Studies of interjurisdictional activities often define contractual arrangements as simply a means to protect local government transactions and procedural rights. Instead, we argue that interlocal agreements constitute a set of special relations, which we refer to as “contractual ties” among governments. Depending on the types of agreements adopted, a network of contractual ties provides local governments with a means of mitigating mutual institutional collective action (ICA) problems by creating potential access to an array of tangible and intangible resources that exist outside each government's organizational boundaries (Gulati 1998). When local officials enter into short- or long-term contracts, their interactions can lead to regular and sophisticated systems of communication (Thurmaier and Wood 2002). It is through repeated interactions that local officials can judge the trustworthiness and legitimacy of their contracting partners, qualities that are crucial for the creation of self-organizing institutions. Contractual ties are embedded in a rich social context in which information and opportunities are exchanged, the risk of opportunistic behavior can be reduced, a cohesive set of preferences can be aligned, and a common interest can be coordinated and mobilized (Maccaulay 1963; Shapiro, Sheppard, and Chraski 1992; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997).

The substantive focus of this study is on the emergence of contractual ties among local government law enforcement departments, emergency medical services, and fire departments within a polycentric governance system (McGinnis 1999). Planning for emergency quick response and recovery efforts often requires local entities to enter into strings of formal and informal agreements.