Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- PART I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
- PART II history of indonesia–malaysia relations, 1957–2017
- Chapter 5 Not Yet Special: Indonesia–Malaya/Malaysia Relations, 1957–65
- Chapter 6 The Beginning of a Special Relationship: Indonesia–Malaysia Relations, 1966–84
- Chapter 7 No More Serumpun? Indonesia–Malaysia Relations, 1985–2017
- Chapter 8 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Chapter 8 - Conclusion
from PART II - history of indonesia–malaysia relations, 1957–2017
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 June 2019
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- PART I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
- PART II history of indonesia–malaysia relations, 1957–2017
- Chapter 5 Not Yet Special: Indonesia–Malaya/Malaysia Relations, 1957–65
- Chapter 6 The Beginning of a Special Relationship: Indonesia–Malaysia Relations, 1966–84
- Chapter 7 No More Serumpun? Indonesia–Malaysia Relations, 1985–2017
- Chapter 8 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
This study seeks to establish an understanding of what is a special relationship, its dynamics, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. The theoretical understanding is being tested through the examination of Indonesia–Malaysia relations, which in turn serves to foster better appreciation of the special relationship.
The existing literature has revealed that a special relationship between two states emerges when two sources of closeness coexist in their relations — that of the two states’ common identities and shared strategic interests. The two states concerned identify positively with each other owing to their two sources of closeness which result in them sharing an understanding that their relationship is closer than their other bilateral ties. Yet, certain conditions need to be in place before two states bound by their common identities could share common strategic interests.
As indicated in Chapter 2, while the common identities of the United States and Great Britain gave rise to their similar strategic understandings, they, however, did not see each other as a strategic partner up until the late nineteenth century. The steady growing of American power since 1850s, which eventually matched with Britain's existing power, produced their mutual need for strategic cooperation.
The Anglo-American special relationship subsequently began to emerge; thereafter, the two states rely on each other for survival. They forge strategic partnerships between them to preserve their similar vision of international order, which is rooted in the English concepts of liberty. Likewise, despite the shared values of the United States and Israel render both similarily prefer a Middle East that is compatible with the interests of Western democracy, the United States did not recognize its mutual strategic dependence with Israel up until 1967 when Israel had demonstrated its capacity by decisively defeating its Arab foes in the Six-Day War. Henceforth, the United States forges a special relationship with Israel. The two states work closely with each other to fashion a strategic landscape in the Middle East which both similarly prefer.
In other words, this study has revealed the relationship between identities and power in the creation of the common strategic interests of two states sharing common identities, which subsequently gives rise to their special relationship.
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- Information
- Special Relationship in the Malay WorldIndonesia and Malaysia, pp. 379 - 389Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2018