Political psychologists and rational choice theorists do not interact very much. This silence is particularly ironic when it comes to explaining political behavior, as such explanations are a core concern of both groups.

Consider, for example, the topic of persuasion, and in particular how people in political settings choose whom to believe. Voters, legislators, and jurors are but a few of the many political decision makers who have opportunities to base what they do on the written or oral statements of others. To explain the decisions that people who can learn from others make, we should understand what makes some statements more persuasive than others. An irony of extant persuasion research is that while it represents an active field of study for both political psychologists and rational choice theorists, most treatments of the topic cite the contributions of no more than one of the two scholarly traditions. It is as if political psychologists and rational choice theorists have nothing to teach each other about persuasion.

Do intellectual differences between these scholarly traditions negate the possibility of constructive dialogue? As a formal theorist who grapples with political psychology's substantive challenges, I face this question often. I have come to believe that a constructive dialogue is not only possible but also worthwhile.