liminal” animals living among humans are compared to denizens. They need to be respected as coresidents of urban spaces but are not included in the citizenship scheme of humans and domesticated animals (Reference Donaldson and KymlickaDonaldson and Kymlicka, 2011: 15).

By employing political concepts, such as citizenship, denizenship, sovereignty, territory, migration and membership, and exploring their use or adaptation in the context of animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka make a clear attempt to promote animal rights beyond mere justifications for rights and justice for animals. While this has been criticized by some scholars because it challenges the distinctive meanings of concepts like citizenship or denizenship (Reference LadwigLadwig, 2015; Reference SeubertSeubert, 2015; Reference SteinStein, 2015), it has also given fresh impetus to the debate on animal rights. If animals are citizens, they are perceived as actors that can directly participate in political communities and be represented through institutions (Reference Donaldson and KymlickaDonaldson and Kymlicka, 2011). Especially in democratic political systems, Peter Reference Niesen, Diehl and TuiderNiesen (2019) argues, there is consensus that those affected by laws should be able to influence the process of making these laws. If institutions neglect certain perspectives and interests, they are undemocratic. We therefore need to rethink our relationship with (and domination over) animals (Reference Niesen, Diehl and TuiderNiesen, 2019: 381). This is reiterated from a post-humanist perspective, which deconstructs species supremacy and anthropocentrism to acknowledge animals’ own agency (Reference BraidottiBraidotti, 2013). This perspective leads us to question whether humans have the “right” to grant animals rights at all.

9.2.2 Political Practice

The modern animal rights movement has been heavily influenced by the work of the philosophers Singer and Regan (Reference WiseWise, 2016). Additionally, lawyers, scientists, academics, veterinarians, theologians and psychologists have influenced the movement. Consequently, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a number of lawsuits have been brought forward to protect the interests and rights of animals. Legal scholars have attempted to advance basic animal rights in political practice, often accompanied by scientific evidence that provides a better understanding of the capacities and behavior of animals (Reference WiseWise, 2016).

An increasing number of animal rights groups have raised awareness of the abusive conditions in which animals are kept, including on factory farms and in medical research laboratories. Rights groups are active at various levels, from local animal shelters to international groups such as PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals).

At the national level, the animal rights movement has succeeded in achieving stronger legal protection of animals by lobbying for the inclusion of animal rights in national constitutions. Two prominent examples are Switzerland and Germany. Animal protection has long been an issue of debate in the Swiss parliament. The “dignity of creatures” (“die Würde der Kreatur”) was first mentioned in the constitution of the canton Aargau in 1980. It initiated a wider debate about the need to include animal welfare and dignity in the federal constitution (Reference GoetschelGoetschel, 2000: 12). The discourse on animal protection in Switzerland has been strongly linked to debates about the legal boundaries of genetic engineering. On the basis of a successful animal rights campaign, a constitutional amendment was passed in 1992 that stated that researchers need to respect the “dignity of creatures” (Reference JaberJaber, 2000). In the course of creating a new constitution in 1998, animal activists tried to strengthen this amendment but were unsuccessful. However, in 2000, the wording of the 1992 amendment was included in the revised constitution (Reference EvansEvans, 2010: 239).

In Germany, a decade-long battle between campaigners and conservative politicians ended with paragraph 20a of the German constitution stating that animals have to be respected and protected by the state (Reference ConnollyConnolly, 2002). The campaign was started because the basic law protected freedom of research and freedom of profession. As a consequence, courts usually ruled in favor of researchers, even if they conducted experiments that caused animal suffering (Reference EvansEvans, 2010: 235). A political opportunity arose when a Social Democrat/Green government coalition was in power from 1998 until 2002, after animal activists’ efforts to include animal rights in the constitution were blocked by the Christian-Democrat majority in parliament during the 1990s. In 2002, activists increased public awareness after the Supreme Court granted permission to practice a traditional religious slaughter ritual that – according to many campaigners – involved unnecessary cruelty (Reference JuddJudd, 2003: 122). Public opinion against this decision and the support of the Green Party led to a successful constitutional amendment that year. Article 20a of German Basic Law now reads:

“(t)he state protects, in the interest of future generations, the natural basis of life, and the animals, within the framework of constitutional laws and through the making of laws and in accordance with ordinances and through judicial decision.”.

(German Basic Law, Art. 20a)

Here, we can see the strong link between animal rights, rights of nature and intergenerational justice. Even though the German Animal Protection League was hoping that this constitutional amendment would lead to a number of relevant changes protecting animals in Germany (Reference ConnollyConnolly, 2002), there are still many problems, mostly relating to animals kept in factory farms and live animal transport. However, legislative changes at the federal and state level following the constitutional amendment of 2002 have almost completely eliminated inhumane research practices involving animals, and keeping animals for fur farming.

Box 9.1 Oostvaardersplassen: Animal Welfare and Rights Versus Conservation

In the Netherlands, the Oostvaardersplassen rewilding project has been subject to controversy after large herbivores (Konik horses, Heck cattle and red deer) introduced by humans starved when they exceeded the carrying capacity of the fenced-in nature reserve. There was a political debate among the Dutch public and animal protection NGOs, who felt responsibility for the welfare of these animals and the duty to prevent unnecessary suffering, and managers stressing the importance of noninterference and allowing natural processes to occur (Reference Kopnina, Leadbeater and CryerKopnina et al., 2019; Reference Lorimer and DriessenLorimer and Driessen, 2014; Reference Ohl and van der StaayOhl and van der Staay, 2012). These animals straddle the divide between wild and domesticated and raise questions regarding our level of responsibility for their welfare, and indeed what their rights are.

9.3 Animal Welfare
9.3.1 The Academic Debate

Over the last three decades, animal welfare has accelerated as a field of scientific study. There is no universally accepted definition of animal welfare and the various conceptions in use lead to different ways of assessing the welfare of animals (Reference Weary and RobbinsWeary and Robbins, 2019). Most definitions, however, differentiate between physical elements contributing to, or impeding, the welfare of animals, including malnutrition, exposure, disease and injury, on the one hand, and affective elements like thirst, hunger, discomfort, pain, fear and distress, on the other hand (Reference MellorMellor, 2016: 8). Challenges to animal welfare can originate in natural and unnatural environments, and to assess the welfare of an individual animal or collective species one needs to consider not only fitness and health, biological needs and wants, but also animals’ sensory or emotional experiences, feelings or affective states (Reference MellorMellor, 2016: 14).

Important ideas on animal welfare originate in the 1965 Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of Animals Kept under Intensive Livestock Husbandry Systems, also known as the Brambell report, published in the UK. The report highlighted that farm animals should be guaranteed five freedoms: to “stand up, lie down, turn around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs” (FAWC, 2009). In reaction to the Brambell report, the UK Farm Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (FAWAC) was established, and subsequently the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC). John Webster, a former Professor of Animal Husbandry at the University of Bristol, helped develop the five freedoms. In his book Animal Welfare: A Cool Eye Towards Eden, he explains the usefulness of this framework in order to assess animal welfare:

Preserving the concept of the “Five Freedoms”, I attempted to produce a logical, comprehensive method for first analysis of all the factors likely to influence the welfare of farm animals, whether on the farm itself, in transit or at the point of slaughter.

Minimum standards based on the five freedoms have been modified by the FAWC, which in 2019 was renamed the Animal Welfare Committee (AWC), and were supplemented by five provisions detailing how to implement them. The AWC today classifies animals’ quality of life as a good life, a life worth living and a life not worth living (FAWC, 2009: iii). Furthermore, in 2018, the UK Government acknowledged animal sentience, which it defines as “the capability to experience pain, distress and harm” (FAWC, 2018), reiterating its commitment to Article 13 of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union (EU), which recognizes animal sentience. Such recognition paves the way for the acknowledgment of the individual animal in biodiversity governance.

Considerations on animal welfare, including relevant welfare and assessment schemes in the UK and beyond, are still guided by the five freedoms and respective provisions (Reference MellorMellor, 2016: 2). The 2009 FAWC report includes:

Freedom from hunger and thirst, by ready access to water and a diet to maintain health and vigour;

Freedom from discomfort, by providing an appropriate environment;

Freedom from pain, injury and disease, by prevention or rapid diagnosis and treatment;

Freedom to express normal behavior, by providing sufficient space, proper facilities and appropriate company of the animal’s own kind;

Freedom from fear and distress, by ensuring conditions and treatment, which avoid mental suffering

Even though the language of “freedom” is akin to the human rights language employed in international agreements (e.g. in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), there is a clear distinction between animal rights and animal welfare approaches. Whereas animal rights proponents emphasize that it is morally wrong for humans to use or exploit animals, animal welfarists are concerned with reducing suffering. Welfarists’ acceptance of the instrumental use of animals by humans is in accordance with anthropocentric thinking, and in line with arguments brought forward by Singer. This utilitarian perspective is contrary to the philosophical ideas of Regan and animal rights proponents, who argue against using animals as a resource to be exploited by humans at all. Still, the five freedoms and pertinent animal welfare schemes are criticized by others for being normative and too idealistic to serve as a code of recommendation for welfare assessment (Reference McCullochMcCulloch, 2013).

Furthermore, the five freedoms have been criticized for being tailored to contexts of animal exploitation (Reference HaynesHaynes, 2011), and focused on “negative freedoms” in which “freedom from” (e.g. hunger, disease and fear) is emphasized. The exception is “freedom to express normal behavior” (FACW, 2009). Scholars have suggested that this focus on negative experiences may not be sufficient because animal welfare should also comprise positive elements, such as being housed in species-relevant environments and encouraging animal-to-animal interaction (Reference MellorMellor, 2016: 2). A more subjective measure of welfare, qualitative behavior assessment (QBA), goes some way to countering the criticisms on the five freedoms. QBA proposes an integrative measurement to assess the behavior of an animal and its interaction with its environment (Reference Wemelsfelder and LawrenceWemelsfelder and Lawrence, 2001).

9.3.2 Political Practice

Conceptualizations of animal welfare, and in particular the five freedoms, have had considerable impact on policy development from the global to the national level.

The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), established in 1924, is an intergovernmental organization with 182 member states. It focuses mainly on the health of domesticated animals kept for food. It has developed animal welfare standards, included in the regularly updated Terrestrial Animal Health Code, and an animal welfare strategy in 2017 that covers standards related to transport, slaughter and the use of animals in research (OIE, 2020a). The organization supports member countries in the implementation of the standards (OIE, 2020b; Reference Visseren-HamakersVisseren-Hamakers, 2018a). Pertinent to this chapter, the OIE’s revised mandate to improve animal health and welfare worldwide extends its scope to wild animals (OIE, 2002). Nevertheless, the focus of its dedicated wildlife working group, created in 1994, is almost exclusively on wildlife diseases, rather than welfare (OIE, 2020c). In sum, the OIE remains predominately anthropocentric in its aims.

