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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 February 2024
Abstract
The Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste came at a time of adjustment in Britain's post-colonial foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. The Labour government largely followed its Conservative predecessor in seeking improved relations with Indonesia, mainly with a view to enhancing trade relations. There was little in the way of existing policy in relation to Timor-Leste beyond a general assumption that, following Portuguese withdrawal, integration of the territory with Indonesia would be the most practical outcome. In contrast with other Portuguese colonies in Africa, there was little public or activist interest in Timor-Leste in Britain. This facilitated Britain's largely pro-Indonesian policy. It was a policy embraced and pursued by British diplomats in Indonesia. It was further encouraged by the British government’s low estimation of Portugal's capacity to influence developments during the upheaval of its revolutionary period. Although uncomfortable issues were raised by the question of recognition of Indonesia's annexation and relations with “old Commonwealth” Australia came under some strain, the British government was broadly satisfied by the diplomatic outcome of the invasion.
Keywords: Britain, diplomacy, Indonesia, Portugal, Asia-Pacific
In the British general election of February 1974 the Conservative government of Edward Heath was – very narrowly – defeated by Labour. Harold Wilson, who had already been prime minister from 1964 to 1970, returned at the head of a minority government. His long-time ally James Callaghan became foreign secretary (Callaghan in fact would succeed Wilson as prime minister in 1976). Despite often fierce challenges by Labour in opposition on overseas issues during the years of Conservative government – including over Portuguese Africa – there was little expectation that the new government would bring any dramatic change to the outlines of British foreign policy.
The inescapable reality was that Britain's place in the world had altered little since Dean Acheson's famous observation in 1962 that the country had “lost an empire but not yet found a role”. By 1974 Britain was in essence a post-imperial state, having decolonised almost completely in Asia, Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean over the previous quarter century. But the contours of a new global identity had not emerged.
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