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1 - Introduction

The Concept of Smart Mixes for Transboundary Environmental Harm

from Part I - Conceptual Approaches to Smart Mixes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 March 2019

By
Judith van Erp ,
Michael Faure ,
Jing Liu ,
Markos Karavias ,
André Nollkaemper  and
Niels Philipsen
Edited by
Judith van Erp ,
Michael Faure ,
André Nollkaemper  and
Niels Philipsen
Judith van Erp
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Michael Faure
Affiliation:
Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
André Nollkaemper
Affiliation:
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Niels Philipsen
Affiliation:
Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
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Summary

An important presumption underlying the smart mixes approach is that ‘complementarity’ adds to the ‘smartness’ of an instrumental mix; however, the questions of what complementarity actually means, in what forms it may occur, and when it can be said to be smart must be answered. This chapter focuses on these questions, considering complementarity between public and private actors in the regulatory and enforcement space from both theoretical and practical perspectives by looking into the goals, nature and dynamics of public-private interaction in several areas. It also assesses when and how public-private complementarity may contribute to an effective smart mix and what contextual factors may affect this. However, public-private regulatory and enforcement regimes will only be truly smart and effective when they are perceived as legitimate – and consequently followed up on – by those affected by them. This chapter argues the importance of taking greater account of the role of the law in this regard, not only to fully explain public-private complementarity, but to fully assess whether this represents a smart mix or not and how the law may impact on the shaping of a smart mix both now and in future, inducing certain limits so as to secure its legitimacy.
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Chapter
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Smart Mixes for Transboundary Environmental Harm , pp. 3 - 24
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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