Additionally, the creation of a United Nations Convention on Animal Health and Protection (UNCAHP) is currently under consideration. The draft convention is an initiative of the Global Animal Law Project (2018). The 2018 draft affirms that animals are sentient beings and acknowledges the five freedoms in its preamble. It proposes general measures in relation to non-cruelty and good treatment, and recommends the creation of a United Nations (UN) institution on animal health, welfare and protection. Another development at the global level concerning animal welfare advocacy was the launch in 2021 of the World Federation for Animals (WFA), a collaboration of animal protection organizations (WFA, 2021).

At the regional level, in Europe, the five freedoms are reflected in the welfare assessment criteria of the European Welfare Quality® scheme. The criteria established are used as assessment standards to determine levels of animal welfare and inform EU citizens on meat products (Reference McCullochMcCulloch, 2013). The EU Strategy for Protection and Welfare of Animals (2012–2015) was evaluated between 2019 and 2020 to assess whether its objectives were delivered. The final report states that the uneven level of protection for different animal species is at odds with the recognition by the EU of animal sentience and that EU citizens’ concerns for animal welfare have increased since 2012 (EU, 2020). The African Union established its Animal Welfare Strategy in Africa (AWSA) in 2017, which refers to One Health and One Welfare approaches and includes all animals, including kept animals and animals in the wild (AU-IBAR, 2017). Meanwhile, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has established Good Animal Husbandry Practices (GAHP), currently focused on livestock important to the region, namely chickens and pigs (ASEAN, 2020).

An overview of animal welfare policies of different countries, as developed by the animal welfare NGO World Animal Protection (2020), shows a tremendous difference in the manner in which animal welfare is recognized and operationalized around the world. In its ratings of welfare policies, not one country receives an A, the highest possible score, with a handful of European countries (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) receiving a B. In the UK, for example, the 2006 UK Animal Welfare Act includes duties of animal owners that are based on the five freedoms, including protection from pain, suffering, injury and disease, as well as the duty to provide a suitable environment, an appropriate diet and adequate housing, and to enable normal behavior patterns (UK Animal Welfare Act, 2006). The five freedoms are also an integral part of a number of welfare codes and schemes in the UK. Examples are various Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) codes of recommendations for the welfare of livestock, for instance for meat chickens and breeding chickens (2002), pigs (2003) and cattle (2003).

Box 9.2 Combining Animal Rights and Welfare Approaches in India

An interesting example on how a combination of animal rights and welfare can be realized is the country case of India. Its constitution stipulates that “…compassion for living creatures” is considered a duty of every citizen (The Constitution of India 1950, amended 2019). Supreme Court decisions, like the 2014 ruling banning the use of bulls for Jallikattu events, directly refer to the dignity of animals, animal rights and animal welfare – and the court considered itself as the guardian of the rights of animals. Court rulings even recognize a transition from anthropocentric perspectives to ecocentric approaches in animal welfare legislation (Animal Welfare Board of India, 2014). Respect for animals’ dignity and intrinsic value is the basis for a number of specific practices, such as prohibition of hunting, reduced meat production and consumption, and encouraging ethically tenable global conservation practices that do not inflict unnecessary harm (Reference Wallach, Bekoff, Batavia, Nelson and RampWallach et al., 2018).

9.4 Earth Jurisprudence and Rights of Nature

The idea that nature has rights is recognized in many indigenous cultures in the Americas (Reference GillGill, 1987; Reference WeaverWeaver, 1996; see also Chapter 2), resonating particularly strongly in the Andes mountains. Pachamama, or Mother Earth, is an Andean goddess who, as the giver of life, has rights irrespective of human desires. A concept related to Pachamama (sometimes written as Pacha Mama) is buen vivir. The term is usually translated into English as “living well” or “good living.” Buen vivir articulates a notion of community and citizenship that embraces all life, with collective rights, including those of nature, prevailing over individual rights (Reference VillalbaVillalba, 2013).

9.4.1 The Academic Debate

The idea of “rights of nature” has gained tentative acceptance in the United States through Christopher Stone’s landmark paper “Should trees have standing?” (Reference StoneStone, 1972). Stone extended the concept of standing (locus standi) to insist that it is unfair for trees to be denied legal protection because they cannot speak and concludes that guardians who wish to defend the rights of trees should be permitted to bring legal action against those whose actions would harm them (Reference StoneStone, 1972). Stone’s paper led to a dissenting opinion in the US Supreme Court. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club opposed a development in the Sequoia National Forest on ecological grounds. The court ruled that the Sierra Club had no standing in the case as neither the club nor its members would be harmed by the development (Reference BaudeBaude, 1973). However, Justice William Douglas dissented, citing Stone’s paper to argue that natural objects should have legal standing, thereby giving guardians the ability to sue for their preservation (Reference HoganHogan, 2007).

Roderick Reference NashNash (1989) saw the extension of rights to other species and natural objects as a broadening of liberal political theory. He argued that freedom of human action should be limited to prevent people from interfering with the rights of other species. Thomas Berry argued that healthy communities cannot be defined solely in terms of the health of people; the health of the natural environment within which a community of people lives also needs to be considered. To Berry, any part of the Earth community has “the right to be, the right to habitat, and the right to fulfil its role in the ever-renewing processes of the Earth community” (Reference Berry and BurdonBerry, 2011, 229). So a river has the right to flow, a tree has the right to grow, a wild animal has the right to roam free in nature and ecosystems have the right to evolve and adapt.

Proponents of Earth jurisprudence argue that nature should be treated as a subject that requires transformative change to secure legally guaranteed rights, rather than an object owned through property rights to satisfy the instrumental needs of humans. There are diverse conceptions of “environmental personhood” (Reference GordonGordon, 2019). Legal scholar Cormac Cullinan builds on the work of Berry to argue that modifying contemporary legal systems will not protect nature. Instead, a thorough transformation of the law, in which humans are recognized as just one species in the Earth community, is needed (Reference CullinanCullinan, 2011). Humans should limit their actions in order to uphold nature’s rights both for moral reasons (it is right to do so) and for instrumental reasons (human rights ultimately depend on the conservation of nature). Under Earth jurisprudence, therefore, obligations are owed not only to humans but to other species and natural features (Reference BurdonBurdon, 2015).

An important academic debate on the relevance of Earth jurisprudence for biodiversity conservation concerns property rights. The liberal notion of private property is essentially individualistic, often emphasizes rights rather than duties and privileges the legal property owner while excluding other stakeholders. Proponents of Earth jurisprudence argue that contemporary property rights are inconsistent with biodiversity conservation. Peter Burdon distinguishes between two approaches to private property. In one view, private property is “inconsistent with ecocentric ethics and ought to be discarded as a social institution” (Reference BurdonBurdon, 2015: 101). In this view, private property establishes a hierarchy, with humans having ownership and dominion over nature. The second, reformist, approach sees private property as an “evolving social institution” that needs to be reconceptualized to take into account the impacts of property use on other people and nature (Reference BurdonBurdon, 2015). In the case of biodiversity governance, nature’s limits should be respected in order to avoid the devastation that humans can cause when property rights are unconditional and unrestricted.

Much contemporary biodiversity policy is based on private property rights and recognizes, implicitly or explicitly, that property owners are entitled to use nature without restrictions, including degrading it. The policy of payments for ecosystems services (PES), for example, rests on the notion that if landowners voluntarily give up a measure of free use in order to provide ecosystem services for the community then payment should be made by that community. PES makes sense in a neoliberal policy context, where owners are free to “sell” on markets the ecosystem services they “provide” to those who benefit from them (see also Chapters 4 and 6).

Earth jurisprudence disputes this logic, arguing that private property is an evolving social construct that needs redefining to take into account our responsibilities to other people and to the community of life. While this runs counter to the liberal notion of property, it is central to the intimate relationship with the land of many indigenous communities, who recognize custodianship as well as ownership. Earth jurisprudence, therefore, articulates a very different notion of property, one in which ethical responsibility to other species is integral and that regulates not just relations between people, but between people and the Earth community.

9.4.2 Political Practice

In 1982 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the World Charter for Nature (Reference WoodWood, 1984). The charter contains twenty-four principles, some of which are now invoked in Earth jurisprudence, including the statements that “Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be impaired” (United Nations, 1982: article 1) and “The genetic viability on the earth shall not be compromised; the population levels of all life forms, wild and domesticated, must be at least sufficient for their survival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be safeguarded” (United Nations, 1982: principle 2). The charter contains the first political recognition by the UN of “harmony with nature,” a phrase that has been repeated in subsequent international environmental declarations, including the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992).

In 2008, Ecuador became the first country to include rights of nature in its constitution, article 71 of which declares:

Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structures, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature.

The Ecuadorian constitution allows any individual or group to take legal action to uphold nature’s rights, a provision that is consistent with Stone’s idea of guardians. Indigenous peoples were represented in the drafting process by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), which paved the way for the inclusion of rights of nature in the constitution. In 2011, the first court case to uphold the rights of nature was brought, namely Wheeler v. Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja. The court ruled that the dumping of road debris into the Vilcabamba River violated nature’s rights and ordered the removal of the debris in order to restore the right of the river to flow (CELDF, 2015; Reference DalyDaly, 2012).

In 2009, Bolivia adopted a new constitution stipulating that Bolivians have a duty to “protect and defend an adequate environment for the development of living beings” (Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2009: Article 108.16). The following year, the Bolivian legislature passed the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, which recognizes seven rights of nature:

  • the right to life and to exist;

  • not to be genetically altered or structurally modified in an artificial way;

  • to pure water;

  • to clear air;

  • to balance;

  • to restoration; and

  • not to be polluted.

While the federal government in the United States does not recognize rights of nature, there has been some recognition at the subfederal level. In Tamaqua Borough, Pennsylvania, in 2006 an ordinance was issued that recognized natural ecosystems within the borough as “legal persons” for the purpose of preventing sewage sludge dumping on wild land (Tamaqua Borough Sewage Sludge Ordinance, 2006). The ordinance, which represents the first instance a public body in the United States granted personhood to nature, stipulated that corporations causing environmental degradation will lose the rights of personhood. Also, in November 2010, the city of Pittsburgh issued an ordinance banning natural gas drilling and fracking, elevating community rights and the rights of nature over and above those of corporate personhood (Pittsburgh Pennsylvania Code of Ordinances, 2013).

