OVERVIEW: WIDER DIFFERENCES, CLOSER PARALLELS

From the early 1600s to the early 1800s, political and cultural integration in the chief states of both Europe and mainland Southeast Asia showed unprecedented dynamism. Yet, ironically, in this very period the physical capacities of European and Southeast Asian states diverged ever more widely.

Consider first the growing power differential. In 1520, recall, although royal authority in France already was more uniform and penetrating than in Burma, Siam, and probably Vietnam, all four realms, along with Muscovy, retained strong patrimonial and solar polity features. Three hundred years later, similarities were less obvious. True, the gravitational pull of Southeast Asian capitals had increased markedly. But tributaries still enjoyed extensive autonomy, and imperial authority still debouched in attenuated zones, not fixed frontiers. Even in the lowland cores of Burma and Siam, royal personality suffused central administration, and tax collections still depended on long patron–client chains that typically pocketed a third or more of total collections. But by 1825 France and other West European states, with Russia in train, had developed increasingly bureaucratic, impersonal systems that operated with growing uniformity within well-demarcated frontiers. European travelers in the 16th century had marveled at Southeast Asian wealth and power. “This King of Pegu hath not any Armie or power by Sea,” declared Cesare Fedrici, an Italian visitor to Burma in 1567, “but in the Land, for People, Dominions, Gold and Silver he farre exceeds the power of the great Turke in treasure and strength.”