Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- PROLEGOMENA
- PART I VALUES
- 2 Exclusionary Preferences
- 3 Preference States
- 4 Changes in Exclusionary Preferences
- 5 Constructing Combinative Preferences
- 6 Pairwise Combinative Preferences
- 7 Decision-Guiding Combinative Preferences
- 8 Monadic Value Predicates
- PART II NORMS
- EPILOGUE
- Proofs
- References
- Index of Symbols
- General Index
4 - Changes in Exclusionary Preferences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- PROLEGOMENA
- PART I VALUES
- 2 Exclusionary Preferences
- 3 Preference States
- 4 Changes in Exclusionary Preferences
- 5 Constructing Combinative Preferences
- 6 Pairwise Combinative Preferences
- 7 Decision-Guiding Combinative Preferences
- 8 Monadic Value Predicates
- PART II NORMS
- EPILOGUE
- Proofs
- References
- Index of Symbols
- General Index
Summary
It is a salient feature of preferences that they change, both in response to external stimuli and as a result of mental processes. Many social phenomena cannot be understood unless changes in preferences are included in the analysis.
Economists have noted that the preferences of a consumer depend on her past consumption, either through habituation or through need for variety. Consumers' preferences may also be influenced by various social factors, such as advertising, propaganda, and conformity with the habits and opinions of others. Preference change also has an essential role in the emergence of morality and of social cooperation; cooperation becomes individually rational if individuals develop preferences that reflect internalized commitments to social values. In this way, preference change is related to central issues in moral and social philosophy. As an example of this, John Stuart Mill's theory of the higher pleasures can be seen as “an attempt to analyze the question of how one would want one's character or system of preferences to develop over time.” Furthermore, preference change is an important factor to take into account in the analysis of certain decision paradoxes. An unusually clear example is the Deterrence Dilemma: “[U]nless you, a nuclear super-power, intend to retaliate if attacked by another … and unless this would guide you in an attack, you will be attacked.” Under these conditions, a subject with pacifist preferences would best serve these preferences by revising them and acquiring a preference for retaliation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Structure of Values and Norms , pp. 42 - 56Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001