The examples of Ecuador and Bolivia (at the national level) and the United States (at the subnational level) have inspired rights of nature movements in other countries, with rivers being granted legal rights in three other countries, namely Colombia, India (including the Ganges and Yamuna) and New Zealand (the Whanganui River) (Reference PecharromanPecharroman, 2018).

In 2010, the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth met in Cochabamba, Bolivia and agreed a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth. The declaration is the most important set of Earth jurisprudence principles produced by civil society groups, although as yet it has no legal status. It aspires to a fundamentally different form of human society in which the rights of nature prevail over other rights: “The rights of each being are limited by the rights of other beings and any conflicts between their rights must be resolved in a way that maintains the integrity, balance and health of Mother Earth” (UDRME, 2010: article 1). Article 1 also states that “Mother Earth is a living being” and “The inherent rights of Mother Earth are inalienable in that they arise from the same source as existence“ (UDRME, 2010: article 1). This has similarities to Gaia theory, which conceives of the Earth as a self-regulating and holistic system of living organisms (Reference LovelockLovelock, 1990). A further civil society initiative is the International Rights of Nature Tribunal, established in 2014. This tribunal hears cases brought by aggrieved parties and those who seek to defend nature’s rights in line with the principles of Earth jurisprudence. Prosecutors and judges are appointed by the Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature (Reference BoydBoyd, 2017).

In 2011, the UN established an annual interactive dialogue on “harmony with nature” (UN, 2020), and in 2012 the expression “rights of nature” appeared for the first time in a UNGA resolution. Resolution 66/288, endorsing the “The future we want,” the main outcome from the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20), notes:

We recognize that planet Earth and its ecosystems are our home and “Mother Earth” is a common expression in a number of countries and regions, and we note that some countries recognize the rights of nature in the context of the promotion of sustainable development.

(United Nations, 2012: para.39)

Also in 2012, the eleventh Conference of the Parties (COP 11) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) passed a decision noting that “biodiversity and development processes can be achieved taking into account non-market-based approaches and respect for ‘Mother Earth’ and the concept of the rights of nature, and that the valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services is one, among other, tools available” (CBD, 2012). This decision represents a broadening of the range of approaches that the CBD is prepared to endorse and a recognition that market valuation and PES policy approaches are not always the most effective. Additionally, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Congress adopted a resolution recognizing the rights of nature “as a fundamental and absolute key element for planning, action and assessment at all levels and in all areas of intervention” (IUCN, 2012). The Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) also mentions rights-based approaches and animal welfare (Reference Razzaque, Visseren-Hamakers, Prasad Gautam, Sonnewend, Brondízio, Settele, Díaz and NgoRazzaque et al., 2019).

Relatedly, the crime of ecocide for violating rights of nature is gaining traction. Ecocide is defined as “extensive damage to, destruction or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or will be severely diminished” (Reference Higgins, Short and SouthHiggins et al., 2013: 257). Reference Legge and BroomanLegge and Brooman (2020) propose that international animal law should recognize “animal ecocide” through an amendment to the Rome Statute, which they argue would significantly advance wild animal welfare. They see animal ecocide as the “unnecessary killing or slaughter of a wild or wild-caught animal, by any human agency, or allowing such killing or slaughter to be so caused by any governmental organisation, to such an extent that an animal, or group of animals, lose their sentient capacity to live a natural life according to their species” (Reference Legge and BroomanLegge and Brooman, 2020: 212). Speciesism is seen as the root cause of ecocide. Recognizing the value and rights of other species would help to prevent such destruction (Reference JerJer, 2019; Reference SollundSollund, 2020).

9.5 Integrative Approaches to Animal and Biodiversity Governance
9.5.1 One Health and One Welfare

Whereas ideas on animal welfare and animal rights focus on the relationship between human beings and nonhuman animals, while rights of nature focuses on the relationship between humans and nature, conceptions of One Health (discussed in detail in Chapter 5) emphasize how all three, namely human, animal and environmental health, are interlinked (Reference Galaz, Leach, Scoones and SteinGalaz et al., 2015; Reference Zinsstag, Schelling, Wyss and MahamatZinsstag et al., 2006; Reference Zinsstag, Schelling, Waltner-Toews and Tanner2011). While the idea has been discussed for decades (Reference Cook, Karesh and OsofskyCook et al., 2004), the outbreak of avian influenza in the early 2000s considerably strengthened discussions relating to the One Health concept. The required cooperation between different international organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), with oversight from the UN System Influenza Coordination Office, emphasized the need for an integrated, intersectoral, interinstitutional and interdisciplinary response (Reference Galaz, Leach, Scoones and SteinGalaz et al., 2015: 3). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, almost certainly caused by a novel coronavirus that was transmitted to humans from animals, led to renewed calls to recognize the interrelationship between environmental, animal and human health.

However, the idea of equally integrating human, animal and environmental health has proven difficult to implement in practice. In addition to hierarchies between professional disciplines, institutional preferences for single-sector approaches, the paucity of funding, capacity-building, education and training that hamper One Health implementation, there is also the critique that the One Health agenda is geographically Northern-dominated, is top-down and lacks consideration of local experiences and knowledge (Reference Galaz, Leach, Scoones and SteinGalaz et al., 2015). Thus, the concept is still weak in its practical application, lacking institutional capacities and interdisciplinary collaboration between the natural and social sciences as well as a fruitful exchange between research and policymakers (Reference ValeixValeix, 2014).

The nascent concept of One Welfare, which is not currently applied at the international level, extends the approach of One Health and highlights the interconnections between animal welfare, human well-being and the environment (Reference Garcia Pinillos, Appleby and MantecaGarcia Pinillos et al. 2016; One Welfare, 2020).

9.5.2 Compassionate Conservation

Proponents of another approach connecting animal and biodiversity concerns, namely compassionate conservation, argue that conservation objectives need to go beyond protecting species and ecological processes to include animal ethics and a concern for animal welfare (Reference Wallach, Bekoff, Batavia, Nelson and RampWallach et al., 2018). This implies not only considering species as a collective but also the interests of individual animals as sentient beings. Hence, compassionate conservationists suggest combining compassion for individuals with conservation of collectives. This can be relevant, for instance, in wildlife management programs or in other areas of conservation practice that opt for killing individual animals from one species to preserve individuals from another species, killing predators to save endangered prey animals, killing introduced or “invasive” species to save native megafauna, killing individual animals for conservation research, or breeding animals in zoos for conservation and education (Reference Wallach, Bekoff, Batavia, Nelson and RampWallach et al., 2018: 1261). According to compassionate conservation, these practices will have to be fundamentally reviewed and reformed in order not to compromise individual animals’ well-being for the sake of their own, or another, species (Reference BekoffBekoff, 2013).

Compassionate conservationists propose transforming human–animal interaction in an ethically appropriate and sustainable way based on four principles: do no harm, individuals matter, inclusivity and peaceful coexistence (Reference Wallach, Bekoff, Batavia, Nelson and RampWallach et al., 2018). Acknowledging the intrinsic value of individual animals requires moving away from instrumentalist thinking, in which animals have material value for human beings, toward valuing them in their own right, irrespective of benefits to humans. This means decentering humans, giving equal consideration to animals and biodiversity as integral parts of an ecosystem and overcoming the human–nature dichotomy. Empirical evidence suggests that nonanthropocentric perspectives, and a stronger focus on the well-being of animals, are increasingly supported within society. Thus, there has been a profound shift toward acknowledging the intrinsic, as opposed to instrumental, value of animals (Reference Bruskotter, Vucetich and NelsonBruskotter et al., 2017).

9.6 Discussion: Integrating the Different Debates

This chapter has reviewed different literatures and policy developments to make the argument for integrating animal rights and rights of nature approaches in biodiversity governance. With many human practices neither sustainable nor ethically sound, it is clear that all of the approaches discussed above, namely animal rights, animal welfare, Earth jurisprudence, One Health and One Welfare, and compassionate conservation, in different ways require a significant rethinking of the relationship between humans, nonhuman animals and nature. At the heart of these approaches is the idea that nature and animals should not merely be treated as objects managed by humans but have equal moral and legal standing with them. The perspectives we have examined vary in terms of how radical their proposals are: Whereas some advocate fundamentally restructuring the relationship between humans and animals, such as animal rights approaches, others suggest the need to diminish inequalities in this relationship, such as animal welfare perspectives.

While academic discussions on animal rights have been ongoing for decades, and their transformative potential is significant, their impact on policy practices has to date been relatively limited due to the prevailing dominance of anthropocentric policy-making. In contrast to animal rights approaches, policies and practices on animal welfare are established and implemented in many countries but often merely reproduce the status quo whereby humans manage and govern animals, albeit with some limited improvements in their living conditions. The transformative potential of animal welfare approaches is therefore limited compared to those on protecting and promoting animal rights. In recent years, rights of nature have been increasingly adopted and implemented internationally and domestically. Ecosystem rights have significant transformative potential, especially if they can be protected by guardians and implemented in court decisions. Integrative perspectives like One Health, One Welfare and compassionate conservation encourage holistic policy development recognizing the link in human, animal and ecosystem health and well-being, and also hold transformative potential, but have not yet had large-scale effects on the ground.

Based on the review, we argue that in a world that is severely threatened by sustainability challenges such as biodiversity loss, we need to refocus our understanding of governance to acknowledge rights as the basis for conflict resolution, peace and just sustainable development. What we can observe in discourse and practice is a changing understanding of human rights: from individual civil and political rights (with its origins in the 1215 Magna Carta and internationally in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights), to collective intergenerational rights (such as the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples or the International Human Right to a Healthy Environment recognized by the UN Human Rights Council in 2021). The emerging discourses and practices on promoting ecosystem integrity, animal rights and interspecies justice, as discussed in this chapter, can be seen as further steps in this ongoing process of increasingly recognizing rights.

Table 9.1 summarizes the main developments discussed in the chapter. It illustrates that many of these debates have been ongoing for decades, with the integrative approaches developing later. Our integrative perspective highlights that different discourses are actually part of the same process of expanding the moral and legal community to include species, individual animals and nature. With this, the chapter has contributed to inclusive governance debates by making the case for the emancipation of those whose interests are not yet being met (see Chapter 1).

