It has become fashionable in some quarters to dismiss scientific method as an outmoded topic of little relevance to contemporary studies of science. Some see the theory of scientific method as a futile exercise in philosophical abstraction that has been shown by historical and sociological studies to have little relevance to the actual practice of science. For them, the work of Kuhn, Feyerabend or the strong programme and other sociologically based approaches spells the end of the theory of method.

As indicated at the outset, we beg to differ with this negative assessment of the methodology of science. It may be true that some simple-minded accounts of method have been shown to be unsustainable by historical studies of theory change or sociological studies of scientific practice. But the wholesale dismissal of the project of the methodology of science is premature to say the least. In fact, some of the studies that deny a role for methodology employ principles of method in making their claims. As we have sought to show in this book, the study of the methodology of science and the development of sophisticated and realistic theories of method is very much alive and well. The area is the focus of much vigorous and productive research.