Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 September 2022
I raise two challenges for theological determinism. First, a prominent criticism of theological determinism holds that human moral responsibility is incompatible with theological determinism. Many theological determinists resist this criticism by maintaining that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. I attempt to break new ground in this debate by arguing that the theological determinist cannot adequately avoid moral luck. I argue that opponents of theological determinism can embrace a truly luck-free notion of responsibility, on which nothing beyond the agent’s control impacts their praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. But theological determinists, insofar as they are not skeptics about human responsibility, are stuck accepting that luck impacts responsibility. Thus theological determinists are committed to intuitive unfairness, which their opponents can avoid. Second, although I grant that some free will theodicies are available to theological determinists, I argue that they cannot make use of the most attractive type of free will theodicy. Finally, I draw an interesting connection between my approach to moral luck and my preferred sort of free will theodicy.
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