Table 9.1 Overview of important developments

YearEvent
1924World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) founded
1965Publication of the UK Brambell report on animal welfare and introduction of the “Five Freedoms”
Early 1970sRichard Ryder coins the term speciesism
1972Christopher Stone publishes “Should trees have standing?”
1975Peter Singer publishes Animal Liberation
1980Founding of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
1982World Charter for Nature adopted at United Nations (UN) General Assembly
1983Tom Regan publishes The Case for Animal Rights
2000Swiss constitution includes respect of “dignity of creatures”
2002German constitution includes the protection of animals
2004Wildlife Conservation Society conference launches One World, One Health
2005First OIE global animal welfare standards
2006Tamaqua Borough in Pennsylvania, USA, recognizes natural ecosystems as legal persons
2008Ecuador includes rights of nature in its constitution
2009UN General Assembly declares April 22 International Mother Earth Day
2009European Union recognizes animal sentience in Article 13 of Lisbon Treaty
2010Bolivia adopts Law of the Rights of Mother Earth
2010Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth
2010Pittsburgh, USA, passes an ordinance recognizing rights of natural communities and ecosystems
2011Court case on rights of Vilcabamba River, Ecuador
2011Draft Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare
2011First UN interactive dialogue on harmony with nature
2012Rights of nature acknowledged in UN General Assembly resolution
2013Marc Bekoff introduces concept of compassionate conservation
2016Idea of One Welfare published
2017OIE Global Animal Welfare Strategy
2017African Union Animal Welfare Strategy
2017Legal rights for rivers in Colombia, India and New Zealand
2018UK Government acknowledges animal sentience
2021World Federation for Animals launched
9.7 Conclusion: Toward Ecocentric Animal and Biodiversity Governance

In this chapter we have analyzed the transformative potential of mainstreaming animal rights and rights of nature in biodiversity governance. We have done so based on an integrative analysis of ongoing academic and policy debates on animal rights, animal welfare, rights of nature and approaches that integrate these debates.

One of the most important insights derived from our review is the recognition of the differences between the discourses on animal rights and rights of nature. The animal rights discourse focuses on animals, arguing that all individual animals have rights, but is silent on the rights of flora and inanimate natural objects such as mountains, which feature prominently in rights of nature discourses that focus on collective rights but are silent on the rights of individual animals. We therefore argue that integrating animal rights and rights of nature approaches is necessary to fully enable ecocentric approaches in biodiversity governance.

Our analysis has several implications for transformative biodiversity governance, in the context of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework. Rights of nature played a prominent role in the negotiations of the framework. We argue that an integrative approach to rights of nature and animal rights should be included in the (implementation of the) framework.

Mainstreaming the individual animal entails designing conservation practices that are more ethically sound and acknowledging human obligations to nature (Reference BurdonBurdon, 2020). Trade-offs between the lives of individual animals and species are not inevitable, but where there is conflict, for example with species deemed invasive, conservation actions can be implemented in ways that respect individuals. This would for example entail choosing management methods that minimize suffering (Reference Barnhill‐Dilling and DelborneBarnhill‐Dilling and Delborne, 2021). A further implication of mainstreaming the individual animal would mean taking wild animals into account as individuals in their own right, rather than just thinking of them as resources or disease vectors. In terms of integrative governance, as exemplified by the OIE’s tripartite+ collaboration (WHO, FAO, OIE, UNEP), which is particularly focused on One Health, this entails shifting the current anthropocentric focus and not automatically prioritizing the interests of humans. There is already evidence that respect for the lives of individual animals will become increasingly important in the future, such as with the launch of the World Federation for Animals to influence international policy-making.

Transformative change, defined as fundamental change including in terms of paradigms, goals and values (Reference Díaz, Settele and BrondízioDíaz et al., 2019), in our view requires fundamentally rethinking the relationship between human beings, individual animals and nature, thereby reorienting biodiversity governance from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric perspective. Expanding the moral and legal community to include not only humans, but also nonhuman animals and nature, is an explicit and essential part of the transformative change required to halt biodiversity loss. Such an ecocentric perspective also requires a foundational rethinking of the concept of sustainable development to incorporate proper acknowledgment of the individual animal (see Reference Visseren-HamakersVisseren-Hamakers, 2020), species and entire ecosystems.

Only a fundamental shift to ecocentric approaches, considering ecosystems holistically and recognizing the rights of individual animals and nature, will allow for the establishment of alternative institutions, structures and processes as part of a broader transformative governance for biodiversity and sustainable development (Reference Chaffin, Garmestani and GundersonChaffin et al., 2016; Reference Visseren-HamakersVisseren-Hamakers, 2018a). The shift also requires rethinking core elements of democracy, such as representation, considering theoretical and practical implications of ecological democracy (Reference Kopnina, Spannring and HawkeKopnina et al., 2021). This will, ultimately, benefit the lives of humans and nonhumans alike, and this approach is embraced in new debates on ecosystem justice, interspecies justice (Reference NussbaumNussbaum, 2006) and multispecies justice (Reference Celermajer, Schlosberg and RickardsCelermajer et al., 2021).

10 Industry Responses to Evolving Regulation of Marine Bioprospecting in Polar Regions

Kristin Rosendal and Jon Birger Skjærseth
10.1 Introduction

A central question in biodiversity governance is how the international community will regulate the conservation and equitable sharing of benefits from the utilization of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). The equity question concerns how to secure benefits from global commons resources for all, not only for financially and technologically strong actors. The access and benefit-sharing (ABS) principles set out in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (CBD, 1993) and elaborated in its 2014 Nagoya Protocol are decisive rules on these equity concerns. ABS is central to the CBD Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework deliberations, which have been delayed due to COVID-19, but which are expected to be adopted in 2022. Along with the pandemic, ABS also put health and biodiversity relationships more prominently on the political agenda, as nature can be both a resource (genetic resources as sources of medicines) and pose threats through zoonoses, depending on how biodiversity is governed (Reference UNEPUNEP, ILRI, 2020). Legal regulation of the utilization of genetic material from ABNJ in the polar regions is currently subject to negotiation within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), based on UN General Assembly decision 72/249, 2017. The ABNJ remain among the few unregulated areas of the world in which bioprospecting is taking place, as the ABS principles of the CBD do not apply directly outside national jurisdiction. The growing focus on the value of marine genetic resources, not least for medicinal development, is likely to be affected by the evolving legal conditions for access and rights to use this material. Addressing a central theme of this volume, we examine the potential effects of the options on the negotiating table in terms of transformative biodiversity governance (TBG).

Here we investigate various aspects of the equity questions, taking stock of evolving regulatory regimes for dealing with the technological aspects of marine bioprospecting, with emphasis on the bioprospectors themselves. First, as we examine legal processes in the making, this study addresses the anticipatory dimension of transformative governance, where the options are still open and malleable. Second, as bioprospectors are central in the utilization of genetic resources, a better understanding of their role and positions is an important element in governing the equity issues of biodiversity conservation and use. By focusing on actors we can examine stakeholder participation, which is central to the TBG debate discussed in this volume. Third, studying the responses and behavior of corporate bioprospecting actors allows an often-neglected focus on technological development as a driver and underlying cause of biodiversity loss. Questions of how to deal with digital sequence information (DSI) and synthetic biology are at the core of international governance of genetic resources (see Box 10.1). Thus, this chapter speaks to Chapter 7 on DSI in this volume, from a more empirically oriented angle.

In multilateral environmental cooperation, issues of North–South divides and equity usually focus on technology transfer and capacity building whenever technology is addressed. Technological developments may also have direct economic and distributional ramifications for poorer countries. We examine how vested interests in biotechnology could challenge transformative change by undermining the principle of equitable sharing of benefits arising from utilization of genetic resources, the ABS regime, as this is central to transformative biodiversity governance (see Reference Chaffin, Garmestani and GundersonChaffin et al., 2016).

“Bioprospecting” refers to the systematic search for biochemical and genetic information in nature, in order to develop commercially valuable products for pharmaceutical, agricultural, cosmetic and other applications (Reference SvensonSvenson, 2013). Marine organisms may be more likely than terrestrial species to contain useful natural compounds, partly because they have evolved in response to extreme environments (see e.g. Reference BodnarBodnar, 2016). However, less than 1 percent of marine organisms have been explored scientifically, and little is known about their rarity or vulnerability. Recent technological advances are making the marine genetic resources of the Arctic and Antarctic Oceans increasingly available and of commercial interest. Collecting biological material from these regions is still very costly and conducted predominantly by a small number of state-funded, oceangoing vessels (see Reference 217LearyLeary, 2018; Reference Müller and SchøyenMüller and Schøyen, 2021). In view of the high levels of public funding that go into infrastructure, collections in biobanks, and delivery of ready bioactive compounds – all of which is necessary to develop commercial products – this has raised questions of cost-sharing as well as benefit-sharing in bioprospecting (Reference Rosendal, Myhr and TvedtRosendal et al., 2016). A handful of multinational corporations are behind more than 80 percent of the patent applications on this material, with BASF alone filing almost half of the patent applications on marine genetic resources since 1988 (Reference Blasiak, Jouffray, Wabnitz, Sundström and ÖsterblomBlasiak et al., 2018). As bioprospecting is largely conducted by private (often multinational) corporations, we must ask whether and how these bioprospectors respond to emerging measures in the ABS legislation.

There are very few studies of bioprospectors, except for some cases of terrestrial medicinal plants (Reference Wynberg, Schroeder and ChennellsWynberg et al., 2009). Also, ABS issues regarding utilization of genetic resources in ABNJ are less explored in social scientific terms than are those lying within national territories. For ABNJ, most of the literature available is from the legal field (Reference Arico and VidasArico, 2010; Reference Drankier, Oude Elferink, Visser and TakácsDrankier et al., 2012; Reference GreiberGreiber, 2011; Reference Jørem and TvedtJørem and Tvedt, 2014; Reference Tvedt and BanetTvedt, 2020). ABS-related studies within the aquaculture and agriculture breeding sector have shown that both commercial and noncommercial breeders alike would prefer aquatic and plant genetic resources to be freely (affordably) accessible, although commercial breeders also need to ensure revenues (royalties) from their own innovations and breeding results through some form of intellectual property rights (Reference Greer and HarveyGreer and Harvey, 2004; Reference Olesen, Rosendal, Bentsen, Tvedt and BrydeOlesen et al., 2007; Reference Rosendal, Olesen, Bentsen, Tvedt and BrydeRosendal et al., 2006; Reference Rosendal, Olesen and Tvedt2013). Similar dilemmas are likely to emerge among marine bioprospectors, as many will need to seek access to genetic material through biobank collections, and many will seek to patent the material. With this chapter, we aim to fill the knowledge gaps concerning the ABS strategies of marine bioprospectors in order to inform the debate on TBG.

