Indonesia is no stranger to great power competition. During the Cold War, Jakarta pursued non-alignment as its foreign policy strategy towards the American and Soviet bloc's rivalries. Being non-aligned meant that Indonesia did not participate in any superpower's military alliance. Moreover, by standing outside the conflict zone, Indonesia had the flexibility to develop economic and trade cooperation with developed countries, especially the United States and Japan. This response to bipolar international politics allowed Suharto's New Order to consolidate the state, create a stable political system, pursue national growth, and settle communal violence.

This success story of the Cold War–era foreign policy conduct has inspired post-Suharto democratic governments to maintain the policy of non-alignment despite the geopolitical changes since then. For instance, the major driving force of great power contestations currently is no longer the ideological hostility between the capitalist West and the socialist East, but new factors related to the US-China strategic rivalry. The economic, military and political rivalries between the two are expressed through initiatives like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) led by Washington on the one side, and Beijing's expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) on the other, resulting in the complex, divided and unstable Indo- Pacific regional architecture of today.

The divisive consequences of intense US-China competition have adversely affected the Indonesian regional position and interests. With the South China Sea being the focal point of acute military tensions, there is increasing potential for great power conflict to reach Indonesia and Southeast Asia. As a result, Indonesia faces the challenge of revitalizing its leadership role to preserve peace and stability in its immediate region and the broader Indo-Pacific. Indonesia's primary diplomatic vehicle, ASEAN, has limited capacity and resources to help Jakarta achieve this.

Against this backdrop, it is time for policymakers in Jakarta to rethink Indonesia's foreign policy trajectory. Non-alignment may have been useful in the past, but pursuing it increasingly comes at a price. Being non-aligned is merely one instrument, among others, of carrying out the country's bebas aktif (independent and active) foreign policy.