Divided SoCs foster very different dynamics of opposition during prolonged crises than do unified SoCs. In the divided system, legal opposition groups commit themselves to maintaining the stability of the regime, and incumbents punish them severely if they break this agreement. Thus, legal opposition groups are given an opportunity to express their political demands, but they are penalized if they mobilize “unruly” demonstrations. Thus, for them, the costs of joint conflict with excluded opponents are greater than those of isolated conflict. By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 3, illegal groups face lower sanctions if they mobilize in conjunction with legal opponents than they do if they act independently.

Consequently, the level and nature of the opposition to the regime varies over the course of prolonged crises. Because legal opponents have organizational structures and government acceptance that lower the costs of mobilizing an isolated protest, they are often able to exploit the early stages of crises to press their demands. As the crises continue, however, the more radical, excluded opponents gain strength. Initially, this makes radical elites more likely to join an ongoing protest even if they are unwilling to mobilize independently. This, however, threatens the moderates – who face greater repression for destabilizing the system. As the crisis mounts and popular dissatisfaction increases, legal parties often choose to sit it out, reducing their challenges against the regime.