The systemic failures of Westphalia

This chapter explores the systemic reasons for the relative edge that small interest groups have over larger interest groups in influencing domestic decision making and international negotiations, including decisions concerning the management of transboundary resources. This first part outlines the relevant norms, procedures, and institutions – both domestic and international – that together sustain small-group influence. Based on this analysis, the second part then suggests modalities for reducing the domination of these groups and enhancing the prospects of positive cooperation among all interested groups.

The edge that small groups enjoy in relation to the management of transboundary resources stems from the fact that the adoption processes for policies relating to resources not solely under the control of a single polity are customarily less transparent than adoption policies for wholly domestic matters. The less transparent the decision-making procedures, the greater the opportunities for the executive to camouflage its concession to interest groups. The management of transboundary resources involves treaties rather than domestic prescriptions. The negotiation, implementation, and enforcement of treaties provide vast opportunities for executive slack and, hence, for interest group gains.

Treaty negotiation and ratification

As suggested by Robert Putnam, international negotiations are structured like a two-level game: a simultaneous game played by government representatives at the international level with representatives of foreign governments and at the national level with representatives of domestic interest groups. But the fact that governments play the game does not necessarily imply that they actually control its outcome.