Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note: measuring sovereign liability over time
- Table of cases
- Table of treaties
- List of abbreviations
- Part I Sovereign defaults across time
- 1 Sovereign debt crises and defaults
- 2 Political responses to sovereign defaults
- 3 Quasi-receivership of highly indebted countries
- 4 Monetary reform and sovereign debt
- 5 Financial necessity
- 6 National settlement institutions
- 7 State succession and the capacity to pay
- 8 Arbitration clauses in sovereign debt instruments
- 9 Creditor protection in international law
- Part II The future role of arbitration on sovereign debt
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law
2 - Political responses to sovereign defaults
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 June 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note: measuring sovereign liability over time
- Table of cases
- Table of treaties
- List of abbreviations
- Part I Sovereign defaults across time
- 1 Sovereign debt crises and defaults
- 2 Political responses to sovereign defaults
- 3 Quasi-receivership of highly indebted countries
- 4 Monetary reform and sovereign debt
- 5 Financial necessity
- 6 National settlement institutions
- 7 State succession and the capacity to pay
- 8 Arbitration clauses in sovereign debt instruments
- 9 Creditor protection in international law
- Part II The future role of arbitration on sovereign debt
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law
Summary
The means by which sovereign debts may be collected have been hotly contested for more than two centuries. For some time, the use of force to compel repayment of sovereign debt was not uncommon. States diverged on whether the use of force in such conditions was permissible. Latin American states led the opposition to armed intervention, after European powers used force to enforce sovereign debt obligations against Mexico in the 1860s and Venezuela in 1902.
Discretionary support by creditor governments
Creditor nations have often only been lukewarm debt collectors for funds that their nationals or residents lent to other governments. At times, creditor governments could pressure debtor governments into payment or settlement by means of superior bargaining power or the use of power politics, including the use of force. For instance, a hundred years ago, several European powers successfully pressed claims of their creditor nationals diplomatically against Turkey and Venezuela. In the case of Venezuela, military intervention followed.
In lieu of direct diplomatic intervention, presentation and settlement of sovereign debt claims before mixed claims commissions were another common way of dealing with sovereign defaults. However, more often than not, these commissions declined jurisdiction, unless there was an express and specific submission of sovereign debt instruments and clear evidence that the state of nationality was ready to present the case diplomatically.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
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