The ABS debate has a history of conflict regarding accusations of biopiracy; therefore, ABS strategies may be sensitive data for the corporations. Moreover, corporations rarely provide position papers in international negotiations. In order to disclose information and compensate for the lack of position papers to the UNCLOS negotiations, we have examined bioprospector responses to public hearings on two draft proposals for Norwegian ABS legislation. Further, in-depth, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with key actors in two corporations, to complement the analysis (see Reference YinYin, 2003). Data have also been collected from public records, secondary literature and interviews with seven key actors from ministries, R&D institutes and international scientific organizations (see footnotes for details). Most of the interview materials were collected between 2012 and 2018, but data collection on the international negotiation process has continued to spring 2021.

We have chosen Norway as a case for three reasons, in addition to easy access. First, resources from marine and polar areas are traditional core Norwegian interests. Second, Norway is investing heavily in marine research and innovation: marine bioprospecting, samples collections to marine biobanks and high-cost oceangoing vessels (about €150 million in public funding to the most recent vessel, Kronprins Haakon, alone) (see Reference Müller and SchøyenMüller and Schøyen, 2021). Third, Norway has a long history of advocating the access and equitable benefit-sharing regime of the CBD, further specified in its Nagoya Protocol, but ABS regulations at home are still stalling, with long and controversial debates and hearings. All this makes Norway a relevant case for examining the political scope between norms expressed internationally and concern for domestic interests (Reference Rosendal, Myhr and TvedtRosendal et al., 2016).Footnote 1

We begin by presenting an analytical framework for assessing and explaining corporate strategies and responses to evolving regulations, outlining the main conflicts of the ABS debate. Next, after explaining what marine bioprospecting entails, we turn to the international legal debate on such activities and the current governance of genetic resources in the polar regions. In Sections 10.4 and 10.5 we present findings from our embedded case study of Norwegian actors engaged in polar marine bioprospecting, based on the analytical models for assessing corporate strategies. In the concluding section we offer inputs to the debate on transforming biodiversity governance based on our analysis.

10.2 Analytical Framework on Corporate Strategies

Our examination concerns responses to the new ABS regulation as regards bioprospecting companies and industry associations – here broadly defined as actors with commercial interests. As such regulation is still evolving, we focus mainly on political responses that may, or may not, lead to actual market adaptation (Reference Kolk and PinkseKolk and Pinkse, 2004). “Political responses” refer here to strategic company support of (proactive) or opposition to (reactive) emerging regulation. These strategies are ideal-typical opposite poles: Real-life companies engaged in a wide range of activities cannot be expected to fit perfectly with such opposing extremes. Our aim is to assess the degree of fit between expectations and observations in the content and direction of corporate strategies in relation to ABS regulations.

We focus on three “ideal type” models for explaining company responses (Reference Skjærseth and EikelandSkjærseth and Eikeland, 2013; Reference Skjærseth and Eikeland2019). The first model sees companies as reactive and “reluctant adapters” to strengthened regulations. This “reactive” model is grounded in the traditional economic view of the firm as a unitary, rational, profit-maximizing agent that develops strategies based on full information on the relative costs of various alternatives (Reference Ambec, Cohen, Elgie and LanoieAmbec et al., 2011; Reference Gravelle and ReesGravelle and Rees, 1981). As new ABS regulations (in ABNJ) would charge companies for previously free access to genetic material and impose administrative and compliance costs that could erode profits, regulation is held to divert capital away from other investments, thus threatening a firm’s competitiveness. We expect political responses that seek to minimize new regulatory costs by opposition to the ABS regime: saying “no” to all kinds of monetary benefit-sharing and resisting expanding its legal scope. Opposition expressed in interviews and lobby papers will be in line with this expectation.

The second model views companies as “proactive innovators.” This model is based on bounded rationality and the search for new market opportunities. The “proactive” response model assumes that firms are “boundedly rational” (Reference SimonSimon, 1976). Profit maximization is seen as central, with strategic managerial choices influenced by the design of regulations, organizational practices and operating procedures, perceptions of risks and opportunities, and information constraints, habits or routines (Reference Cyert and MarchCyert and March, 1963; Reference Delmas and ToffelDelmas and Toffel 2008; Reference SanchezSanchez 1997).

Anchored in these assumptions, environmental regulation does not necessarily represent a threat to profits and competitiveness; on the contrary, it may contribute to innovation, improved performance and competitive advantages (Reference Esty and WinstonEsty and Winston, 2006). According to Reference Porter and van der LindePorter and van der Linde (1995a; Reference Porter and van der Linde2005b), “appropriately” designed regulation may spur learning about resource inefficiencies and technological improvements, reduce uncertainty about future investment and stimulate innovations that can offset the costs of compliance. Adjusting to appropriately designed regulations, a company may support regulation and view compliance as a rational way to improve profits and attract new customers. Promoting a profile of green equity can also help companies avoid accusations of “biopiracy,” and hence secure access to resources and collaboration with partners that can promote and increase such access.

“Appropriate” in this case can be assumed to imply adhering to the basic principles of ABS, while not condoning any kind of expansion in its legal scope. “Proactive response” to the ABS regime means accepting monetary benefit-sharing with “provider” countries, but excludes derivatives (see Box 10.1), excludes monitoring through disclosure of origin of genetic material through patent application systems and limits the time scope to the entry into force of the CBD’s Nagoya Protocol in 2014 rather than to the CBD itself (1993) (ENB, 2018; Reference Oberthür and RosendalOberthür and Rosendal, 2014). The idea behind disclosure is that intellectual property rights (IPR) systems are most useful for monitoring ABS, hence the proposal to include the origin of genetic resources in patent applications (Reference Jørem and TvedtJørem and Tvedt, 2014; Reference Morgera, Buck and TsioumaniMorgera et al., 2013; Reference Prip, Rosendal, Andresen and TvedtPrip et al., 2014). Some of these elements have been included in the 2014 EU ABS regulation, which accepts the basic principles of monetary benefit-sharing and derivatives, but not disclosure and extended time scope. We will use acceptance or support as expressed in interviews and government consultations to check whether these elements are in line with expectations.

The third “social responsibility” model assumes that company managers can have mixed motivations that may include social norms of responsibility, in addition to profit maximization. This perspective builds on the tentative assumptions that managers evaluate options broadly in terms of social, economic and political aspects, and that their response to regulation is affected by social norms of responsibility. Regulation can affect such norms of responsibility for companies operating in a complex political and social environment where consumers and civil society organizations play an important role.

Norm-guided behavior has increasingly been incorporated into economic studies of responses to governmental regulation (Reference Esty and WinstonEsty and Winston, 2006) and is discussed in the vast literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Companies can contribute to providing public goods, for instance through voluntary CSR principles and measures. However, since voluntary contributions are rarely deemed sufficient to provide important public goods, like conserving biodiversity, additional state regulation is normally viewed as necessary (Reference Barth, Wolff, Barth and WolffBarth and Wolff, 2009). In the context of ABS and bioprospecting, expected responses here are full acceptance of ABS: accepting monetary benefit-sharing, accepting the inclusion of derivatives, linking monitoring to disclosure through IPR/patent systems and setting the time scope to the entry into force of the CBD (1993). This position accepts an ABS design broadly in line with what developing countries have generally fronted in ABS negotiations. However, empirical assessment of this perspective may prove challenging, as corporate norm-guided behavior is difficult to distinguish from other motivations.

10.3 Governing Bioprospecting in the Polar Regions
10.3.1 Marine Bioprospecting

There is increasing economic interest in genetic material from marine bacteria, sponges, krill, corals and seaweeds. Marine biotechnology research includes aquaculture, novel products such as Omega 3, fatty acids from fish oil, carotenoids, pigments, flavorings and nutritional supplements (Reference Blunt, Copp, Munro, Northcote and PrinsepBlunt et al., 2011). The total value is difficult to assess and may be overrated (Reference 217LearyLeary, 2018), but Reference Blasiak, Jouffray, Wabnitz, Sundström and ÖsterblomBlasiak et al. (2018) estimate the value of global marine bioprospecting in 2025 at $6.4 billion. However, although the number of patent applications based on marine genetic resources is increasing, only 1–2 percent of preclinical candidates become commercial products (Reference 217LearyLeary, 2018). Patent applications merely indicate a demand for patent rights, not actual control, and there is yet little information regarding patents granted.

Bioprospecting the high seas is a cost-intensive, high-risk activity. Apart from possible legal constraints on bioprospecting, collectors also face economic and biological challenges. Economic: Only a few research vessels are equipped to access and collect samples in the polar regions. Some of the collected material is already known and has been analyzed, isolated and characterized, as most species studied have a large geographical distribution (Reference SvensonSvenson, 2013). Biological: The high-cost, high-risk nature of collecting makes resampling difficult; hence the motivation to stock up as much as the vessel’s freezing capacity allows, which gives rise to issues of sustainability in harvesting (Reference SvensonSvenson, 2013).

Reflecting the high costs, marine bioprospecting and patent applications come predominantly from a few developed nations and their industries (Reference Arnaud-Haond, Arrieta and DuarteArnaud-Haond et al., 2011; Reference Müller and SchøyenMüller and Schøyen, 2021; Reference Oldham and KindnessOldham and Kindness, 2020). Beside Australia, Germany, Norway, Russia, the USA and UK, China is currently preparing to join this exclusive club,Footnote 2 having established a large marine science center in Qindao, Shandong province, aiming to study the extreme marine environments of the Polar regions, and building ocean-going vessels specifically rigged for collecting marine samples.Footnote 3

Bioprospecting takes place by directly collecting organic material from nature, and through genetic sequencing of such material that has already entered biobanks. At the time of harvesting (collecting from the wild), the material typically includes all kinds of living specimens or samples from organisms. On return to shore, the marine material is usually stored in biobanks in various forms, from living organisms through dried material to prepared laboratory samples. From these, new expressions can be made, including taxonomic information, ready-made assays, biochemical compositions, DNA sequencing, DSI, screened genomes and synthesized enzymes (biological molecules) copying those found (Reference Tvedt and BanetTvedt, 2020). Enzymes are a central part of polar marine bioprospecting for their function in catalyzing chemical reactions in living organisms (respiration, digestion, etc.).Footnote 4 Bacteria for antibiotics and anticancer agents form another major group (Reference Oldham and KindnessOldham and Kindness, 2020). As shown in Box 10.1, synthetic biology and the use of DSI are increasingly affecting the ABS debate, and also invoking and intensifying the derivative debate in UNCLOS (Reference Lai, Canavan and CameronLai et al., 2019; Reference WolmanWolman, 2016).

