Studies of depression indicate the existence of temporal abnormalities, particularly as related to the perspectival and agentive aspects of lived experience in persons who undergo depression. With reference to these anomalies, there is a long-standing view in phenomenological psychopathology, reinforced by empirical studies, that depression involves a disruption of “intrinsic temporality.” This view is widely incorporated into contemporary enactivist approaches to cognition, which link such a disruption to disorders involving affect, affordances, and narrative aspects of experience. We argue that classical phenomenological accounts of temporal abnormalities in depression do not warrant the supposition of a disruption to “intrinsic temporality,” and that this term itself is ambiguous. Instead, we understand depressive experience primarily in terms of affectivity, which does indeed feedback into the experience of lived time. Our view demonstrates a deeper consensus between phenomenological psychopathology and “4E” approaches, including work on both Gibsonian affordances and narrative, than is typically recognized.