My argument suggests a solution to the debate over which democratic institutions make politicians most responsive to special interests: economic geography. My findings further suggest the widespread use of the plurality/proportionality dichotomy obscures an important mechanism linking electoral institutions to policy: the nature of electoral competition. Further confusion about the policy effects of electoral institutions stem from poor measures of particularistic economic policy. I demonstrate a novel way to classify government programs by estimating the geographic distribution of potential beneficiaries using entropy indices. My argument also adds an important element to neo-institutional theories in political science by demonstrating that it matters not only what voters want from government but also where they are located. The logic of my argument is general and can be applied to issues where voters with shared preferences exhibit varied geographic patterns. One example may be ethnic politics. My argument also has important implications for international politics, as discussed in this chapter. My argument suggests which countries are most likely to violate international economic agreements, which countries are most likely to impede future economic integration and which countries are most likely to demand reforms to existing international agreements.