Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations
- About the Author
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- One The Uses of National Models
- Two The First Wave
- Three Comparing Nations in a World Crisis
- Four Riding the Waves: Reckoning and Strategic Adjustments
- Five Recasting the Swedish Model in Crisis Mode
- Conclusion
- Notes
- References
- Index
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 October 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations
- About the Author
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- One The Uses of National Models
- Two The First Wave
- Three Comparing Nations in a World Crisis
- Four Riding the Waves: Reckoning and Strategic Adjustments
- Five Recasting the Swedish Model in Crisis Mode
- Conclusion
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
In early March 2021, when most of Western Europe and many other regions of the world were shutting down for fear of the new coronavirus, one country in the Baltic region opted for an alternative and risky pathway. Sweden, with the lowest hospital bed capacity per capita of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), went on with life – not exactly as usual, but keeping primary and middle schools open and not closing bars, restaurants, cinemas, shops or museums. Ski resorts continued to run until the end of March, and national borders remained open for a full month. Even the final round of selection for the Eurovision song contest, the highly popular Melodifestivalen, went ahead in front of a roaring crowd on 7 March, whereas the Danish counterpart had played before empty seats. During a press conference on 6 March the director of the Public Health Agency (Folkhälsomyndigheten, hereafter FHM), Johan Carlsson, said that the situation was under control in Sweden, yet two days later Italy locked down 17 million people in its northern regions, extending the measure to the entire country on 10 March. On 11 March, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a state of pandemic of which Europe was the epicentre.
As most European countries closed their borders and implemented more or less strict lockdowns of their population (the UK being one of the last to do so), the Swedish situation started to appear as a visible anomaly, even at home. The rest of the Nordic countries adopted more stringent policies early on, although the Danish chief epidemiologist was not in favour of the strict lockdown that the government of Social Democrat Mette Frederiksen decided to implement in all haste. It is not the case that Sweden did nothing, as many foreign observers seemed to believe at the time. The authorities in charge of the crisis held daily press meetings; they advised people to wash their hands, keep their distance, stay at home in case of any symptoms and work remotely when possible; and they requested a cap of 500 people for gatherings (down to 50 by the end of March). Universities and high schools converted to distance learning. On 17 March the prime minister, Social Democrat Stefan Löfven, gave an unusual six-minute address to the nation to communicate the gravity of the situation and to urge compliance with public health recommendations.
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- The Swedish ExperimentThe COVID-19 Response and its Controversies, pp. 1 - 17Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2022