Among the enduring images of Islamic State's time controlling territory in Iraq and Syria are photographs and videos of the wanton destruction of the ancient ruins of Palmyra. From the perspective of its strict adherence to a Salafi-jihadist branch of Islam, these historic sites were idolatrous, justifying this massive act of iconoclasm. Other examples that were recorded and shared by the group included the destruction of items at the Mosul Cultural Museum, the Nineveh archaeological site and the Nimrud archaeological site (González Zarandona, Albarrán-Torres & Isakhan 2018). At the same time, this iconoclasm concealed a conscious material motivation to acquire portable relics and antiquities for sale on the black market, which provided a further source of income. The multi¬tude of income sources utilized by IS attracted the attention of the governments working to counter this new transnational terrorist threat. The UN Security Council directed the production of a report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team specifically on IS in 2014. Subsequently, the FATF and a number of other organizations produced additional studies analysing IS finances and suggesting methods to prevent its fundraising as a way of defeating the group.

IS, also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as by the Arabic acronym, Daesh, succeeded in controlling territory across Iraq and Syria for a period from 2014 to 2019 (Talley & Faucon 2020). As such, it offers a case study that is different from other twenty-first-century terrorist groups, with its capacity to exploit different sources of funding, including oil and taxation. Simultaneously, it provides a case study for assessing the effectiveness of the tools used to combat the financing of terrorism. The next section introduces IS, explaining its evolution out of a series of earlier jihadist groups in the region and the ways that it collected revenue before 2014. The second section explores the funding methods that controlling territory allowed IS, meaning they were able to gather revenue “like a state”. This is followed by a companion section covering the other methods used by an insurgent/terrorist group that also continued to be used by IS.