Box 10.1 The derivative debate

The CBD, Article 2, defines “genetic resources” as genetic material of actual or potential value, and “genetic material” as any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity. The second definition has given rise to dispute, as genetic sequences and enzymes applied in synthetic biology do not necessarily contain functional units of heredity. The real value of genetic resources lies, however, in their information. Hence developing countries argue that such derivatives of genetic resources must remain part of the ABS regime even when this material does not contain functional units of heredity. Technological developments in synthetic biology have produced large quantities of biological data, which are stored online in databanks. This digital sequence information on genetic resources is increasingly replacing the need to access biological samples of genetic resources in nature and this has major implications for the CBD architecture on ABS (see Chapter 7). If access to derivatives, necessary to foster scientific research, is not accompanied by benefit-sharing modalities, the CBD’s third objective on equitable sharing may become increasingly undermined. Similarly, it may be argued that all new drugs that enter the market still originate from the natural world, and that excluding derivatives would also exclude incentives for biodiversity conservation. Industry actors, coordinating their views on DSI through the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), would strongly oppose the expansion of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol to cover DSI (ICC, 2017).

10.3.2 Governing Bioprospecting

Three levels of law are relevant for polar bioprospecting. At the regional level, Antarctica is governed by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). The legal overlap between ATS and UNCLOS regarding Antarctica is subject to some controversy; however, neither of these regimes has regulations relating directly to marine bioprospecting. The international level includes the rules in UNCLOS, treaties on patent law harmonization and the general rules concerning ABS in the CBD. A general ruling in UNCLOS, Article 118, states that the parties shall cooperate in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas. The ABS regime of the CBD is more specific about ABS conduct in bioprospecting, and might take precedence over UNCLOS through “lex specialis” (as more specific legal acts tend to take precedence over less specific ones). The ABS regime is also more inclusive, with 196 ratifying member states, as against 168 UNCLOS ratifications. The USA has not ratified either. The CBDs ABS regime demands prior informed consent (PIC) and mutually agreed terms (MAT) about where genetic material is found and under what conditions the material has been appropriated. Unlike UNCLOS, the ABS regime is not directly applicable outside of national jurisdiction, however.

In the ongoing UNCLOS negotiations (based on UN General Assembly decision 72/249, 2017), developing countries have advocated an ABS regime, whereas the developed countries’ main concern has been with open access to the high seas (Reference Blasiak, Pittman, Yagi and SuginoBlasiak et al., 2016). Developing countries favor an ABS regime along the lines of the CBD, which may involve mandatory, monetary benefit-sharing upon commercialization, the inclusion of derivatives, linking monitoring of ABS to patent systems (with mandatory disclosure of origin of genetic material in patent applications) and that the time scope for collected material is reckoned from the entry into force of the CBD (1993). Most of the developed countries, and increasingly China, are opposed to a fully fledged ABS regime along the lines of the CBD.Footnote 5 Unlike the case in the CBD, FAO, WIPO and WTO, corporations and industry associations are hardly represented in the UNCLOS preparatory committee meetings where ABS and marine bioprospecting are discussed. They are, however, active in lobbying state actors on UNCLOS agenda issues.Footnote 6 The ICC coordinates industry views on use of genetic resources within national borders, but this strategy does not address ABNJ directly (ICC, 2018). The biotechnology industry is concerned with reducing legal uncertainty, which, many argue, is hampering innovation and the development of products from marine habitats (ICC, 2018).Footnote 7

The UNCLOS negotiating parties are split between the principle of the freedom of the high seas versus principles on ABS from use of marine genetic resources. This is predominantly a North–South conflict, exacerbated by the diverging norms embedded in internationally harmonized patent regimes (IPRFootnote 8), and the ABS regime of the CBD with its Nagoya Protocol, respectively (Reference Oberthür and RosendalOberthür and Rosendal, 2014). In the polar regions the IPR–ABS discussion assumes new aspects as it relates to regulations of resources beyond national jurisdiction. The debate here can be seen as about striving to fill a legislative gap in the governance of genetic resources, as genetic resources in ABNJ are not directly covered by the CBD ABS regime. This concerns the access to and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of what may be regarded as a global commons resource, traditionally conceived of as a Common Heritage of Mankind (the CHM principle) (Reference De LuciaDe Lucia, 2019). The central argument linked to the global commons nature of these resources concerns the need to maintain affordable access to the resources also for those without the financial means to conduct bioprospecting on the high seas. Such access might, for instance, be achieved through common pool collections of marine genetic samples (Reference Jørem and TvedtJørem and Tvedt, 2014; Reference Tvedt and BanetTvedt, 2020). The transparency necessary to realize benefit-sharing could also be achieved by notification through a clearinghouse mechanism: Reference PripPrip (2021) argues that such a notification system should cover not only marine genetic resources (MGRs) collected in the sea, but also those held ex situ, as in gene banks, as well as DSI on MGRs. Another advantage of a common pool collection and a clearinghouse mechanism concerns sustainability in harvesting: Duplicates would be accessible to all, instead of each collector needing to collect their own sample, which might reduce the pressure on potentially rare marine specimens.

The third legal level refers to private rights subject to domestic legislation, contracts and patents. Updated information on national ABS legislation can be found at the CBD Clearing House site.Footnote 9 The majority of developing countries have enacted, or are in the process of enacting, ABS legislation, whereas this is less widespread in developed, typical “user” countries. In 2014, the EU issued ABS legislation that is in support of mandatory monetary benefit-sharing and includes acceptance of derivatives and disclosure. The EU legislation timeframe is limited to 2014 (with the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol) and does not cover utilization of genetic resources back to the establishment of the ABS regime in 1993. Iceland regulates bioprospecting in relation to microbes isolated from their geothermal areas (Reference LearyLeary, 2008), and Queensland, Australia has ABS for commercial bioprospecting at home (Reference Prip, Rosendal, Andresen and TvedtPrip et al., 2014). Sweden and Denmark have determined that for the time being they do not intend to regulate ABS of genetic resources within their own national borders; similarly, Russia has no ABS regulation. The USA, which is not party to the CBD, has ABS-like regulations for bioprospecting within its national parks. Norway and Denmark have advanced ABS regimes for regulating Norwegian and Danish bioprospecting abroad. Both countries have modified their patent acts, requiring disclosure of where genetic material is found and under what conditions the material has been appropriated (PIC and MAT obligations). Norway and Finland are in the process of developing ABS regimes for regulating bioprospecting also at home. In Norway, an administrative order on how to regulate ABS and foreign bioprospectors at home has been subjected to two separate hearings (2012 and 2017). In our case study of Norway, we pay specific attention to this decision-making process, which was still pending at the time of writing (spring 2021).

10.4 The Case of Norway: Bioprospecting Policies and Positions

The polar regions (Antarctic and Arctic) are part of Norway’s identity as a polar nation. Norway is one of the seven claimant Parties to Antarctica. The Norwegian government’s marine bioprospecting strategy (White Paper, 2009: 7) aims to “strengthen bioprospecting activities in the High North by giving priority to the collection of marine organisms from the northern ocean region.” Of the Arctic states, Norway has the most highly developed marine biotechnology sector and has territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) ranging from the North Sea and Skagerrak to the polar areas surrounding Svalbard, Jan Mayen and the Barents Sea.

Norwegian (and foreign) bioprospectors receive considerable public funding through the research programs under the Research Council of Norway and public funding of oceangoing research vessels collecting biological samples, as well as access to the marine samples deposited in the public marine biobank – Marbank in Tromsø (Reference SvensonSvendsen, 2013). Most marine bioprospecting activities involve collaboration between academia and business, of which MabCent has been the largest in Norway (Reference Greco and CinquegraniGreco and Cinquegrani, 2016; MabCent Report, 2015). A recurrent complaint associated with these public–private partnerships concerns the patent processes, which are necessary for commercial actors but tend to delay the publication of research results, on which the academic actors depend (MabCent Report, 2015, Reference Prip, Rosendal, Andresen and TvedtPrip et al., 2014; Reference Rosendal, Myhr and TvedtRosendal et al., 2016). In 2015, MabCent was replaced by the Arctic Biodiscovery Centre at the Arctic University, which is not contractually linked to any specific commercial partner.Footnote 10

About one third of the materials and samples in Marbank have their origin in ABNJ. This makes it pertinent to examine bioprospector positions in the UNCLOS debate as well as on relevant Norwegian policies. The lack of position papers and plenary statements in UNCLOS caused us to look elsewhere to identify the specific industry interests in marine bioprospecting. We gained some indications of bioprospector positions and strategies by evaluating the hearing responses from the two consultation processes (2012 and 2017) on the Norwegian draft ABS administrative order. These hearings appear highly relevant for our purposes, for two reasons: First, it is difficult to distinguish between marine material collected from areas within national jurisdiction and in ABNJ. Researchers on board the vessels collecting materials will know where the samples have been collected, but the sampled organisms may well occur in many locations both within and beyond national jurisdiction. Second, the hearings cover the same issues, relevant at international and domestic levels, concerning the regulation of accessing samples from marine biobanks and regulating access and use of genetic digital sequence information and derivatives such as enzymes. Third, the corporate actors involved have an interest in marine resources from locations both within national jurisdiction and in ABNJ.

In examining the hearing responses, we distinguish among positions according to the three corporate models described above. Both drafts aim to comply with the CBD/Nagoya Protocol objectives for ABS. The first draft of the Norwegian ABS administrative order (2012) included monetary benefit-sharing, and defined derivatives (enzymes, digital sequences) as part of genetic resources. The hearing revealed strong support for this ABS model among public actors and NGO respondents, whereas industry actors were critical of what they feared could become a cumbersome, expensive access model (Reference Rosendal, Myhr and TvedtRosendal et al., 2016).Footnote 11 Seven of the eight commercially oriented actors opposed the draft ABS legislation, albeit with conditional support, as they pointed to pending ABS legislation in the EU. One of the eight commercial respondents supported the full text of the ABS draft, citing the need to secure equitable sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources.

In 2017, a revised draft administrative order on ABS was circulated. To accommodate industry responses to the first round of hearings, the revised draft did not mention monetary compensation except as a voluntary fee for access to public biobank collections. Also, the draft excluded enzymes – in other words, derivatives.

