Social movement scholars have demonstrated that political opportunities influence the emergence and dynamics of social movements (e.g., Costain 1992; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1989). Groups are more likely to mobilize when the institutionalized political system is open to them. Doug McAdam (1996) and Sidney Tarrow (1996) describe a number of dimensions of the political opportunity system that may influence mobilization, including the stability or instability of elite alignments and the presence or absence of elite allies. Although elites are central to political opportunity theory, we do not know which elites may influence mobilization.

In this essay, I examine the effect of elites in different branches and levels of government on student protest mobilization from 1930 to 1990. Using Democratic Party officials in office as a proxy for left-wing allies, I examine the impact of Democrats (and Republicans) in the executive and legislative branches of the federal and state governments on student mobilization. I conduct an event history analysis of 2,496 protest events to examine the relationship between different governmental positions, parties, and protest. I suggest that elite allies in some locations may inspire increased protest activity, as suggested by political opportunity theory, but that powerful elites sometimes serve as antagonists that inspire mobilization by threatening the goals of a movement.

Political Opportunity Theory

Scholars studying a variety of social movements demonstrate that political opportunity structure influences mobilization.