Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Foreword, by Louis J. Moses
- Acknowledgments
- Note added in proof
- Part I Comparative and Developmental Approaches to Self-awareness
- Part II The Development of Self in Human Infants and Children
- Part III Self-awareness in Great Apes
- Part IV Mirrors and Monkeys, Dolphins, and Pigeons
- 21 The monkey in the mirror: A strange conspecific
- 22 The question of mirror-mediated self-recognition in apes and monkeys: Some new results and reservations
- 23 Mirror behavior in macaques
- 24 Evidence of self-awareness in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus)
- 25 Mirror self-recognition in bottlenose dolphins: Implications for comparative investigations of highly dissimilar species
- 26 Further reflections on mirror-usage by pigeons: Lessons from Winnie-the-Pooh and Pinocchio too
- Part V Epilogue
- Author index
- Subject index
25 - Mirror self-recognition in bottlenose dolphins: Implications for comparative investigations of highly dissimilar species
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Foreword, by Louis J. Moses
- Acknowledgments
- Note added in proof
- Part I Comparative and Developmental Approaches to Self-awareness
- Part II The Development of Self in Human Infants and Children
- Part III Self-awareness in Great Apes
- Part IV Mirrors and Monkeys, Dolphins, and Pigeons
- 21 The monkey in the mirror: A strange conspecific
- 22 The question of mirror-mediated self-recognition in apes and monkeys: Some new results and reservations
- 23 Mirror behavior in macaques
- 24 Evidence of self-awareness in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus)
- 25 Mirror self-recognition in bottlenose dolphins: Implications for comparative investigations of highly dissimilar species
- 26 Further reflections on mirror-usage by pigeons: Lessons from Winnie-the-Pooh and Pinocchio too
- Part V Epilogue
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
To date, the only species to show compelling evidence of self-recognition are humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans. (Only one gorilla, Koko, has displayed self-recognition; see Patterson & Cohn, SAAH17). An important question is whether self-awareness is a uniquely primate (great ape–human) ability or a potential outcome of any sufficiently intelligent system. In order to address this question we can compare tests of self-awareness in primates with another taxonomic group that has diverged extensively from them yet displays a comparable level of neurobehavioral complexity, namely, the Cetacea. Comparisons of primates and cetaceans, therefore, form the basis for a test of convergent cognitive evolution and could set the stage for subsequent tests of the generality of Gallup's (1982) model of self-awareness.
Dolphins are provocative candidates for self-awareness for a number of reasons. They share those neurological, cognitive, and social characteristics with great apes and humans that are generally regarded as having been important for the development of self-awareness in primates. Humans, great apes, and dolphins show similarities across several measures of encephalization, including a high brain-weight / body-weight ratio (Glezer, Jacobs, & Morgane, 1988; Jerison, 1982), extensive cortical surface area (Jerison, 1982), and a high neocortical-volume / total-cortical-volume ratio (Glezer et al., 1988). The bottlenose dolphin is capable of high levels of performance on a variety of auditory learning, artificial language comprehension, and memory tasks comparable to those mastered by chimpanzees (for a review of this literature see Herman, 1986).
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- Self-Awareness in Animals and HumansDevelopmental Perspectives, pp. 380 - 391Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994
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