Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Illustrative Examples
- 3 How Do the Rules of the Competitive Game Change?
- 4 Elected Officials and Coalitions
- 5 Coalition Building
- 6 Public Opinion Strategies
- 7 Regulators
- 8 Advocacy Strategies with Regulators
- 9 Preemption
- 10 Windows of Opportunity
- 11 SBM in Society
- 12 Competitive Strategy versus SBM
- Glossary
- References
- Index
7 - Regulators
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2023
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Illustrative Examples
- 3 How Do the Rules of the Competitive Game Change?
- 4 Elected Officials and Coalitions
- 5 Coalition Building
- 6 Public Opinion Strategies
- 7 Regulators
- 8 Advocacy Strategies with Regulators
- 9 Preemption
- 10 Windows of Opportunity
- 11 SBM in Society
- 12 Competitive Strategy versus SBM
- Glossary
- References
- Index
Summary
Regulators are different from elected officials because regulators are not motivated by electoral incentives. But then, what motivates regulators? This chapter makes the case that all regulators are motivated by a desire to uphold and increase their reputation for technical expertise. In addition, political appointees are accountable to the elected officials who have the power to remove them.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Strategy Beyond MarketsPolitical Economy from the Firm's Perspective, pp. 84 - 100Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023