The policy study on the Europeanization of environmental policy-making in Germany and Spain confirms the major findings of the institutional analysis presented in Parts II and III of this book. In both countries, Europeanization caused an uneven distribution of “say and pay” in favor of the central state. The Länder lost their formal co-decision powers in policy initiative and decision-making, while the CCAA faced the centralization of their legislative and administrative competencies on the implementation level. With respect to the “pay” side, the Länder have to bear significant implementation costs by incorporating European policies, which do not fit German regulatory structures. The CCAA, in turn, carry the major burden of building up regulatory structures and capacities that are required for the effective implementation of European environmental policies in the first place.

The uneven distribution of “say and pay” in EU environmental policy-making has changed the territorial balance of power to the detriment of the Länder and the CCAA. The regions of the two countries have, however, resorted to very different strategies in responding to this pressure for adaptation. The Länder have tried to share the costs of adaptation with the central state. Co-decision powers in the formulation and representation of the German bargaining position compensated the Länder for their loss of competencies. The joint shifting and sharing of implementation costs by upgrading German regulations to the European level, on the one hand, and absorbing and watering down of mismatching European policies, on the other hand, have so far helped to reduce implementation costs.