In Tracking Truth, Sherrilyn Roush attempts to breathe new life into Robert Nozick's tracking approach to knowledge. This chapter discusses some problems for Roush's overhaul and then looks at how her new tracking view handles some counterexamples to the original Nozickean view. It also discusses about the examples whose import was that, the view was too strong, in ruling that knowledge was absent in cases in which intuitively it seemed to be clearly present. The chapter presents some important observations about knowledge and lotteries that arise from Roush's analysis. One famous property of Nozickean tracking was that according to Nozick's analysis, knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. Roush's discussion of knowledge and lotteries exposes an important inadequacy in Hawthorne's well-known treatment of these issues and provides a plausible account of Vogel's car-theft case.