Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction and overview
- 2 Basic economic principles
- 3 Welfare and efficiency in pricing
- 4 Nonuniform pricing I
- 5 Nonuniform pricing II
- 6 Efficient pricing and flowthrough
- 7 Efficient pricing for policy analysis
- Appendix to Chapter 3 – Mathematical derivation of efficient prices
- Appendix to Chapter 4 – The optimal two-part tariff
- Appendix to Chapter 5 – Derivation of optimal nonuniform price schedules
- Appendix to Chapter 6 – Efficient prices with flowthrough
- Appendix to Chapter 7 – Computation and evaluation of optimal price schedules
- References
- Index
2 - Basic economic principles
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction and overview
- 2 Basic economic principles
- 3 Welfare and efficiency in pricing
- 4 Nonuniform pricing I
- 5 Nonuniform pricing II
- 6 Efficient pricing and flowthrough
- 7 Efficient pricing for policy analysis
- Appendix to Chapter 3 – Mathematical derivation of efficient prices
- Appendix to Chapter 4 – The optimal two-part tariff
- Appendix to Chapter 5 – Derivation of optimal nonuniform price schedules
- Appendix to Chapter 6 – Efficient prices with flowthrough
- Appendix to Chapter 7 – Computation and evaluation of optimal price schedules
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to introduce basic concepts of welfare economics and industrial organization that shall be used throughout the book, and to introduce the paradigm of the regulated firm that we use throughout our discussion. We intend neither a full and complete treatment of these concepts nor an elementary textbook treatment of the material. Such is available elsewhere. Our intent is to provide a brief and nontechnical introduction to those ideas used most frequently in chapters subsequent to this.
We assume that the objective of regulators in setting prices is to maximize social welfare, broadly defined. Pricing policy serves this function in two ways: directly, by redistributing wealth in society, and indirectly, by signalling a reallocation of resources in society.
So called lifeline service that offers minimal service at low rates to poor people and the elderly is often a redistribution to these groups from the company and other consumers. It achieves the social purpose of providing public utility service to those who would not otherwise be able to afford it. This is an example of the redistributive function of pricing policy. As an example of the reallocative effect of pricing, imagine that the utility were to offer an optional day/night tariff constructed to yield the same revenue to the company as some existing tariff. Consumers cannot lose by such an offering to the extent it is indeed optional.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Theory of Public Utility Pricing , pp. 6 - 25Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1986