In response to these changes in the ABS design, the commercial respondents welcomed the 2017 draft administrative order. In general, their responses moved from what we expected in the first to the second model, apparently due mainly to the announced adjustment on excluding enzymes. In 2012, nearly all commercial respondents had referred to forthcoming EU legislation on ABS as a reason for stalling, but EU legislation was not mentioned by them in the 2017 hearings. This is hardly surprising, as the EU’s ABS legislation in 2014 came out in support of mandatory monetary benefit-sharing and acceptance of derivatives and disclosure (setting the timeframe to the Nagoya Protocol [2014], and not the CBD [1993], though).Footnote 12 The 2017 hearing received twenty-nine responses, including nine from actors with commercial interests in marine bioprospecting, such as ArcticZymes (part of the MabCent consortium).

As monetary benefit-sharing was dropped to accommodate industry interests, the issue of access-fees (or “cost-sharing” [Reference Rosendal, Myhr and TvedtRosendal et al., 2016]) in biobanks became relevant. The 2017 draft proposed that public (but not private) biobank collections should allow free access, and here the university museums and Marbank were critical. Marbank argued that the revised draft order might dissuade private collectors from sharing and depositing their material with Marbank, while having free access to Marbank’s material and being free to patent innovations based on this material.Footnote 13 In Marbank’s view, the public collectors that provide marine genetic material would be left with no rights, whereas the commercial users of the material would have no obligations. In practice, access to Marbank has usually taken place through academia–industry consortia, but corporate actors are currently not allowed access, in anticipation of the new legislation.Footnote 14 Similar criticism came from noncommercial actors, who argued that the revised draft was no longer in compliance with the CBD’s ABS obligations, and warned that monopolization might follow from the lack of restraints on patenting.Footnote 15 Critics pointed at the flaw in the 2017 draft: Unlike ABS regulations in the EU, it does not include enzymes and derivatives and may hence undermine the CBD’s ABS regime and be poorly equipped to deal with synthetic biology activities.Footnote 16 As noted, enzymes constitute about one third of marine bioprospecting. This may partly explain why ArcticZymes reacted positively to the revised draft order.

According to the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries, which is responsible for the ABS administrative order, however, enzymes will not be excluded from the (still pending) ABS legislation.Footnote 17 The reason is that excluding enzymes would not be compatible with EU legislation, let alone the CBD (see note 12, on enzymes [as derivatives] being part of the EU definition of genetic resources).

10.5 Variation in Corporate Strategies

We have examined the ABS positions of two bioprospecting corporations in further detail (see Table 10.1). Novozymes is a multinational corporation, headquartered in Denmark, and among the world’s largest producers of industrial enzymes. ArcticZymes, based in Tromsø, Norway, is a smaller company that is part of a multinational pharmaceutical corporation, Biotec Pharmacon (thus also part of MabCent); now known as ArcticZymes Technologies.

Table 10.1 Positions on ABS: ArcticZymes and Novozymes

COMPANIES/ORGANIZATIONSSUPPORT OR OPPOSITION TO ABSARGUMENTS BASED ON MODEL 1ARGUMENTS BASED ON MODEL 2ARGUMENTS BASED ON MODEL 3
ARCTICZYMESConditional supportOppose benefit-sharing on material from open publications and databases.Accept monetary benefit-sharing, but not if derivatives (incl. enzymes) are defined as genetic resources.
NOVOZYMESSupport
  • Accept monetary benefit-sharing.

  • As part of ICC: do not wish to close the legal geographical and technological gaps.

  • Bases corporate strategy on strong language on ABS.

  • In favor of EU ABS legislation on derivatives and goes further than EU by accepting CBD (1993) as timeline for ABS.

10.5.1 Novozymes

Novozymes (part of NovoNordic until 2000) is actively engaged in the ABS issue, with the explicit policy of adhering to the ABS principles of the CBD. Going further than the EU’s ABS legislation, Novozymes holds that ABS starts with the entry into force of the CBD in 1993. Further, the corporation is set on avoiding accusations of biopiracy. According to its explicit policy:

Novozymes endorses the globally recognized principles in the CBD and ABS. As a part of our obligation towards the CBD, we only take samples in agreement with all relevant laws and regulations in the countries we operate in. In addition, we have stringent internal procedures including a database system for traceability of genetic resources to ensure that we live up to our commitments.Footnote 18

The strong ABS policy is often linked to Novozymes’ and NovoNordic’s first CEO, Steen Riisgaard – due partly to his background from the NGO sector, which included Friends of the Earth and WWF, Denmark, and due partly to his many official statements on how enzymes technology can contribute to a more environmentally friendly world.Footnote 19

Still, the ABS regime seems to have had more of a hampering effect on Novozymes’ bioprospecting than boosting it. As a direct result of the CBD principles on ABS, most of its bioprospecting collaboration with university partners in developing countries stopped in the mid 1990s. According to our interviewees at Novozymes, this is because ABS legislation is sometimes inappropriately designed, leaving too much legal uncertainty regarding documentation of PIC and MAT about where genetic material is found and under what conditions the material has been appropriated.Footnote 20 And indeed, when Brazil changed its ABS legislation (2015–2017) to a simpler system, Novozymes reengaged in cooperation.Footnote 21 The Brazilian example indicates that it is possible to design “appropriate” ABS legislation that provides bioprospectors with enough legal certainty to trust in collaboration.

At present, Novozymes may be largely self-sufficient in genetic resources through its own collections, but the company acknowledges that marine genetic resources from the deep sea may be interesting and necessary in the future. Novozymes already has roughly 50,000 bacteria and fungi in its collection, which dates back over sixty years; however, as put by Peter Falholt, head of R&D at Novozymes, “I’m a little bit skeptical of synthetic biology [as being able to provide sufficient genetic material for bioprospecting], because you cannot beat four billion years of evolution” (quoted in Reference PeplowPeplow, 2015). Their patent filings on polar, marine material date back to 1986 and 1992 for candida Antarctica (an enzyme, lipase), with applications ranging from food and fuels to detergents and medicine (Reference Oldham and KindnessOldham and Kindness, 2020). Novozymes ranks as number one by a considerable margin for first patent filings involving Antarctic organisms (Reference Oldham and KindnessOldham and Kindness, 2020): Novozymes tops the list with 300 filings, with BASF coming second with 113 filings. However, Oldham points out that in patent filing registrations, Novozymes is more likely to appear prominently because it is far more likely (than any of its competitors) to state the origin of the material in its patent applications: This is in line with the corporation’s formal policy and guidelines to abide by the CBD’s ABS regime. Further, BASF may appear less prominently because it is less explicit in stating the origin of its material, so the sources will not be registered in the patent filings.Footnote 22 This shows how ABS compliance could also expose a corporation to criticism, as Novozymes “appears” to have more patent filings involving marine organisms.

Novozymes does not participate directly in UNCLOS but coordinates its positions with the ICC. Although Novozymes might seem to fit into our third model given its strong language on ABS, there is agreement within the ICC group to lobby against applying ABS to genetic digital sequence information (ICC, 2017; 2019). The ICC is explicit in strongly opposing any expansion of the scope of the ABS regime to apply to digital sequence information and genetic resources in ABNJ (ICC, 2017: 1). That places Novozymes closer to our second model on appropriate design, as they argue against closing the legal gap, hence against increasing the scope of ABS.

10.5.2 ArcticZymes / Biotec Pharmacon

ArcticZymes describe itself as follows: “we use access to the marine Arctic to identify novel cold-adapted enzymes for use in molecular research, in vitro diagnostics, and manufacturing.”Footnote 23 It has a history of collaboration with Norwegian universities through the MabCent project, as part of holding company Biotec Pharmacon. The academic collaboration has allowed free and open access to Marbank’s collections and to Marbio’s ready-made assays. Access to Marbank is now a thing of the past, due to legal uncertainty linked to the fate of the Marbank material in the draft Norwegian ABS order. However, losing access to Marbank is not seen as a problem for ArcticZymes as it can find what it needs in international biobank collections and databases, where digital genetic sequences may be purchased online.Footnote 24

Biotec Pharmacon ranks as the largest holder of patent filings on Arctic marine materialsFootnote 25 and, according to MedNous (2019), “Biotec Pharmacon’s inventive step was to scour the marine environment for solutions that were not already on the market and patent them.” Several patented products based on cold-water enzymes are presented on ArcticZymes’ online website.Footnote 26 These include proteinase, which is an unspecific endopeptidase (an enzyme) originating from an Arctic marine microbial source,Footnote 27 and glycosylase, which belongs to a family of enzymes involved in DNA repair and stemming from Atlantic cod.Footnote 28 Compared to Novozymes, ArcticZymes is a small firm that attracts scant public attention and might hence be less worried about possible accusations of biopiracy. When enzymes were excluded from the Norwegian ABS draft legislation, the company came out in favor of the ABS proposal. If enzymes were to be redefined as subject to the ABS legislation, ArcticZymes could be expected to oppose it. Hence, it is hard to judge whether it fits into our first or second model (Table 10.1).

10.6 Discussion

The hearing responses to the two draft ABS administrative orders reveal how the Norwegian authorities have found it hard to adjust domestic legislation to the global ABS regime of the CBD, for which they were strong advocators at the time. The government’s response has been to change the wording of the ABS administrative order from including enzymes (2012), to excluding enzymes (2017), and then possibly to include enzymes in the regulatory scope once more. The Norwegian ABS regulation is still pending, nearly a decade after its conception and despite the intensity with which Norway advocated the ABS regime of the CBD. This would seem to be a classic example of how policies may change when internationally agreed policy obligations are to be translated into domestic policies, if these policies prove to entail explicit costs to specific subnational target groups. Similarly, Norway is no longer a strong advocate of ABS principles in the current process on the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework.

Corporate actors were far less skeptical of the second draft administrative order, which excluded enzymes from the definition of genetic resources. The increased acceptance was due mainly to this (potentially short-lived) adjustment on excluding enzymes. The change in responses suggests an effect of adjusting the regulatory design, which is in line with our Model 2 expectations.

