Introduction

Writing in the first few months following the granting in 1999 of limited self-government to Wales and Scotland, policy specialists commented that “the full effect of these changes has yet to be seen, but there is clear potential for a significant and long-lasting impact on the future shape of social policy” (Sykes et al, 2001, p 3). Others have variously chosen to refer to a “sub-national opportunity space” (Bulmer and Burch, 2002, p 21) or to explore the extent to which ‘devolution’ has the potential to deliver better governance (Chaney et al, 2001). As the following evidence shows, quasi-federalism in the UK has important implications for social policy. Here we explore the social policy record for the National Assembly for Wales during its first term (1999-2003). Our task is threefold. First, it will be argued that the Welsh Assembly is, if it is anything, a social policy body. Second, that the government of the Assembly has gone about discharging its social policy responsibilities in a way that has an explicit set of articulated, ideological principles, which mark out that agenda as distinctive. Third, we aim to demonstrate that this distinctiveness has not been confined to policy formulation but has also been translated into the detail of policy implementation and regulation.

The scope and powers of the Assembly: a social policy body?

The powers of the National Assembly for Wales, as framed in the 1998 Government of Wales Act, amply illustrate the asymmetrical character of devolution in the United Kingdom (Sandford, 2002; McCrone, 2002), for the Welsh Assembly (in contrast to the Scottish Parliament) lacks both primary legislative and tax-varying powers. A growing number of observers have highlighted the deficiencies in the present constitutional arrangements for Wales (see, for example, Rawlings, 2003a, 2003b). Hazell (2003, p 298) puts it this way: “the settlement is precarious, because it is completely dependent on the goodwill of the British government to find legislative time (always in short supply) and their willingness to accommodate Welsh concerns”. Regardless of one’s position on this contentious issue, it is clear that the current constitutional arrangements do provide “greater scope for substantive divergence” – and “ever more policy innovation” (Keating, 2002, p 14).