Legislative term limits have been a hot political issue in the early 1990s. This makes them attractive to study, but presents a liability as well. Any account of the status of term limits is likely to be outdated quickly. On May 22, 1995, while this book was being copyedited, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in the case of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton that struck down all term limits imposed by states on their representatives to the U.S. Congress – which is to say that all the limits represented in Table 1.2 of this book have been declared unconstitutional. The Court's decision was based primarily on its understanding of the Qualifications Clauses in the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Sections 2 and 3), and has no bearing on term limits that the states have imposed on their own legislators. Thus, all the limits represented in Table 1.1 stand, and more can be expected in the years ahead.

At any rate, this book is not about accounting for the status of term limits, and its goals are not affected by the Court's decision, with which I happen to agree. The primary purpose of the book is to contribute to our general understanding of legislatures. It is almost axiomatic among political scientists to explain legislative behavior as motivated by the desire for reelection.