Model 3 responses would be closer to transformative biodiversity governance but are difficult to assess. On the rhetorical level, Novozymes’ history and links to the NGO sector have made a deep impact on its policy to support ABS. Moreover, its history, not least its visibility as a large corporation, has made Novozymes cautious, as well as vulnerable to being associated with accusations of biopiracy. In effect, Novozymes has backed away from bioprospecting collaboration with countries with (arguably) unclear ABS legislation that is claimed to engender legal uncertainty. When Brazil simplified its ABS legislation, Novozymes resumed collaboration – indicating that deeds followed words, but also showing how the company’s responses may be more in line with Model 2. Further, a possible problem for bioprospectors in complying with the ABS principle of disclosure is that this may expose the corporation to criticism: This is exemplified by Novozymes’ reporting of origin of material in patent applications, possibly to a much larger extent than BASF reporting. Moreover, as part of the ICC collaboration in UNCLOS, Novozymes is apprehensive about any expansion of the ABS scope (“don’t close the legal gap”).

The takeaway message is that policymakers have legal and political room to maneuver in adjusting ABS to get bioprospecting corporations on board. The political feasibility room here might not fully correspond to the aims of transformative biodiversity governance, however.

Finally: How do corporate actors plan and strategize regarding their own access to marine biological material from ABNJ? Access may be affected if only a handful of multinational corporations come to monopolize the bulk of collected material through patent applications. Granted patents have been few, but if the majority of patent applications succeed, that would clearly undermine ABS efforts while also severely restricting access for other bioprospectors. This aspect indicates an interesting potential for common ground between ABS principles and corporate interests, which might increase the political feasibility room.

10.7 Conclusions

Future transformative biodiversity governance should heed two regulatory “gaps” in current legislation: one primarily of a technological nature, the second geographical. Developments in new biotechnologies may widen the technology gap in ABS regulations: This gap is likely to remain open to corporate actors unless states decide to define derivatives (DSI, synthetic enzymes, etc.) as part of genetic resources. As noted, ABS legislation in the EU has included derivatives (enzymes and DSI) in its definition of genetic resources. Will industry become more inclined to accept the EU design for ABS as appropriate? And will the EU’s approach to ABS have a bearing on how the UNCLOS debate deals with derivatives? (Bio)technological developments make it difficult to monitor bioprospecting, as bioprospectors can now access, sample and develop a large range of digital genetic sequences from online databanks.

With the evolving technological potential, technology has direct and significant implications for the global governance of biodiversity and genetic resources, as the ABS regime is more readily undermined by genetic resources expressed as digital sequence information. This challenge to the equity principles of the ABS regime indicates how vested interests in biotechnology might obstruct central elements in TBG.

Second, while the UNCLOS debate continues, uncertainty remains as to whether the regulatory geographical gap is likely to remain open to bioprospectors. One way of closing this gap would be to subject marine genetic resources from ABNJ to ABS regulation as global commons resources by making it mandatory to share duplicates of collected samples in common pool biobanks. This proposal features centrally on the UNCLOS agenda, along with the proposed clearinghouse mechanism. Sharing duplicates openly would, in addition, reduce pressure on rare marine species – an important point for transforming biodiversity governance.

Our study has revealed important elements and differences between formal and informal stakeholder participation and inclusion, the latter being central to the TBG debate dealt with in this volume. There are indications that multinational corporations may exert strong influence on legislative processes and policymaking, albeit being formally absent from decision-making forums, internationally and nationally. Turning to the domestic level in Norway, despite the small number of industry actors engaged in the ABS hearing processes there, they had a deep impact on the output of the first hearing and may have influenced the stalling of the regulation. On the international arena, the ABS regime clearly represents a normative victory for developing countries, who continue to advocate ABS principles in international forums also outside the CBD. However, it remains to be seen whether the ABS norms will succeed in steering UNCLOS’ governance of common, marine resources in a more equitable direction. The most inclusive suggestions currently on the UNCLOS negotiation table would seem to involve a combination of establishing common pool collections for marine genetic resources and a clearinghouse mechanism.

Footnotes

5 One Health and Biodiversity

Part of this chapter builds on, and is very grateful to work conducted in the frame of, the European Cooperation on Science and Technology (COST) 582 Action TD 1404 “Network for Evaluation of One Health.”

6 Biodiversity Finance and Transformative Governance: The Limitations of Innovative Financial Instruments

1 Actual deforestation rates each year were compared to a ten-year average (baseline) that would actualize every five years. For instance, actual deforestation rates between 2011 and 2015 were compared to the baseline of 2001–2010. The difference between the baseline and actual deforestation rates would represent the “result” for which Brazil could receive REDD+ payments.

2 The problem with these latter supplier groups is that CRA credits will not add to the protection of its vegetation, because these lands are already legally prohibited from clearing this vegetation.

7 Emerging Technologies in Biodiversity Governance: Gaps and Opportunities for Transformative Governance

Florian Rabitz’s contribution has been supported by Lithuanian Research Council grant no. P-MIP-19–513, “Institutional Adaptation to Technological Change (ADAPT)”.

Jesse Reynolds thanks Open Philanthropy for its support of this work.

Elsa Tsioumani has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement no. 101029634 (SynBioGov).

8 Rethinking and Upholding Justice and Equity in Transformative Biodiversity Governance

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Earth System Governance conference in Oaxaca in 2019. We are grateful to the editors and to an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on previous drafts. Research for this chapter was supported by the following bodies: the Australian Research Council (grant number FL140100154) [JP]; the “Just Conservation” project funded by the Centre for the Synthesis and Analysis of Biodiversity (CESAB) of the French Foundation for Research on Biodiversity (FRB) [ND and BC]; Brazil’s National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and Programa de Excelència Acadèmica (PROEX)-CAPES [CYAI].

1 We define norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors” (Reference FinnemoreFinnemore, 1996: 22).

2 Reference Bennett, Blythe, Cisneros-Montemayor, Singh and SumailaBennett et al. (2019: 5) define just transformations as “radical shifts in social–ecological system configurations through forced, emergent or deliberate processes that produce balanced and beneficial outcomes for both social justice and environmental sustainability.” On the distinction between transition and transformation, see Chapters 1 and 4.

3 While the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has an established system of burden-sharing, this is not based on a strict formula derived from equity principles.

4 Note that these principles could also apply to area-based conservation measures.

9 Mainstreaming the Animal in Biodiversity Governance: Broadening the Moral and Legal Community to Nonhumans

10 Industry Responses to Evolving Regulation of Marine Bioprospecting in Polar Regions

Research project funded by the Research Council of Norway (project number 257631). We are grateful to all reviewer comments and also to Susan Høivik for language editing.

2 China was accepted as an observer in Arctic Council in 2013; Beijing sees the Arctic as part of its Belt and Road project, with interests in transport, oil and gas, and marine natural resources (Reference Tvedt and BanetRottem and Soltvedt, 2020).

3 Personal communication, Erlend Ek, Norwegian embassy, Beijing, October 9, 2018. www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/08/c_136959522.htm. See also http://www.qnlm.ac/en/index.

6 Personal communication at Antarctic Conference in Tromsø, May 7, 2018, with Professor Steven Chown, Director of SCAR (Scientific Commission on Antarctic Research), of the Antarctic Treaty System.

7 Observation by Morten Walløe Tvedt at Brest meeting of biobank collections, May 14–15, 2018.

8 Mainly the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the World Intellectual Property Organization.

11 This is based on the authors’ reading of all the consultation responses to the 2012 draft administrative order.

12 EU No. 511/2014. See also SEPA, 2018: 10: “The Regulation also applies to derivatives which were acquired at the same time as the genetic resource. Derivatives are defined as naturally occurring biochemical compositions that result from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, although they do not contain functional units of genetic material. Examples of these are enzymes, proteins and essential oils.”

13 Interview / personal communication with Kjersti Lie Gabrielsen, Director of Marbank, May 8, 2018.

14 Interview / personal communication with Kjersti Lie Gabrielsen, Director of Marbank, May 8, 2018.

15 This view was central in the hearing letters from the Research Council of Norway, the National Ethical Research Committees, the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Norwegian Coastal Administration.

16 This is based on the authors’ reading of all the consultation responses to the 2017 draft administrative order.

17 Personal communication with NN, of the Ministry of Trade and Fisheries and responsible for the second draft administrative order, August 29, 2018, at the FNI Genetic Resources Seminar, Lysaker, Norway. At the time of writing, the administrative order is still pending.

20 Interview with representative from Novozymes, Copenhagen, October 2018.

21 www.cbd.int/abs/ABNJ-views/2019/Brazil-DSI.pdf (on the new ABS legislation in Brazil).

22 Personal communication with Dr. Paul Oldham of Lancaster University, UK. May 11, 2020.

24 Interview with representative from ArcticZymes, Tromsø, September 2018. Corroborated in Hearing from ArcticZymes, Tromsø, October 3, 2017.

26 https://arcticzymes.com/products/enzymes/. See also ArcticZymers Technologies. 2020. Q4 Report 2020. Tromsø, Norway.

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Figure 0

Figure 5.1 Pathways linking biodiversity to human health

(Marselle et al., 2021)
Figure 1

Figure 5.2 Structural One Health“Structural One Health investigates the broader context of a disease, including out beyond the local, more proximate mechanisms of emergence on which more episodic One Health focuses. Preventive and emergency medicine are deployed in response to threats on the health of specific populations and individuals. For all mechanisms that promote disease (under ‘crisis’), the proximity in space, time and causal origin to any given outbreak increases up the pyramid. The relative importance of each point along the scale is dependent on the collective interplay between all parts of the pyramid. An array of inputs and outcomes for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Thailand is shown across the schematic”.

(Wallace et al., 2015: 5)
Figure 2

Figure 5.3 Salutogenis and pathogenis

(Bauer et al., 2006)
Figure 3

Table 5.1 One Health transformative biodiversity governance potential

Figure 4

Table 6.1 Overview of global biodiversity finance sources and needs. Amounts are in billion US$ (categories are based on Deutz et al., 2020)

Figure 5

Table 6.2 Assessment summary for innovative financial instruments. Symbols refer to positive (+), negative (−) and mixed or neutral (*) assessments and reflect author interpretations

Figure 6

Figure 8.1 Frequency of references to equity and (in)justice in CBD and UNFCCC documents

Source: CBD and UNFCCC conventions and COP reports compiled for this chapter, excluding equity financing and names of organizations containing *equit* and/or *justice. The CBD COPs take place every other year. Peaks in CBD equity data generally coincide with heightened attention to equity in access and benefit-sharing, notably the Nagoya COP in 2010
Figure 7

Table 8.1 Dimensions of justice in biodiversity governance

Figure 8

Table 9.1 Overview of important developments

Figure 9

Table 10.1 Positions on ABS: ArcticZymes and Novozymes

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